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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING A CASE STUDY SIMULATION FOR GRADUATE LEVEL
BUSINESS EDUCATION

SEPTEMBER, 1989
GUIDO H, SLANGEN M. A., PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN
BELGIUM
M.A., EDUCATION, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICAL,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
M. S., MANAGEMENT, RENSSELAR POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE,
TROY, NEW YORK
M. A., PSYCHOLOGY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK
EdD., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Byrd L. Jones

Rapid changes in business and technology conditions challenge graduate
level business education. Many graduates will succeed or fail in the business world
on the basis of their ability to deal with this dynamic environment. Multinational
corporations find themselves involved in negotiations entailing issues they never
faced before.
This study presents the design and implementation of a comprehensive
simulation of international business negotiations. The course was designed for
managers who have completed all MBA course requirements, who have at least
three years experience as a manager in any one or two functional areas of busi¬
ness, and who want to learn about the dynamics of international business negotia¬
tions. The focus is on multinational negotiations involving both profit-making
firms and government agencies entering major investments and long-term commit
ments over technically advanced equipment.

The IMAS (International Military Aircraft Sales) course was offered as an
elective course in the MBA curriculum on an experimental basis during the Fall
1987 semester. The experimental design of the course allowed for the necessary
flexibility to try out different types of materials and teaching methods to determine
workable strategies and content. The situation was designed in such a way that no
single teacher could be expert or teach the subject matter. This encouraged stu¬
dents to discriminate between different behaviors and strategies in order to find
the strategy providing the most favorable consequences for all parties involved.
Twenty five participants for the IMAS course were selected from a list of students
who were in their last semester of graduate school, majoring in International Busi¬
ness.

In order to offer the course, the researcher developed over two hundred

pages of materials to support the international negotiations and the roles that
members of the class would play. The course was fifteen weeks in duration, meet¬
ing eight hours on alternate Saturdays for a total of forty five instructional hours.
Students were also required to meet outside scheduled class meetings to prepare
for the sessions or to meet with individual representatives.

The IMAS sumulation presented a rather complex problem, and there was,
in contrast to the textbook problem, usually more than one winning strategy. At
the same time unlike the ’’discussion,” some strategies are clearly much superior to
others. This kind of problem is often encountered by managers in real life situ¬
ations.
The evidence presented in this study supported the hypothesis that experi¬
ence-induced learning is an effective way to resolve ill-structured problems. The
kind of experience-induced learning with which this study was concerned was that
in which the consequences of certain behavior were demonstrated to the students.

vi 1

The author witnessed two basic kinds of changes: changes in cognitive
growth and changes in affective growth. Most students came into this experimen¬
tal course expressing verbal and nonverbal fears about participating in a nonstructured class, but in observations of these students throughout the semester,
some of these fear were assuaged. Students who were frightened began to steadily
develop positive feelings and attitudes about the non-structured sessions.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

iv

ABSTRACT

vi

LIST OF TABLES

.

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES

.

xv

PART ONE
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE STUDY
SIMULATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

.

2

Nature of the Problem .
Purpose of the Study.
Significance of the Study .
Research Design.
Organization of the Study.

3
7
9
11
14

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

.

The Use of the Case Method in Graduate Business Education
Teaching Concepts Derived from Adult Learning Theories ...
Relationship Between Adult Education Principles and the Case
Methodology.
Limitations of the Case Study Methodology for Adult Learners
Definition of Simulations .
Differences between Case Studies and Simulations.
Conclusion
.

18

18
22
27
34
35
37
40

CHAPTER III
TEACHING PROCESS FOR THE SIMULATION.

46

Inroduction
.
Basic Pedagogical Elements .
Instructional Strategies used in Teaching the [MAS Course ...
Preparing for the Negotiating Sessions .
Instructional Climate .

46

49
53

Establishing the Instructor-Student Learning Contract.
Listening and Response: the Key Skill Dimension.
Leading the Discussion Process .
Conclusion
.
CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF A PILOT COURSE IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION (IMAS)
Introduction
.
Overview of the IMAS Course.
Curriculum Materials.
Biographical Sketch:.
Sample Memorandum .
Sample Top Secret Information Memorandum.
Overview of the Design Process.
Teaching Format of the IMAS Course .
Scenario
.
Student Roles .
Role of the Instructor.
The Role of the Managers.
Procedure and Rules .
Grading the Course.
Evaluation of the IMAS Course.
Course Evaluation Instrument.
Course Evaluation Form .

63
64

66
67
74
77
79

83
85
85
86

87
88

90
90
92
93

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Conclusion
.
Recommendations .
Personal Reflections .

x

99
99
101
103

PART TWO
CURRICULUM MATERIALS FOR CASE STUDY SIMULATION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
.
F-18 Wins Spanish Fighter Competition .
The Fighter Competition; Complex Process, High Stakes Game
Objectives and Descriptions .
Opening Observations.
Building the Model .
Step One: Identify the Key Players
.
Step Two: Identify the Key Players’s Goals .
Step Three: Classifying the Goals
.
Step Four: Classify Goal Sets
.
Step Five: Determine Cost/Benefits of Sale .
Step Six: Use Fighter Competition Matrix .

107
107
108
109
109
Ill
Ill
Ill
112
113
113
115

CHAPTER II
COST BENEFITS OF A MAJOR AIRCRAFT SALES AGREEMENT
Political Costs and Benefits .
Political Benefits .
Symbolism and Friendship.
Influence
.
Leverage
.
Political Costs.
Repressive Regimes.
Loss of Prestige.
Hostages
.
Military Costs and Benefits .
Military Benefits.
Support for Allies.
Support for Friends.
Base Rights.
Intelligence Gathering Rights.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
Test Combat Equipment.
Military Costs .
Military Readiness.
Use Against Seller.
Technology Theft by Hostile Powers
Economic Costs and Benefits.

xi

117
117
117
118
118
118
119
119
119
120
120
120
121
121
122
122
122
122
123
123
123
123
124

Selling Country: United States.
Purchasing Country: Spain.

-124

Purchase Made Without Financing and Offset.
Purchase Made With Financing and Offset.
Subnational Perspective. •.
Selling Country: United States.
Purchasing Country: Spain.
Transnational Perspective.
Global Economy.

126
126

Domestic Production & Processing Requirements.
Coproduction Requirements.
Increased Pressure To Cut Defense Costs.

131

CHAPTER

125

127
127
129
130
131

131

132

III

THE SELLERS
.
The United States Government .
Present Goals and Policy of the United States.
United States Corporations and Their Products.
Profits v. Patriotism.
General Dynamics and the F-16.
McDonnell Douglas and the F-L8.
The European Competition.
The Countries and their Aircraft.

136
136
144
146
146
148
149
150
153

CHAPTER IV
THE SALES PROCESS.
161
Overview of a Fighter Sales Competition.
161
Pre-Announcement Phase.
161
Post-Announcement Phase.
163
Combat Capability.
163
Price.
163
Financing
.
164
Offset
164
Coproduction.
164
Licensed Production.164
Subcontractor Productions.
165
Overseas Investment .
165
Country Trade.
165
U.S. Government Impact on the Competition .
166
United States Law.
Preference of Purchaser.
FMS Sale - Process and Review .
Request for Information .

xii

167
168
168
169

Review of Information Request.
Review of Aircraft & Request to Purchase .
Executive Review of LOA Request .
Congressional Review .
Commercial Sale Progress.
Review by the Executive Branch.
FMS Review .
Commercial Review.
Congressional Review .

169

169
170
170
170
171
171
172
172

CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH CASE.
Introduction
.
The Situation
.

176
176
179

APPENDICES
A: TABLES
.
B: FIGURES
.
C: SAMPLE ROLE DESCRIPTIONS.
U.S. GOVERNMENT CORRESPONDENCE.
NEWS RELEASES .
D: WRITTEN CONSENT FORM.

186
196
217
268
279
292

BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

.

xm

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

PAGE

IDENTIFICATION OF KEY PLAYERS BY CATEGORY .. 187
A CONGRESSMAN’S SCORING FOR AN F-18 SALES
AGREEMENT . Igg
FIGHTER COMPETITION MATRIX... 189
IMPACT ON UNITED STATES ECONOMY OF MILITARY
AIRCRAFT SALES. 190
IMPACT OF MILITARY AIRPLANE IMPORTS ON SPANISH
ECONOMY. 191
SPANISH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS . 192
PRIMARY MILITARY AIRCRAFT CONTRACTORS .... 193
GENERAL DYNAMICS POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS ... 194
GENERAL DYNAMICS SALES OF F-16
195

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

1. UNITED STATES INCOME FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT
SALES. 197
2. DIRECT AND INDIRECT JOB-YEARS GAINED BY U.S
ECONOMY FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT
SALES 1972-1982 . 198
3. INCOME LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY FROM AIRPLANE
PURCHASE .

199

4. JOB-YEARS LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY DUE TO NET
AIRPLANE SALES AGREEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES . 200
5. COST REDUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH
FOREIGN SALES . 201
6. GENERAL DYNAMICS F-16 FIGHTING FALCON . 202
7. F/A - 18 HORNET
. 203
8. MIRAGE 2000 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT. 204
9. PANAVIA TORNADO F.2
205
10. LIFE CYCLE COST BREAKDOWN . 206
11. COMPONENTS FOR SPANISH INDUSTRY: F/A/ - 18. . . 207
12. U.S. SALES PROCESS MILITARY SALES TO A NATO
COUNTRY . 208
13. U.S. SALES PROCESS FOR COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
SALE TO NATO. 209
14. KEY PLAYERS IN EXECUTIVE REVIEW PROCESS .... 210
15. FLOW OF REVIEW FOR UNCONTROVERSIAL SALE . 211
16. THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS . 212
17. SPAIN’S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM . 213
18. SPAIN’S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FOR F-16 OFFSET
PROGRAM.. 214
19. SPAIN’S ECONOMIC BENEFITS PROVIDED BY F - 16
OFFSET PROGRAM. 215

xv

PART ONE
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE STUDY
SIMULATION

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This case study presents the design and implementation of a comprehen¬
sive simulation of international business negotiations. The course was designed
for managers who have completed all MBA course requirements, who have at
least three years experience as a manager in any one or two functional areas of
business, and who want to learn about the dynamics of international business
negotiations.

The focus is on multinational negotiations involving both profit¬

making firms and government agencies entering major investments and long¬
term commitments over technically advanced equipment.
The amount and complexities of considerations and the limited knowledge
held by anyone individual raises a key question: how can any facilitator ’’teach”
a case in which no one, including the instructor, can know all the pertinent in¬
formation or the most probable outcome? Many graduate students have consid¬
erable in-depth experience in particular issues—technical design, financing joint
ventures, legal aspects of international agreements, liaison with government
agencies (notably Defense), and so on—which no instructor can or should at¬
tempt to match.

The crucial ’’knowledge” to be dealt with in class puts less

emphasis on data and stresses more the processes of negotiations that bring
requisite knowledge into discussions as needed through a format of co-inquiry.
The instructor/researcher assists to provide enough background information that
students may make appropriate decisions.
An important stimulus to learning can be the way in which a class is con
ducted using a business simulation and the process of co-inquiry.

As stated by
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Jones and Maloy: ”... By bringing

multiple realities and ill-structured prob¬

lems within loosely connected organizational frameworks [classrooms], partner¬
ships encourage reflexive thinking that is appropriate for adult development,
(and learning).” 1
By creating a simulation of a complex international business negotiation,
the author hopes to contribute to educational understandings of how to address
ill-structured problems for advanced students.
Learning to deal with other people in complex situations is a very impor¬
tant managerial skill, as stated by Robert Lawrence Kuhn in his book Frontiers

in Creative and Innovative Management.
. . . We should strive to find ways within the business school setting
to help students acquire chunks that involve, not merely the situation in
cases, but the behavior of fellow students. . . . Creating that experience in
the classroom would be a very valuable part of managerial education.2
Nature of the Problem

The environment in which business operates has changed dramatically
over the past two decades, particularly for United States business.

The Ameri¬

can economy is increasingly becoming interdependent both domestically and in¬
ternationally.

Imports and exports now represent twice as large a portion of

United States gross national product (GNP) as they did two decades ago.

Al¬

most one-fifth of United States’ industrial production is exported, and fully sev¬
enty percent of the goods produced in the United States compete with merchan¬
dise from abroad.3

In 1992, the European Community plans to eliminate all

remaining economic boundaries between the twelve member countries. European
companies will have a home market more populous than the United States or

4

Japan.

New economies of scale will make them stronger in world markets for

technically complex production.4
Management practices and policies that sufficed in the past no longer
provide a competitive advantage to sustain a high standard of living in the
United States.

Continued growth depends on ’’globalization” as that business

will continue to operate in an ever interconnected world.5 Managers will have
to shape organizations that can respond quickly to developments abroad.

As

nations move toward a global economy with industries capable of technological
developments and large-scale output, no firm can presume its capacity to com¬
pete in international markets where technological skills, an industrial workforce
and investment funds are widely available as they now are in Europe, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
New cooperative agreements (coalitions, joint ventures, partnerships, and
so forth) take on special importance during this process of global redistribution
of specialized capital and labor. Foreign companies and investors will become
stronger influences in the United States in the near future.

American business

groups in Washington already worry that foreigners may be outdoing them in
twisting congressional arms. Pat Choate, TRW’s Washington economist, points
out that 152 Japanese companies are paying lobbyists in the Unites States a to¬
tal of $100 million in 1988 to press their causes.6
In addition to economic shifts, new applied technologies have affected
every sector of the labor force.
Recent research and literature

The high technology revolution is all around us.
(Drucker, 1980; Ferguson, 1980; Kantor, Nais-

bitt, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Toffler, 1970, 1980) have identified the
critical issues before us and contrasted the old assumptions of our fading indus¬
trial society with the new assumptions of our modern, technological, informa-

5

tion-based society.

Some of these issues relate to new forms of competition

and new competitors that challenge the commercial position of United States’
firms at home and abroad.

These new competitors (especially Japan) are throw¬

ing the lackluster performance of United States’ firms, particularly those that
manufacture, into sharper relief.

Companies will have to adopt fluid structures

that can be altered as business conditions change.

Other issues refer to tradi¬

tional country-centered economic concepts, such as comparative advantage,
which do not assist firms as they seek achievement in world market leadership.
These authors argue that the United States’ challenge is to catch up to the Japa¬
nese in a variety of technologies and to learn how to gain the benefits of coordi¬
nating among dispersed units.

The alternative is to be trapped by myths of de¬

centralization and competition when new technological developments require bil¬
lions of investment in untried technologies.
With so much change ahead in the 1990s,

business school deans, and

managers who hire MBAs, might well be concerned that United States’ schools
at best have slipped off the leading edge and at worst have become irrelevant.
Xerox vice-chairman William Glavin charged, ’’They are developing middle
managers, but we are not hiring or promoting very many of them.”7
At the same time, disciplined inquiry in human development and adult
learning have provided us new insights on how teaching of adult learners can be
improved. (Cross, 1981; Erickson, 1963; Greenberg, 1981;
ten, 1968; and others).

Kolb, 1984;

Neugar-

They advocate that the purposes and methods of teach¬

ing adults must be adapted to the needs of individuals at different stages in
their development.

From this point of view, adult education is concerned not

with preparing people for life, but rather with helping people to live more suc¬
cessfully.

Thus, if there is an overreaching function of the adult educational
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institution, it is to assist adults to increase their competence, or negotiate transi¬
tions in their social roles (workers, managers, negotiators, etc.), and to assist
them in solving their adult related problems.
Case study methods of teaching adult graduate students have an honor¬
able history of involving students in the learning process, but they need modifi¬
cation to cover ill-structured problems created by this fast-changing environ¬
ment.

These ill-structured problems raise issues of multiple realities, as Mitroff

noted, ”... ill-structured problems not only vary in their definitions from
stakeholder to stakeholder; they vary over time as well.

They are dynamic.

A

solution for one time period and one set of conditions is not necessarily a solu¬
tion for another.”

No scientific study can conclusively resolve such issues:

”.

. . there are either too many data, or too few, never exactly the right amount or
the right kind.”8
The challenge of trying to meet the needs in adult learning is probably
greater than in most professional areas.

The nature of adult learning makes it

one where continuous updating of program offerings is a common occurrence.
In our changing times, continuous learning becomes essential for all.

For those

involved in providing learning programs, challenges will always be present due
to constant change in our complex society.
Since society changes so rapidly, and the implications of these changes
are so great, the adult educator faces a continuous battle in keeping programs
and personal qualifications up to a point where the challenges can be success¬
fully met and overcome.

The growing need for updating curricula and media of

instruction is actually a function of this rapidly accelerated rate of change which
characterizes society today, and the demands that it places on educational sys¬
tems.

What does this mean for our MBA programs?

Clearly, the focus of our
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educational programs must be on producing graduates who will be effective and
comfortable in a global marketplace.

Second, it has become clear that govern¬

mental, political, and social forces—all of which are what we term nonmarket
forces

are becoming major influences on business strategy and managerial ef¬

fectiveness.

Business schools should therefore produce graduates who under¬

stand, influence, and harness the nonmarket forces that impact business effec¬
tiveness.
Purpose of the Study
Teachers decide what materials and methods they will use so that stu¬
dents have a useful learning experience.

Case methods and business simula¬

tions are two effective tools to bring realistic decision making problems into the
classroom.9

Most fields of professional study have an abundance of text books

designed to

introduce a body of knowledge that informs professional practices.

Apparently case studies and simulations in graduate business education depend
on more local knowledge and instructional strategies.

Few college professors

have formal training in developing case studies and simulations.

For these rea¬

sons, the case simulation methodology, although used in most business schools,
has received little or no attention in the professional literature of adult educa¬
tion. 10
In most universities, where case studies research has been carried out,
individual professors have the responsibility for developing new case study mate¬
rials.

Some professors collect data from their own experiences, others use re¬

search assistants or case writers.
learns by doing.”

The normal approach seems to be that ’’one

Most training occurs on the job and many instructors find it

difficult to use a case developed by another faculty member.
quality expectations vary considerably.

Productivity and

Most research assistants work on the
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task of case writing for about a year and then turn to other activities. As a re¬
sult, there is a high turnover of personnel. These factors add to the problem
that casewriting, although a major and continuing commitment in the field of
graduate education, is a fairly disorganized activity. 11
This study, therefore, will explore the development and use of a case
study using simulation methodologies in graduate business education. Based on
research in the field of adult learning, the study will document the appropriate¬
ness of long-term simulations for presenting ill-structured problems.
Second, the principles developed in part one will be applied in part two
to the development of a comprehensive simulation related to the field of Interna¬
tional Military Aircraft Sales (IMAS).
Taking mastery of content for granted, the author will develop what is
being called a process-dominant simulation. 12 The focus of this comprehensive
simulation is primarily on the dynamics involved in an international business ne¬
gotiation. The simulation creates a model of a competition between firms in¬
volved in the sale of military aircraft to United States allies. Most salient strate¬
gic elements are present in the simulation, but many thousands of factual or op¬
erational details, which must be attended to in reality, are absent. This facili¬
tates a time compression so that students can participate in the entire life cycle
of the negotiations over a relatively short period. Enough data will be included
on the knowledge requirements of other business courses that one would hope
the students will appreciate the academic circumstances in which the teaching
problem has developed.
Another critical assumption of this study is the belief that student
growth, not instructor ego gratification, is essential for the effective use of
simulations. In the intensity of the classroom drama, many teachers may seek

9

to play center stage, with the class as their supporting cast; but the goal is adult
learning of complex processes and information. A summary of student evalu¬
ations of their learning experience will be an integral part of this study. As
stated by Darkenwald:
Adults who have many and varied experiences and who daily make
decisions affecting their lives and the lives of their dependents are capable
as well of participating in the planning and implementation of their learning.
They are also the ones who can accurately judge the value of a learning ac¬
tivity and its relevance to their lives. 13
Significance of the Study

Many events, in the form of changes and advancements, confront and af¬
fect professionals in the practice of their profession. For the professional who
wishes to stay abreast of these events, it appears imperative that new ideas be
examined, new knowledge be gained, and new and different concepts, princi¬
ples, and processes be reviewed carefully so that the professional can perform
duties at the best possible level. In other words, many forces and factors come
to bear on educators which force them to be continuous learners; therefore, pro¬
fessionals must continue their educational experiences after entering a profes¬
sion.
The adult graduate education profession is, of course, no exception.
Many advancements in theory, knowledge, and practice as well as dynamic
changes in society, curriculum structures, values, cultural orientations, and edu¬
cational thrusts confront teachers and administrators in their efforts to provide
adults with the best learning experience possible. Adult educators, like other
professionals, must define self-improvement plans to keep abreast of events that
enter their field of endeavor.
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To do an effective job, professionals have needs which are as varied and
complex as the changes to which they are subjected. The treatments and reso¬
lution of these needs and concerns can also be a varied and complex process.
However, to do a professional job one must continue the updating process and
focus on the specific concerns perceived by the individual professional.

Since

treatments of professional problems and concerns will probably be varied, a set
of alternatives may have to be offered.

No set precription will affect all profes¬

sional educators.
This study is devoted to a discussion and explication of alternative ways
of teaching graduate business education.

The case study and simulation delivery

systems for learning experiences is the focus of this study.

Much of this disser¬

tation deals with what an individual professor can do for self-improvement.
This is essential.

Adult educators are devoted to helping others grow and real¬

ize their potential, but not enough is done in the area of developing appropriate
curriculum materials to assist the individual educator.
This study should be of value to those who wish to improve their curricu¬
lum delivery system, and should be helpful to those entering the field.

It also

has significance for experienced instructors who would benefit from a fresh ex¬
amination of efforts to improve competencies to meet the needs of students.
That is, this case study may encourage reflection over teaching methods even
when it does not have direct applications in classrooms.

11

Research Design
In order to delineate the process which we label a case study, as ”a slip¬
pery term,”14 it is first advisable to understand what a case study in social re¬
search is not:
1.

Case Study

is not the name for a standard methodological package.

2. Case studies should not be equated with observational studies, partici¬
pant or otherwise.
3. Case studies are not simply pre-experimental.15 The case method is,
according to Adelman and Associates, a study of an instance in action.16
A case study focuses on the understanding of human behavior in its own frame
of reference and how people ”go about the task of seeing, describing, and ex¬
plaining order in the world in which they live. ”17
Defined more formally, a case method is:
... an in-depth investigation of a given topic resulting in a complete,
well organized picture or unit. The scope may encompass the entire life cy
cle or only a selected segment; it may concentrate upon specific factors or
take in the totality of elements and events.18
The case study method has also a number of advantages, particularly as
a teaching methodology for adult learners. These include: (a) data is ’’strong in
reality”, but difficult to organize; (b) the process allows the subtleties and com¬
plexities of each case or ’’instance” to be seen and understood; 19 (c) a proc¬
ess that can reveal complexities and alternative modes of interpretation; (d) the
possible provision of data is so deep and rich, so thickly descriptive that it is
useful for subsequent reanalysis and reinterpretation; (e) rootedness in the eve¬
ryday ’’real world” that allows data to be fed back to stimulate and show direc-
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tion to action; (f) because the presentation is in a publicly accessible form, it
has the ’’capability of serving multiple audiences.”20
This study explores the use and application of the case studies and simu¬
lation methodologies in graduate business education.
its functions are those of descriptive research.

As an exploratory study,

Most educational research meth¬

ods are descriptive; that is, they set out to describe and to interpret what is.
Descriptive research, according to Best,
... is concerned with conditions or relationships that exist; prac¬
tices that prevail; beliefs, points of view, or attitudes that are held;

proc¬

esses that are going on; effects that are being felt; or trends that are devel¬
oping.21

This design is suited for, it becomes apparent that this design is required
by the specific purpose of this study:

to explore the use of, and to design a

case study simulation for teaching graduate business education.

In choosing this

format, the researcher has moved away from the realm of social science.

This

study will, therefore, be dealing with ’’social (i.e.person-made) artifacts;”

to

the extent that these are held to be different from physics and chemistry (i.e.,
the natural sciences), it is quite legitimate to address them with different proce¬
dures.’^

Cohen and Mannion, state that descriptive research ’’helps us understand
. . . not the products of scientific inquiry, but the process itself. ”23 Descriptive
research also has its methodological weaknesses: (a) the methodology itself is
eclectic:24 although there are a number of procedures and techniques that are
commonly employed, they must be ’’customized to fit the exigencies of the situ¬
ation. ”25 This customizing constrains the skills of the researcher and often de¬
mands experience in its effective execution: (b) descriptive research is ’’particu-
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larly vulnerable to subjective biases,”26 so ’’there is much in the technique of
data-gathering, observing and reporting . . . that is left to the judgment of the
evaluator.27 Similarly, ’’what an observer collects as data is dependent on what
he/she defines as relevant. ”28

Thus, the opportunities for insight in social re¬

search are also opportunities for subjectivity or even prejudice.29

(c) Social

research is severely limited in generalizability, since the focus of the research is
depth and not breadth.30 Overall, the potential benefits of using the descriptive
research methodology in studying the case study method of teaching seem to
outweigh the disadvantages.
Nonetheless, safeguards to offset the effects of the limitations of this re¬
search methodology have been incorporated in the design of this study. In view
of the subject matter under consideration, descriptive and topical methods of
presentation will be used in this study.
In the preparation of this project, the writer made use of publicly avail¬
able information found in the libraries of the Hartford Graduate Center, United
Technologies, McDonnell Douglas General Dynamics, Dassault-Breguett, and
TRW corporations, the National Archives of the United States, and the library of
Congress.
Both primary and secondary sources have been consulted. Primary
sources included interviews with company officials and managers who had been
involved in actual negotiations.

These interviews gave the author a unique in¬

sight into the day-to-day workings and attitudes of companies all over the
world.

These interviews were used to construct the negotiation process in part II

of this study.

Secondary sources have consisted of commentaries on actual pro¬

posals, found in books, periodicals and newspapers.

In addition the writer has

utilized a personal collection of related references such as student papers and
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teaching notes.

The case study methodology used as a research method in so¬

cial sciences may not be confused with the case method of teaching. They both
have the same object of study in that they both describe actual situations, but
the focus and applications are different.

The case study methodology of re¬

search does focus on the situation as a tool for the researcher’s data collection
and analysis.

The case study method of teaching attempts to integrate theory

and practice.

Because case studies closely reflect reality, they are eminently

suitable for preparing business managers.

This methodology suits the business

school’s mission of training men and women not only to know, but to act.

Organization of the Study
Chapter I contains a broad introduction to some major contemporary
business issues and the impact they create on graduate adult business education,
together with a statement of the problem addressed in this study.

Basic as¬

sumptions upon which the study is based and the significance of the study are
also reviewed.
Chapter II will examine literature on the case studies and simulation
methodology in graduate business education.

This chapter also reviews related

literature from the disciplines of adult learning theory and teaching methodolo¬
gies. The advantages and disadvantages of both methods will form the basis for
the selection of one of these methods as being more effective method for deal¬
ing with ill-structured problems.

The conclusions will form the framework for

the writing of the curriculum materials for the international business negotiation
simulation in PART II.
Chapter III describes the instructional process used in the teaching of the
International Military Aircraft Sales (IMAS) course.

Chapters IV and V describe

the pilot course in international negotiations (MAS), the design strategy of the
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course and the evaluation method used, as well as the author’s recommendation
for future research related to this study. All materials for the course were de¬
signed by the author. The author will use student reaction evaluation in order
to obtain data how the participants responded to the simulation as it took place.
The actual simulation in International Military Aircraft Sales was first used in
the fall of 1987 at the Hartford Graduate Center, a graduate business school
where the author is employed as an Associate Professor. A summary of student
comments of the teaching process will be included in Chapter m, not to justify
what we are doing but to improve teaching and learning through the use of
comprehensive business case simulations.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The Use of the Case Method in Graduate Business Education
Over fifty years ago the Harvard Business School pioneered in adapting
case discussions from the disciplines of law and medicine.

The case method

has long been referred to as an integral part of the school’s business administra¬
tion curriculum. 1
Powell and Bennet, Philosophies of Adult Education (1960), delineated sev¬
eral beliefs shared by most adult educators: (1) adults are different from young
people;

(2) education is an activity that emphasizes learning rather than teach¬

ing; (3) there is some interplay between the intellectual and emotional elements
in learning; (4) the primary vehicle of adult learning is the group;

and (5) em¬

phasis is placed on applications versus theory.2
Case studies attempt to integrate theory and practice.

Because cases

closely reflect reality, they are eminently suitable for preparing business manag¬
ers.

This methodology suits the business school’s mission of training men and

women not only to know, but to act.
Today case studies are included in the management development pro¬
grams of hundreds of companies here and abroad.

Developing skills and abili¬

ties in thinking logically and working in harmony with others are the essential
aims of the case method.

Business and industry have always needed executives

and middle management personnel who can think for themselves and who can
get work done through others.
One of Harvard’s early professors, Arthur Stone Dewing, philosophically
compared the theoretical method (lecture) with the case method of teaching in
the business schools:
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This method [lectures] has great advantages. Above all, lecturing
is efficient, it is also economical of the time, energy, and the patience of
instructor and student. Further, this method produces brilliant results. A
student trained under it seems to possess a sureness, a precision, a firm¬
ness of grasp remarkable for the relatively short time which he is com¬
pelled to spend on acquiring his knowledge.
The other method [case study] starts with an entirely different pur¬
pose and ends with an entirely different result.
. . . Business people must be able to meet in action the problems
arising out of new situations of an ever changing environment. Educa¬
tion, accordingly, would consist of acquiring facility to act in the presence
of new experience. It asks not how people may be trained to know, but
how people be trained to act.3
In more pragmatic terms, E. Lawrence Lowell underscored the relation¬
ship between classroom discussion and the day-to-day work of a businessper¬
son.
The case method of business training is deemed the best prepara¬
tion for business life, because the decision of questions by the banker,
the manufacturer, the merchant or the transporter consists of discerning
the essential elements in a situation and applying to the principles of or¬
ganization and trade. His most important work consists of solving prob¬
lems and for this he must have the faculty of rapid analysis and synthe¬
sis.4
This emphasis on problem solving suggests the requirement that informa¬
tion be presented that is realistic, yet neither obvious nor ambiguous. Individu¬
als both listen and express their own views. Bertrand Fox further emphasized
the individual learning opportunity in a group’s discussion process.
The method provides an opportunity to gain confidence in one’s
own judgment, but also a degree of humility as well. It also provides a
most invaluable opportunity to learn how far one can go by rigorous logi¬
cal analysis of one or another dimension of the problem and the extent
to which judgment comes into play when many factors which have no
common denominator must be weighed.5
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John Dewey defined education as the reconstruction and reorganization of
experience, which increases one’s ability to direct the course of subsequent ex¬
perience. It is both active and passive.

That is, education or experience is not

just what happens to a person, but also what that person does. It is more pre¬
cisely, the interaction of the individual with the environment.

Dewey’s theory

supports the Dewing-Fox position, for his theory of learning supports a discus¬
sion-oriented teaching methodology for adults.
As Jonas Soltes notes, Dewey believed the learner is like an explorer who
maps an unknown territory:
The explorer, like the learner, does not know terrain and adven¬
tures his journey holds in store for him.

He has yet to discover moun¬

tains, deserts, and water holes and to suffer fever, starvation, and other
hardships.

Finally, when the explorer returns from his journey, he will

have a hard-won knowledge of the country he has traversed. Then, and
only then, can he produce a map of the region.

The map, like a text¬

book, is an abstraction which omits his thirst, his courage, his despairs
and triumphs—the experiences which made his journey personally mean¬
ingful.

The map only records the relationships between landmarks and

terrain, the logic of the features without the psychological revelations of
the journey itself.

To give the map to others (as a teacher might) is to

give the results of an experience, not the experience by which the map
was produced and became personally meaningful to the producer. . . edu¬
cational growth consists of combining past experience with present expe¬
riences in order understand future experiences.

To grow, the individual

must continually reorganize and reformulate past experiences in the light
of new experiences in a cohesive fashion.6
A review of literature on adult learning and the case method of teaching
supports the position that to the extent that students can learn business practice
in the classroom, there are limits, the case method enables them to discover and
develop their own unique framework for approaching, understanding, and deal¬
ing with complex business problems.?
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Interest in teaching methodologies for adult graduate education has in¬
creased dramatically during the last two decades, fueled in part by a dozen or
more private and governmental study commission reports on the current state of
academia.8 A major conclusion of these reports is that teaching needs to be
improved. The Association of American Colleges sums up the point: "The fac¬
ulty should concern itself with the quality of college teaching on which, after all,
the effectiveness of any curriculum depends. We must assure that future college teachers are better prepared to teach.”9
Claude Mathis, director of the Center for the Teaching Professions at
Northwestern University, reminds us that the teacher is essential to any such
revitalization process. In a recent editorial in the New York Times, Fred
Hechinger points out that:
Education is the teacher you remember after you’ve forgotten the
others. . . . Changing the way schools are organized and introducing tech¬
nology to provide much of the instruction may increase the chances for
serendipity to provide what is missing in schools but the ultimate reform
must come from the teacher. 10
These pleas for more attention to teaching have been accompanied by a
questioning of higher education’s traditional dependence on lecturing. Both
students and teachers are demanding greater use of active, student-involved
teaching methods. 11

Interest in discussion teaching is clearly on the rise

throughout the academic community. For example, a special panel convened by
the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) urged medical schools
to provide more active learning experiences by reducing lecture time, emphasiz¬
ing independent learning skills, and requiring less factual memorization. Spe¬
cifically the report recommended that:
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. . . medical schools should establish programs to assist members
of the faculty to expand their teaching capabilities. . . . Faculty members
who guide student into independent learning must do more than merely
transmit information. They must challenge medical students to be in¬
volved actively in their own education rather than being passive recipients
of prepackaged information. To create such a learning environment, fac¬
ulty members will require assistance in developing the skills they need to
be effective and stimulating guides and and mentors. 12
This study creates a complex case to enable faculty members to guide
student into independent learning rather than merely transmitting information.
Most salient strategic elements are present in the simulation, but many thou¬
sands of factual or operational details, which must be attended to in reality, are
absent. Enough data will be included on the knowledge requirements of other
business courses that one would hope the students will appreciate the academic
circumstances in which the teaching problem has developed.
Teaching Concepts Derived from Adult Learning Theories

Carl Rogers made one of the sharpest breaks between theorists who
based their teaching concepts based primarily on studies of children and those
theorists who derived their theories of learning primarily from studies of adults:
Teaching, in my estimation, is a vastly over-rated function. Hav¬
ing made such a statement, I scurry to the dictionary to see if I really
mean what I say. Teaching means ’to instruct’. Personally I am not
much interested in instructing another in what he should know or think.
’To impact knowledge or skill’. My reaction is, why not be more efficient,
using a book or programmed learning? ’To make to know.’ Here my
hackles rise. I have no wish to make anyone know something.

’To show

guide, direct.’ As I see it, too many people have been shown, guided,
directed. So I come to the conclusion that I do mean what I say. Teach¬
ing is, for me, a relatively unimportant and vastly overvalued activity. 13
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Rogers explained that in his view teaching and the imparting of knowl¬
edge make sense in an unchanging environment, which is why it has been an
unquestioned function for centuries. ’’But if there is one truth about modern
man, it is that he lives in an environment which is continually changing,” and
therefore the aim of education must be the facilitation of learning.14 He defines
the role of the teacher as that of a facilitator of learning. The critical element in
performing this role is the personal relationship between the facilitator and the
learner, which in turn is dependent on the facilitator’s possessing three addi¬
tional attitudinal qualities: (1) realness and genuineness, (2) nonposssessive car¬
ing, prizing, trust, and respect, and (3) empathic understanding and sensitive
and accurate listening.15
He provides the following guideline for a facilitators of learning:
1. Facilitators have much to do with the initial mood or climate of the
group or class experience.
2. Facilitators help to elicit and clarify the purposes of the individuals in
the class as well as the more general purposes of the group.
3. They rely upon the desire of each student to implement those purposes
which have meaning for them as the motivational force behind significant learn¬
ing.
4. They endeavor to organize and make easily available the widest possi¬
ble range of resources for learning.
5. They regard themselves as flexible resources to be utilized by the
group.
6. In responding to expressions in the classroom group, they accept both
intellectual content and the emotionalized attitudes, endeavoring to give each as-
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pect the approximate degree of emphasis which it has for the individual and the
group.
7. As the accepted classroom climate becomes established, facilitators are
able increasingly to become participant learners, members of the group, express¬
ing their views as those in one individual only.
8. In their functioning of facilitators of learning, they endeavor to recog¬
nize and accept their own limitations. 16
Although Maslow does not spell out his conception of the role of teacher,
several followers of both Rogers and Maslow have experimented with translating
their theories into classroom behavior. George Brown, for example, described
the development of confluent education—the term for the integration of flowing
together of affective and cognitive elements in individual and group learning—in
the Ford-Esalen Project in Affective Education in California in the late 1960s.
Elizabeth Drews described an experiment to test a new program designed to fos¬
ter self-initiated learning and self-actualization, in which teachers defined their
roles as facilitators of learning. Their conclusions can best be summarized us¬
ing Goodwin Watson’s Guidelines for the facilitation of learning:
1. Behavior which is rewarded, from the learner’s point of view, is more
likely to recur.
2. How ’’ready” we are to learn something new is contingent upon the
confluence of diverse—and changing—factors, some of which include:
a. adequate existing experience to permit the new to be learned;
b. adequate significance and relevance for the learner to engage in
learning activity;
c. freedom from discouragement, the expectation of failure, or threats
to physical, emotional, or intellectual well-being;
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3. Genuine participation intensifies motivation, flexibility, and rate of
learning. 17
Contrasting adult learning with childhood learning also offers one means
for exploring the unique characteristics of adult learners. Malcolm Knowles has
proposed adoption of the term andragogy, the ’’art and science of helping adults
learn, ”18 to be distinguished from pedagogy, the instruction of children. Andrag¬
ogy is grounded on four assumptions, that pinpoint some of the salient features
of adulthood:
1. As a person matures his or her self-concept moves from one of a
dependent personality toward one of self-directed human being.
2. An adult communicates a growing reservoir of experience, a rich
resource for learning. For an adult, personal experiences establish self-identity
and so are highly valued;
3. The readiness for an adult to learn is closely related to the develop¬
mental tasks of his or her social role; and,
4. There is a change in time perspective as individuals mature, from one
of future application of knowledge to immediacy of application; thus an adult is
more problem-centered than subject-centered in learning. 19
The preceding principles drawn from the research on adult learning theo¬
ries are helpful as a set of guidelines for a teacher in a graduate business
school setting and are the foundation of the case study methodology of teaching.
These assumptions encapsulate much of the literature about adult learn¬
ing and development. The first two—that adults are independent beings and
have forged their identities from unique personal experience—are drawn from
humanistic philosophy and psychology and readily generate implications for
teaching adults. The third and fourth assumptions, dealing with the adult’s
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readiness and orientation to learning, provide the links to understanding adult
learning from a psychological developmental perspective. Some knowledge of
both the humanist and developmental orientations, when combined with princi¬
ples related to the learning process itself, offer adult educators an understanding
of the complex relationship between adulthood and learning.
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Relationship Between Adult Education Principles and the Case Methodology

Fundamental principles of adult education are closely related to charac¬
teristics of the case method as shown in the following parallels based on Jack R.

Gibbs’s article on Learning Theory, 20 and David Ulrich’s article: The Case

Method.
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PRINCIPLES OF ADULT EDUCATION

THE CASE METHOD OF TEACHING

Learning must be problem centered. . .
the problem must arise in the experi¬
ences, perplexities, doubts, and thinking
of the learner; the problem must be a
problem of the learner.

Independent, constructive thinking
on the part of the student is es¬
sential . . .

Learning must be experience centered; the
teacher must provide the optimal kind of
experiences that will relate to the problem
of the learner,

Developing rapport with the class is. .
. the deliberate creation of an envi¬
ronment in which the students can
learn.

The learner must be free to look at the
experience. The learning climate
should be permissive, supportive, ac¬
cepting, free, spontaneous, reality-cen¬
tered, or person-centered.

In a democratic and permissive atmos¬
phere the teacher will get help from
the students in getting away from the
unilateral way of teaching.

Experience must be meaninful to the
learner. A shared responsibility of the
learner and the teacher is to create
and environment in which the learner
can see meaning.

The teacher should deal with those
aspects of the case which are
meaningful to the learner.

The goals must be set and the search
organized by the learner. Active
learning is a more effective learning
mechanism than passive learning.

Case studies are student centered; the
desired result of student participation
is achieved by the opening of free
communication between students and
other students and between students
and the teacher.
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Schmidt and Svenson stated:
The case study provides an opportunity for each individual to ar¬
ticulate his/her assumptions, attitudes, and theories and to compare them
with those of others in the group. . . . Individuals in the learning group
read the description of a real or simulated problem situation. Through
discussion they share ideas on the key elements of the problem, princi¬
ples to be followed in solving it, and action which they would take if con¬
fronted by such a situation.22
Kidd pointed out that:
. . . What makes a particular case useful is its reality, its rele¬
vance to problems faced by others, the completeness of available data,
and the significance of the issues and values at stake. . . . The case
method has applications particularly to fields where there are few or no
final answers, and where judgment is the essential quality. Many of the
characteristics of a small discussion group must be present if there is to
be genuine learning. Its reality and the efforts to state principles in
terms of good practice in real situations makes it an approach of par¬
ticular value to many adult students.23
Each of the following purposes for which cases are commonly used, ac¬
cording to Miller, impose somewhat different requirements on their construction:
It is important to . . . specify the learning objective or we find our¬
selves without some crucial element in the materials a lack of which is
not exposed until a group is engaged in discussing [the case].24
In view of these similarities it is surprising that the case method or the
simulation method is not dealt with in more detail and more frequently in the
literature of adult education. Based on this close parallelism, case methods
seem ideally suited for adults. They have more experience to draw from in ar¬
riving at judgments based on specific information. A simulation allows knowl¬
edgeable adults to share their information and to arrive at group responses to
developing negotiations.

29

In discussing the need for ’’self-education,” or active participation by the
learner in the process of learning, A. Lawrence Lowell wrote: ” ’Self-educa¬
tion’ is based on the principle that, beyond the mechanical elements, noone can
be really educated against his will, or without his own active effort.”

25

In short, learners share actively in the task of learning; they must create
for themselves the ideas that the instructor seeks to communicate. The process
of learning is not one of absorption or of fitting pieces of knowledge into one
pattern. The process of learning is truly one of creation. Other adult educa¬
tional theorists describe the case method of teaching as an effort to blend cogni¬
tive and affective learning modes. Any attempt to capture this dynamic, the
subtle ebb and flow of interacting ideas between teacher and student, is difficult
at best, perhaps impossible. This may be why the phenomenon of the case
method has seldom been analyzed or described in adult education literature.26
A review of the fundamental principles underlying the case method of
teaching may help explain better the relationship between adult learning and the
case method of teaching.
1. The primacy of situation analysis. For both teachers and students of
business, the primary consideration is ’’the law of the situation,” to use sociolo¬
gist Mary Parker Follett’s pithy

phrase.27

Analyzing a specific situation forces

students to deal with the ”as is”, not the ’’might be.” They must confront the
intractability of reality: an absence of needed information, the ever present con¬
flict of objectives, and the imbalance between needs and resources. The man¬
ager must and can act effectively under those circumstances; the intern manager
is also expected to do so.
This situational orientation, moreover, insistently reminds students of the
vast gap between simplistic, global prescriptions and what can be said to a spe-
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cific manager at a specific time on a specific issue. The goal of the case dis¬
cussion is to help students develop the capacity to deal with the situation in a
specific way, not to deliver commentaries on the general. From experience gar¬
nered in many case discussions, students will in fact derive generalizations, but
they are stated tentatively, tested frequently, and always with care.
2. The imperative of relating analysis and action.
The traditional academic accomplishment has been to know; the adult’s
has been to act. The case method seeks to combine these two activities. The ap¬
plication of knowledge, always partial, to the complexities of a business prob¬
lem, never capable of complete solution, is the manager’s primary task. Case
discussions are crude mirrors of reality. The class considers action in tandem
with analysis whenever possible. The minimum end product of a case discussion
is an understanding of what needs to be done and how it can be accomplished.
At its best, the case discussion will include an exploration of how a plan can be
translated into committed behavior of a group of managers.
The importance of action influences the entire case discussion, which fo¬
cuses on the practical and doable, the partial but accomplishable, and the neces¬
sity for dealing with first-step accommodations rather than waiting for complete
solutions. Long term cases and simulations give students an opportunity to
build relationships which enable them to work more effectively together, gather
specific information and develop data bases needed for the negotiation sessions.
3. The necessity of student involvement.
The active intellectual and emotional involvement of students is the hall¬
mark of case teaching. Involvement offers the most dramatic visible contrast
with a stereotypical lecture class. In the educational process of managers,
where knowledge and application must be related, student involvement is essen-
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tial. One does not learn to play golf by reading a book, but by taking club in
hand and actually hitting the golf ball - preferably under a pro’s watchful eye.
A practice green is not a golf game, and a case is not real life. Fortunes, repu¬
tations and careers are not made or lost in the classroom, but case discussion
is a useful subset of reality; it can present a micro-cosm of actual managerial
life. It also allows students to practice the application of real-life management
skills: observation, listening, diagnosing, deciding, and intervening in group proc¬
esses to achieve desired objectives.
Case discussion demands total involvement in a variety of ways, first and
foremost in the give-and-take of class discussion—with mind as well as vocal
cords. It insists that students practice managerial skills both in class and in all
other academic activities, taking responsibility for their own self-education and
for the development of their colleagues. Managers are, after all, both teachers
and students in their everyday work.
4. A nontraditional instructor role.
A teacher thoroughly experienced in traditional methodologies may well
find case teaching difficult to understand. ”As far as I can see the instructor’s
job is to give an intelligent grunt of approval, ask some questions, and make a
summary statement,” said one. Another commented, ”It’s a blinking bit of in¬
tellectual chaos and so darned inefficient! Why let the class ’muck around’ for
an hour to work through a point when I can explain it in a few minutes. They
call that teaching? Just what is the instructor doing?” Guiding a process of dis¬
covery, an advocate of the method might reply.
Some instructors, unfortunately, use the case method in masquerade
form. While espousing openness and collaboration, they require students to fol¬
low their teaching plan point by point, with drumbeat cadence. It may seem as
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if the student’s assignment is to come up with the missing words in an aca¬
demic crossword puzzle—the instructor’s teaching plan. Such pedagogical fail¬
ures give ammunition to the critics of the case method of teaching, for the
badly executed case discussion can be a disaster: inefficient in use of time and
ineffective in student motivation and learning.
Even if teachers are masters of case method instruction, it is difficult to
say what they are doing.28

We all appreciate the difficulty of describing what

an artist ’’does.” What artists and instructors do or do not do, when and how,
may be as important as what they know. The artistry of teaching may be ar¬
cane, but some of its mystery can be clarified, as Professor Kenneth Andrews
thoughtfully describes the case instructor’s role:
The instructors provide the impromptu services which any group
discussion requires. They keep the proceedings orderly. They should be
able to ask questions which invite advance in group thinking and at the
same time reveal the relevance of the talk that has gone before. They
need the ability to weave together the treads of individual contribution
into a pattern which not only they themselves but the entire class can
perceive.
They need the sense of timing which tells that the discussion is
not moving fast enough to make good use of available time or is racing
away from the comprehension of half the class. They exercise control
over the essentially ’’undirected” activity, but at the same time they keep
out of the way, lest they prevent the class from making discoveries new
also to the instructor. Since unpredictable developments always distin¬
guish real learning, they examine the class rather than the subject.29
The instructor’s role in this kind of learning process differs in several as¬
pects from the traditional practice.30 First, the task is not so much to teach
students as to encourage learning. This shift in mission affects a wide range of
instructional activities, from preparing class material and planning class sessions
to measuring what the course has accomplished.
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Second, the teacher must be willing to forgo the role and status of the
center-stage, intellectually superior authority figure.3l

As discussion leaders

they are simply members of the learning group, albeit with a unique position.
Gragg wisely stated that

. .Teachers Also Must Learn. ”32 in addition to pro¬

viding information and monitoring the quality of student analysis and presenta¬
tion, the instructor must facilitate a process of co-inquiry. A primary responsi¬
bility, therefore, is the maintenance of the quality of those paths of inquiry.
Third, the instructor must be both teacher and practitioner. Students
might accept that one can legitimately discuss the Battle of Waterloo without
having the capacity to command a brigade of infantry. But instructors who try
to develop student’s skill in observation, listening, communication, and decision
making will be expected to practice what they are preaching and vice versa.33
While the case method has many advantages of self-education and self¬
development, the method is also seen by some educators and management
training directors to have certain limitations. It puts great responsibility on the
participants and on the skill of the instructor. This often presents an obstacle to
the less outgoing, who need to rely on more structured forms of instruction.
The case method often frustrates participants who seek "the right answer" and
who look to the teachers for firm direction. But a teacher using the case
method is required to help each member to deal with the reality of their own
experience. A skillful leader must gradually lead the dependent and sometimes
doubting participants to defend his/her own ideas independently of the teacher.
The adult educator who can achieve this movement from dependency to inde¬
pendent thought and action is needed today.
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Limitations of the Case Study Methodology for Adult Learners
The standard mode of using cases has historically been the lecture and
discussion method,but that approach has some limitations that simulations may
overcome, the most critical problem, is that the material is presented sequen¬
tially by the lecturers. They must select an appropriate place to start in describ¬
ing a complex topic, and then must try to work their way through to the end.
With such a linear approach, it is frequently difficult for the learner to grasp
the nature of the whole. As R. H. Rhyne suggested, it is like an inchworm try¬
ing to study the Mona Lisa by crawling over it, viewing one piece of the paint¬
ing at a time.34 Linear approaches do not eventually yield a good appreciation
of ill-structured Problems. This is particularly so in instances in which one is
trying to teach an appreciation of the simultaneity of events and actions.
Likewise, case studies usually entail comments, questions, and answers,
following the lecture by the teacher. Often such discussions begin with the re¬
marks of the most loquacious person in the group, rather than those of the one
with the most important comments.

Similarly, the time devoted to consideration

of given topics may be more closely tied to the persistence of the speaker (and
the hesitation of the instructor to cut him or her off), than to the relative impor¬
tance of the comment. In addition, discussions rarely begin with the first points
made in the presentation and proceed through the points in the order in which
were made; thus in many cases the questions flow in no logical order.
A third, related shortcoming of the case method or any other use of ver¬
bal models, is that the form is one in which it is difficult to present system char¬
acteristics clearly. The multiple connections and consequences of a given ele¬
ment or action are difficult to convey verbally. While it is often impossible to
understand a social system, by simply immersing oneself in it, because the com-
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plexity is too confusing, the verbal description too often suffers from oversimpli¬
fication.

For example, a case study on international business negotiations may

include discussion on the functions and operations of the company, the Senate,
the chief negotiator and the balance of power among them; then it may turn to
processes such as lobbying and bargaining.

Each of these can be looked at one

at a time, and the listener may have a difficult time piecing the parts together.
Fourth, without prior experience, words may not call up such imagery, or
they

may call up different imagery to different members of the class.

This

symbiotic confusion is particularly likely to arise in cross-cultural situations and
where case studies developed in one society are employed in another.

Because

business cultures differ from society to society, home culture perceptions of the
task environment may be inappropriate when dealing with people whose opera¬
tions are located abroad.

This societal environment includes the wider patterns

of social relationships and of cultural definitions of social life in a society: lan¬
guage, social organization, law, and politics.
Definition of Simulations

The best way to define a simulation is to think in terms of a large-scale
technological system, such as a wind tunnel for testing aircraft and training pi¬
lots, or a televised simulation of spacecraft vehicles and their maneuvers.
These are models of systems—in the former case, showing the wind elements
and effects of these on aircraft, and, in the latter case, showing a technological
system built to travel and perform operations in space. In neither of these
simulations is the entire system represented; that is, they are not just scaled
down

versions of the larger referent systems.

fied and others are omitted.

Rather, some aspects are simpli¬

Thus the simulated spacecraft was constructed so
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that the dimensions are scaled accurately to the original, but the weight of the
model is likely to have been a matter of no concern to the modelers.
As changes take place in the referent system, they likewise take place in
the model, for a simulation is an operating model.

Consider, for example, the

difference between a diagram of the solar system, and the simulation one finds
in a planetarium.
Keeping these examples in mind, the author’s definition of a simulation
reads as follows:

A simulation is an operating model of central features or ele¬

ments of a real or proposed system, process, or environment.

This definition

stresses the critical dimension of a simulation, namely, that: a simulation is a
form of a model; it is a dynamic, as opposed to a static (case), model; only se¬
lected elements of the referent system are included; referent systems can be of
several different sorts.
Business simulations can therefore be seen as attempts to devise an envi¬
ronment for students that they would not ordinarily experience—an environment
that abstracts from reality those social, economic, or political phenomena that
together make up a complex and sometimes confusing situation, but when re¬
duced by simulation, become comprehensive, revealing and educational in the
broadest sense.

Whether the referent system is a business firm, a national gov¬

ernment, or an international negotiation, the principle is the same: central fea¬
tures are identified, represented, and constructed into a model that operates in a
manner similar to the real world system.34
Simulations are often confused with ’’games,” and the distinction between
simulation and games is often unclear, as the two terms are sometimes used
synonymously.
usage.

The confusion of terms is not only simply the result of sloppy

It also results from users’ concerns that both terms have problematic
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connotations that users dislike. For some people, simulations are too complex,
too technical, too mechanical. Hence, they prefer to use the lighter-toned term
’’games”. Ken Jones argues that this is the main reason why teachers avoid
simulations. His solution to the dilemma is to suggest that: ’’instead of thinking
of a simulation like a game, it is useful to think of it as being a case study, but
with the participants on the inside, not on the outside. ”35
In addition, in business simulations, there is little ’’second-guessing” in
terms of personalities of particular people or positions. Participants are not only
given a scenario and a role profile, but also have to meet company goals. Thus
the consequences of actions in terms of goal attainment or failure to achieve
desired ends are built into the design.36

Managers involved in this interna¬

tional simulation will experience that their actions create consequences that are
responsible for the international movement of capital, technology, and personnel.
They are agents of change in consumer tastes, skills, ideas, and even political
and social systems.
Differences between Case Studies and Simulations

How is teaching with simulations different from teaching a case study?
First, in simulations, in contrast with cases, the class members are active learn¬
ers. They must make decisions, pay the consequences, articulate positions, and
make the system work. After the simulation, the analysis focuses on what hap¬
pened and why, how that relates to the real-world counterpart, and the limita¬
tions of the simulation. Thus the learning experience builds upon the philoso¬
phy in the old Chinese proverb:
I hear and I forget
I see and I remember
I do and I understand
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Adult learning theories stressed the importance of the student’s active in¬
volvement with the materials or skills to be learned. The use of simulations
permits discovery, experimentation, and reflection. Omar Khayam Moore and
Alan Ross Anderson’s four heuristic principles for the design of learning envi¬
ronments also parallel the arguments for the effective use of simulation in
teaching.37

They suggest that, first, the learner should be given the opportunity

to operate from various perspectives. The learner should not just be a recipient
of information, but should at times be an agent, a referee, and a reciprocator.
Second, activities should contain their own goals and sources of motivation, not
just represent means to some end (such as grades). That is, in an effective
learning environment, activities are authentic. Third, the learners should be
freed from a dependence on authority and allowed to reason for themselves;
they are thus made more productive in the learning process. And fourth, the
environment should be responsive to the learners’ activity. Not only should they
be given feedback, but they should be helped to be reflexive, evaluating their
own progress see Darkenwald, 1982.
The active involvement aspect of simulations in the learning process has
been well described in the major books in the field see Abt, 1974; Boocock and
Schild, 1968; Duke, 1974; Goodman and Coppart, 1979; Gordon, 1970;
Greenblat and Duke, 1975, 1981; Jones, 1980, 1982; Raser 1969; Sanoff, 1979;
Shubik, 1975; Taylor and Walford, 1978.
To say that students engaged with the materials does not mean that the
experience is all pleasant or ”fun.” Linda Lederman and Lea Stewart have de¬
scribed the multiple dimensions and consequences of such engagement as fol¬
lows:
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Finally, years of experience with interactive, instructional simula¬
tions have demonstrated that students in simulations have an involvement
with learning unmatched in any traditional classroom. Engagement in the
activity call for active learning, and action brings with it involvement.
This is not to say, however, that involvement always carries with it a
’’feeling good” affect. Experiences bring them challenges, challenges
which at times bring them uncertainty (”how am I supposed to do this?”),
ambiguity (’’what’s the right way?” ’’why doesn’t the professor tell me
what to do?”), change (”I have never been in this position before, no one
ever told me before that I needed to behave differently”). But, uncer¬
tainty, ambiguity, and change, as well as error, diversity, and even at
times confusion are the lifeblood of learning by doing. They provide the
raw data out of which participants, through their own methods, in their
own ways, and in their own time, construct for themselves patterns, theo¬
ries, and behaviors that permit them to cope successfully with the simu¬
lated environment, and therefore, in the long term, the real-world envi¬
ronment which it models.38
Second, rather than being lectured to and then engaging in discussion,
students experience the topic as a whole, since many components of the system
are presented simultaneously in the simulation. In addition, discussion and
analysis following the simulation is often structured by roles rather than by out¬
spokenness or assertiveness. Indeed, the author less often experienced that pre¬
viously silent members of a class sometimes become the most vocal active par¬
ticipants in a simulation and in the ensuing discussion.
Third, and finally, simulations are particularly useful for conveying sys¬
tem characteristics. It has long been recognized that systems are more clearly
described using graphic models, such as diagrams or pictures, or using physical
representation, then through using verbal models. Consider, for example, the
greater clarity of a diagram as opposed to a verbal description of the human
circulatory system. A simulation, or a model of a system in operation, such as
an international negotiation session, can be an even more potent teaching tool
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than a graphic model. By being actively involved, students develop orientations
to particular concepts ("offset,” "exchange rates”) within a common context
(negotiations in aircraft sales). These concepts and related principles can then
be explored, using the experience shared by all members.
Simulations thus differ from case studies in the degree of structure and
formalization they entail and in their emphasis on interaction processes rather
than on assuming individual roles at the end of the case. Simulations are mod¬
els of systems. As changes take place in the referent system, they likewise take
place in the model, for a simulation is an operating model. Furthermore, in
many instances of using case studies in the classroom, several students partici¬
pate while the remainder of the class can be passive. When simulations are
used, all students are participants; none are passive observers.39
Conclusion
What happens when the environment in which business operates is chang¬
ing so dramatically that teachers in graduate business schools find it difficult to
keep up with these changes and remain experts in their respective disciplines?
Simulations might add another dimension to the case study method which will
help in the identification of what I previously called ill-structured problems.
While simulations will not solve all adult educational problems, it is clear that
their utilization offers better opportunities than case studies for teaching and
learning about ill-structured problems.

Such utilization extends beyond the

classroom context, for many international business negotiations require that de¬
cision makers obtain the overall perspectives and systematic understandings that
emerge so well from simulation activities.40
The author’s review of literature in the fields of adult learning and teach¬
ing methodologies perhaps best characterizes the relationship between the adult
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student and teacher as a partnership. If adult education is seen as the recon¬
struction of experiences through interactive processes with one’s environment,
then this view of the teacher-learner relationship is correct. The teacher’s re¬
sponsibility then is to organize, stimulate, instigate, and evaluate the highly com¬
plex process of education. The teacher provides a setting that is conducive to
learning. In so doing, the teacher also becomes a learner, for the relationship
between teacher and learner becomes reciprocal. Both should plan and learn
from each other. The adult teacher is neither totally directive nor totally passive.
Rather, in Chistensens’ words, ’’The teacher is a learner, and the learner is,
without knowing it, a teacher, and upon the whole the less consciousness there
is, on either side, of either giving or receiving instruction, the better. ”41
When the literature in the field of the case method and simulation of
teaching adult graduate business students was reviewed, it became apparent to
the author that the case method of teaching had an honorable history of involv¬
ing students in the learning process and, on the other hand teaching materials
that are illustrative examples of ill-structured Problems created by a fast chang¬
ing business environment are almost non-existent. By creating the MAS simu¬
lation, the author wanted to bridge this gap by providing students with an oppor¬
tunity to integrate and apply theoretical knowledge and personal experience in a
simulated environment. Participating in a simulation such as MAS may be as
close as it is possible to come to a real world management experience within
the confines of a traditional course of study. Unlike case studies, where the
situation can never react to the student’s analysis, MAS offers a variety of stra¬
tegic problems that result directly from the decisions and actions of all partici¬
pants.
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Unlike the real world, the simulation enables total concentration upon
strategic planning, as the implementation of those plans is carried out in the ne¬
gotiation sessions. Also unlike the real world, IMAS is ultimately only a learn¬
ing experience. No participant’s performance will affect his or her standard of
living. On the other hand, creative strategies may be freely tested with a degree
of freedom not available when the welfare of a real corporation and its employ¬
ees depend upon the outcome.
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CHAPTER III
TEACHING PROCESS FOR THE SIMULATION
Introduction

In Chapter I, the need to revitalize teaching methodologies in adult gradu¬
ate education was discussed. Possible improvements included a greater use of
active, student involved teaching methods such as the use of case study simula¬
tions to strengthen the link between adult learning theories and teaching meth¬
ods. Chapter II delineated previous attempts at introducing the case method of
teaching as an appropriate method for adult learners and suggested changes
through the use of simulations to accommodate ill-structured Problems created
by the rapid changes in today’s complex business environment.
This chapter details the pedagogical elements that form the foundation
for the teaching process used in the MAS simulation. The specific objectives
for the development of the MAS simulation were to provide prospective manag¬
ers with a complex business situation which defies conventional standards for
structuring problems, so that adult learners may bring their background and ex¬
perience to bear in the learning situation.
By participating in the simulation, students will then structure the vari¬
ables given in the curriculum materials to fit the needs of both the individuals
and the organization they represent. Presented in simulated form, the course
materials the author developed are intended to encourage student involvement
by providing data—substantive and process—essential to an analysis of a spe¬
cific situation, for the framing of alternative action programs, and for their im¬
plementation recognizing the complexity and ambiguity of the situation (see
Chapter n, pg 15). This simulation provides students with an opportunity to
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bring to bear an unlimited variety of knowledge and skills acquired in their previous academic and practical experience.
Individual students have little access either to the corridors of power in¬
volved in international negotiations or to much of the secret information that
guides and influences these negotiations.

Using the different backgrounds of

their colleagues, the IMAS simulation proved an effwctive, if imperfect, instru¬
ment to probe these matters.
The second objective is to provide some practical suggestions for instruc¬
tors who use ill-structured Problems problem materials in their curricula to im¬
prove their effectiveness as facilitators in the adult learning setting.

Both objec¬

tives reaffirm the essential elements of adult learning principles explained in
Chapter H: learning should be problem centered, action oriented and experience
based.

The DMAS simulation itself enlarges on Lawrence’s theme of the case as

a teaching instrument crafted to create a specific discussion opportunity.
Basic Pedagogical Elements
Analyzing a specific situation forces students to deal with the ”as is,” not
the ”might be.”

During the semester, the students will find themselves repre¬

senting the United States government, a specific industry, or a third world mili¬
tary power.

At times the decision making roles are less specific and are played

collectively by the team.

Areas of activity can range from defense to economic

management, from diplomatic negotiations to journalistic or espionage activities
(see Appendix C).

Skills in decision-making, negotiating, proposal writing and

planning are the order of the day.

On other occasions students will be required

to confront the intractability of reality: an absence of needed information, the
ever-present conflict of objectives, and the imbalance between needs and re¬
sources (see Appendix D).

As managers, they need to learn to act effectively
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under these circumstances; the intern manager, as well as the experienced man¬
ager is also expected to do so.

The situational orientation of the IMAS simula¬

tion, moreover, insistently reminds students of the vast gap between simplistic,
global prescriptions and what can be said to a specific manager, at a specific
time, on a specific issue.

From experience garnered in many discussions,

the

adult learners can in fact gain a ’’knowledge of,” rather than a ’’knowledge
about” international negotiations.

F. J. Roethlisberger in his research on Train¬

ing for Human relations, puts it as follows:
Although related, we assumed that there were two kinds of knowl¬
edge that needed to be different. One is the kind of knowledge that is
associated with the scientist who is seeking to make verifiable proposi¬
tions about a certain class of phenomena. The other is the kind of knowl¬
edge that is associated with the practitioner of a skill in relation to a
class of phenomena.
The difference between these two kinds of knowledge can be read¬
ily seen by contrasting the aim of the scientists with the aim of a practi¬
tioner of a skill.

The aim of the scientist is to discover and make vari¬

able propositions about a certain class of phenomena; the aim of the
practitioner

is the immediate ’’control” of the phenomena with which he/

she deals. Although the ’’knowledge of acquaintance” which the practitio¬
ner acquires from the practice of skills often remains intuitive and im¬
plicit, it serves his/her immediate purposes well.l

The purpose of adult graduate business education is to combine knowl¬
edge and action.

The application of knowledge, always partial, to the complexi¬

ties of a business problem, never capable of complete solution, is the manager’s
primary task.
The IMAS simulation tries to create a crude mirror of the international
business reality in the sense that the salient strategic elements are present, but
thousands of tactical or operational details, which must be attained in reality,
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are absent.

This facilitates a time compression so that students can participate

in the entire process of the negotiations over a relatively short period. The stu¬
dents consider action in tandem with analysis whenever possible. The minimum
end product of a discussion is an understanding of what needs to be done and
how it can be accomplished.

At its best, the classroom

discussion will include

an exploration of how a plan can be translated into committed behavior of a
group of managers.

The importance of action influences the entire discussion,

which focuses on the practical and doable, the partial but accomplishable, and
the necessity of dealing with first-step accommodations rather than waiting for
complete solutions.
The active intellectual and emotional involvement of students is the hall¬
mark of the MAS simulation.

Involvement offers the most dramatic visible

contrast with a stereotypical lecture class.

In the educational process of manag¬

ers, where knowledge and application must be related, student involvement is
essential.

One does not learn to play golf by reading a book, but by taking club

in hand and actually hitting the golf ball—preferably under a pro’s watchful eye.
A practice green is not a golf game, and a case study is not real life.
For a teacher of adults, the interplay of knowledge, and the discussion
process is critical.

Like two scissor blades, both elements must work together

for incisive learning.

Not all instructors appreciate that reality. Most adult stu¬

dents do.
Instructional Strategies Used in Teaching the IMAS Course
Preparing for the Negotiating Sessions
When teaching adults it is easier to declare the need for the integration
of knowledge into the discussion process than it is to provide practical, detailed
support for instructors wishing to improve their proficiency as discussion lead-
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ers.

How does the need for a certain degree of mastery of both knowledge and

process affect preparation for class? What are some of the consequences for a
teacher’s leadership in a simulation dialogue? One of the author’s students in
the pilot course stated the problem pointedly.
discussion session yet to be born? ”

She asked, ”How do I plan for a

How do I ready myself for the minute-by-

minute job of running the class—to be able to understand, organize, and guide
the free flowing give-and-take of the simulation class? As soon as I ask the
first question to anyone on the other side, everything is wide open.

It is a

frightening process—traditional structures just don’t seem to work for me.
What’s the answer?”

There is no simple solution.

Based on the experience gained from teaching the MAS pilot course and
ten years of working with adult graduate business students, the author has devel¬
oped his own method of preparing for a discussion class where there are no
right or wrong solutions.

These suggestions are only intended as guidelines.

The suggested approach is just one of many possibilities.
The first step used in the preparation for teaching the MAS case is to
review the substantive materials (PART II) to be introduced in the session, and
to note the critical issues that need to be raised or were raised in previous ses¬
sions (later on in the semester).

At the same time it is important to pinpoint

areas where further examination needs to be encouraged.

What topics remain

to be raised, and what upcoming proposals offer the best possibilities for their
exploration?

Detailed instructor summary notes, made after each session, pro¬

vide the data for this exercise. Postclass discussion with students is also valu¬
able to review strengths and weaknesses of each session. Videotaping some of
the sessions provides useful

feedback for the instructor.

51

Next, an in-depth preparation of the simulation is suggested. The objec¬
tive is to prepare a detailed analysis of the data needed for the upcoming nego¬
tiation session. Superior command of substantive information and the discipline
of a rigorous intellectual analysis are basic to any preparation, but offer special
benefits to a discussion leader. Command of the substantive gives the instructor
additional opportunities to concentrate on understanding and managing the nego¬
tiation process, the only first hand data with which he or she has to work.
Roethisberger clarified this point: ’’For me the important facts existed in the dis¬
cussion of the data and not in the written materials per se. It could be said that
they [other instructors] were teaching the written case, whereas I was teaching
the discussion of it.”2 Ideally a facilitator can use both data banks.
Once this analytic exercise is complete, preparation could shift to a more
complex task: trying to predict and prepare for the process by which students
and instructor will handle the negotiations. Without attempting to draw up a
formal statement, the aim is to develop an internalized appreciation and com¬
mand of the complexities of the MAS simulation that may influence the discus¬
sion dynamic during any of the negotiating sessions. First and foremost is an
understanding of each student’s background, and a reading of the current work
experience of the group. The instructor needs to anticipate approximately
where in the discussion opportunities may arise to meet individual student and
group learning needs.
Where are the danger spots? The following five step procedure might help to
plan for constructive guidance during the negotiations:
1. Assess the status of the negotiations. How far and well have they
progressed in terms of an agreement? Where have they made the most pro-
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gress, where the least? What is the capacity of the class to work as learning
groups?
2. Review each student history and performance. Who might contrib¬
ute most? Does the simulation provide special learning opportunities for stu¬
dents with limited experience?
3. Recognize and try to deal with your own mood. Do you like or
dislike to teach this simulation? Is this a fun course for you or an academic
chore? Where might the instructor’s personal biases or prejudices affect the
leadership of the discussions? All those considerations as well as family and
personal concerns, influence the instructor’s behavior in the classroom. It is
helpful to acknowledge and examine the potential impact of these factors on
classroom leadership.
4. Review the MAS date (PART II - Student Materials) as a discus¬
sion instrument. Where are the best opportunities to practice needed negotiation
skills? Where can students’ experience best be utilized and in what group?
What issues of the negotiations have high potential for involvement and conflict?
5. Work up a series of operational guidelines. How should class
time be divided between role-playing and diagnosis? How should the sessions
be paced? Where is there hope for high-involvement points?
Though there is no way to predict precisely what will happen during the
upcoming negotiating sessions, this preparation regime has been helpful to the
author. At a minimum such planning helps instructors avoid some errors and
capitalize on learning opportunities. At best it may help them appreciate the
power and complexities of a teaching approach that deals with both both content
and process while dealing with illl—structured problems problems.
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Instructional Climate
The first section of the pilot course (see materials in Chapter IV) offers
an instructor the opportunity to cover usual first-day tasks, reviewing instruc¬
tional protocol and course administration.

When the author conducted the

course, he commented, in considerable detail, on the outline of the simulation
(see Student materials in Part II), and provide students with some background
on How Adults Learn, Chapter II).
The first of two key objectives in this session is to ’’romance” the course;
we highlight the unique learning opportunities it represents.

A superior instruc¬

tor of adults continually relearns what it is like to be an adult student.
can learn a great deal from watching experienced colleagues

Students

explore and deal

with familiar problems in innovative ways, and from noticing how the session
leader meets the familiar challenge of directing the discussion process.
In addition, the instructor should begin his/her efforts to change a gather¬
ing of individuals into a cohesive, supportive learning group by personally wel¬
coming each student to the room.

In the first session students need to share a

bit of their backgrounds and future career interest in international negotiations
with the group.

It is advisable to address each student by name and make cer¬

tain that students do likewise.

An instructional philosophy of openness and trust

must be behaved to be believed.

Professor Glover and Hower put the point

well.
Clearly, if the students are to take responsibility for analyzing situ¬
ations and discuss them with others, they need a favorable climate to do
so. This means a permissive atmosphere in which they feel free to put
forth their ideas and their questions without the instructor reacting in the
form of rejection, derision, blame, or authoritarian injunctions to think
along certain lines preferred by the instructor at the moment. This free
atmosphere will be fostered if the instructor makes up his/her mind to
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hear and to try to understand what students have to say, and encourage
others to do the same.3
Operationally, during the first class the instructor can start by raising
small issues such as the impact of a potential military aircraft sale on the Con¬
necticut economy (see Student Materials). The intend is to demonstrate that ap¬
parently simple problems can be really complex. This allows the instructor to
raise the key issues covered throughout the entire IMAS course. These are the
issues that need to be covered:
A sales agreement is only the end result of a fighter competition. The
country holding the competition selects one of the competing aircraft and agrees
with the winning company and country on the terms of the sale. Each sales
agreement is a unique product of:
1. the economic, political and military goals of the purchasing govern¬
ment;
2. the economic, political and military goals of the selling government;
3. the economic, political and military goals of the military and civilian
hierarchies and legislative committees which compete within the governments of
both the purchasing and selling countries to determine the goals of each;
4. the economic and political goals of competing aerospace companies;
and
5. the goals of all other organizations which perceive themselves as af¬
fected by the competition and who were motivated by those perceptions to take
action. The competitive process by which a sales agreement is reached is
driven by individual decision makers possessing varying degrees of influence
within these governmental and corporate organizations. These people must work
within the following constraints:
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(a) national law,
(b) the written standard operating procedures of the organization for
which they work,
(c) the unwritten rules, customs and procedures of the various participat¬
ing organization and
(d) their personal perceptions of relevant political and economic environ¬
ments. These perceptions are based on information gathered through both the
media and personal sources.
The summary of the first session focuses on questions raised and point
not explored by the students, as well as suggestions on how they might want to
work with these issues in their groups.
Establishing the Instructor-Student Learning Contract.

Initially the instructor should focus on the challenges of the negotiating
sessions that appeared between class sessions when the perennial problems of
instructor uncertainty and ’’class building” are at their peak (See details on The
Teaching Format of the MAS Course in Chapter IV). Someone once said that
academic communities do not commit homicide with new instructors, they sim¬
ply induce suicide. How does a novice instructor survive in the present, and yet
plan for the future—the remainder of the semester?4 How does an experienced
instructor avoid a faltering start-up, from which early errors may accumulate
later into major problems for the class?
The following are some highlights of preparation requirements for the
second session: what crucial observations about section behavior need to be
made? Are the students getting too much involved with details and are there¬
fore missing other important elements of the negotiations? What information
that the instructor received between classes might be useful and how can it be
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used? What new data from newspapers or publications can be used to get stu¬
dents focused on the dynamics of the process? At this time it is useful to pro¬
vide students with the data in the Appendix called: Government Correspondence
and News Releases.
Listening and Response: the Key Skill Dimension

Central to the effectiveness of any case discussion leader is the ability to
ask questions, listen, and respond.5 Unfortunately, relatively little research has
been done on just what goes on in the crucial black box of professional educa¬
tion —the classroom.6 The pioneering investigations of Dwight Allen, formerly
University Professor at the Darden School of Education, Old Dominion Univer¬
sity, and Don Oliver’s work7 have been most helpful to the author. Some very
practical advice can be found in Margaret Morganroth Guillette’s, The Art and
Craft of Teaching.8
Questioning, listening, and response is an area the instructor might want
to pay attention to throughout the entire semester.

The instructors need to dem¬

onstrate this skill throughout the discussions and encourage students to critique
this dimension during the semester. According to Guillette, this teaching process
issimple in design but difficult in execution.

The teaching plan to accomplish

this feedback, she explains, takes a two-step approach.
First, the instructor can encourage students to identify and categorize
question-and-response patterns: to develop their own typologies.

Instructors are

typically intrigued when they realize there are six or eight basic patterns of
questions and dozens of subset of questions available for their use—a whole ar¬
mament in fact.

They can ask, for example questions of fact, of interpretation,

of extension, or they can create hypothetical questions.

Designing questions for
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maximum student learning opportunities is an essential ingredient in the artistry
of case teaching.
Second, once the students have established their own first-cut typology,
the instructor can make these categories operational.

When, for example, would

you use a very general, interpretive question—"What is your appraisal of this
proposal?”—versus a very specific, factual question—"What is the current return
of this proposal for the company?”

When do you personalize a question—for

example, ’’Janet, how did you react to that conclusion?”

When do you make

your questions more or less, abstract? In what way is the first class question
unique?

What questions are most appropriate in the early part of the negotia¬

tions as opposed to the later part?
It is important that the instructor explores the complexities of the re¬
sponses. Should you respond verbally to a speaker or simply shift to another
participant? If you respond to the first student, do you express personal ap¬
proval or disapproval of those comments? Do you restate the comment and ask
for elaboration of one or more of its component ideas? Do you demand de¬
fense? Ask for clarification? Do you suggest how the current point could be
combined with a comment made by an earlier contributor? Do you respond to
the technical content of the comment or the latent feelings of the speaker?
In case discussions the author suggests putting emphasis on operational
decisions. How does one decide which student to recognize? Do you make a
random selection?

Do you call on the student whose hand has been raised long¬

est? (the author’s experience suggests not; thinking often stops when the hand is
raised, and if the patient student is recognized, his or her comment usually will
not fit into the current discussion flow.)
involvement level?

How does one determine a student’s
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Sensitive listening is the bridge that links questioning and responding and
is especially important during negotiation sessions that can easily turn into a
heated discussions if attention is not paid to this process. In Teachers Also must
Learn, Charles Gragg puts the point well: ’’Teaching is not only the art of thinking and speaking. It is also the art of listening and understanding. Nor by lis¬
tening is meant just the act of keeping still. Keeping still is a technique, listen¬
ing is an art. 9 The objective is to make each class session a laboratory to ex¬
plore the barriers and gateways to ’’active listening”—for example to use Carl
Roger’s phraseology. The suggested approach highlights five principles.
First, we ask numerous ’’checking questions” during the sessions—for ex¬
ample, ”Is that what you said, Ms. James? Did Ms. Young hear your point?”
When miscommunication occurs—and in negotiation sessions is is expected to
happen—the instructor should explore the reasons for the breakdown. These in¬
terchanges can serve as a continuing reminder that listening to the other party’s
point of view is hard work and that miscommunication is all too easy.
Second, emphasis should be placed on the fundamental distinction be¬
tween listening for content and listening for latent feelings—the hidden agenda
of the negotiations. During the MAS sessions, the instructor should continually
make decisions about which level he/she should respond on.
The third principle of effective teaching the course is closely related: ef¬
fective listening is most difficult unless one knows each participant as a unique
human being. Knowing a person helps the instructor hear what the person is
really saying, especially when the person’s latent feelings are critical to the topic
being discussed.
Fourth, constructive listening asks that one understand not only what the
other person has said but also what they other person might have been expected
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to say and did not.

Instructors need to keep in mind what the specific negotia¬

tion session has been dealing with and what the students may be talking about
in the next few minutes, in the next few classes.
The author also like to include another working proposition which can be
expressed in an old Swiss proverb: "When one shuts one eye one does not see
everything." Observation of the entire negotiation scene—its hot and quiet spots,
the speaker’s manner in making a point, and the reaction of the other person to
whom the message is being sent—all contribute to one’s understanding.
Two operational points typically arise in these discussions. First, how
does one evaluate a classroom contribution? What is a useful comment; what is
a poor one? Does one reward a student for excellent process contribution to the
group’s deliberation? How does an instructor remember, for evaluation pur¬
poses, the thirty or fourty comments made in each class session?iO
The crafting of questions, sensitive listening, and constructive response
are the key skill requirements for effective discussion teaching.

Second, the in¬

structor’s ability to stimulate classroom dialogue, to multiply individual insights
and points of view, and to create circumstances in which individual students
may practice their negotiation skills and gain in knowledge, maturity, depends in
large measure on the instructor’s ability to carry out these critical tasks.

Leading the Discussion Process
This part of the instructional strategy examines the problem of reaching
instructional objectives while maintaining a delicate balance between controlling
the negotiation sessions—putting students through a series of questions usually
based on the instructor’s analysis of the situation and following his/her bent and
logic—and directing the negotiations—allowing students substantial leeway to
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explore ideas of significance to them at a pace appropriate to the needs of most
section members.
To put the challenge directly: the discussion leader in an international ne¬
gotiation course such as the MAS simulation must learn to relinquish some con¬
trol over the content of the discussion and try to orchestrate participants’ com¬
ments.

Throughout the semester, as the negotiations go into more technical de¬

tails, the author finds it easier to do so since students’ technical experience usu¬
ally compensates for the instructor’s lack of expertise.

This is a straight for¬

ward task, for merely stepping aside and letting the group chat will produce
chaos and accelerate frustration.

The instructor is, in the final analysis, respon¬

sible for the negotiation proceedings. But he or she must endeavor to help the
different groups succeed, and give their comments shape and direction, without
being either directional or irritatingly manipulative—no small task. A tightly
controlled negotiation session is an anomaly, neither efficient as a lecture nor as
involving as an guided discussion. Most important, the role descriptions in the
Appendix provide the students with a friendly and open forum to state their own
objectives for peer criticism or comments.

Clearly it affects the preparation of

a teaching plan, encouraging the use of a framework of key questions with alter¬
native plans for dealing with anticipated student responses.

From the IMAS ex¬

perience, the author has learned to be ready to make major changes in the
teaching plan if students interest moves in dramatically unplanned directions.
On the one hand, the uncertainty of not being able to anticipate what might
happen in the classroom is probably the most difficult area for an instructor to
deal with.

On the other hand this issue is the core ingredient of dealing with

ill-structured Problems in the classroom.
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Conclusion
The teaching of the MAS course places a heavy emotional burden on
both student and teacher.

From the student’s point of view, it requires an ex¬

traordinary degree of openness: a willingness to state and publicly defend per¬
sonal positions, often on controversial issues; to expose one’s own feelings and
uncertainties to peer scrutiny; to attempt to practice publicly some very complicated techniques and skills.
Section openness is possible only in a climate of mutual trust and sup¬
port.

Hugh Prater put it very well in Notes to Myself: ”In order to see I have to

be willing to be seen. i1

As a discussion leader for the IMAS course the in¬

structors needs to be willing to cast aside their traditional academic armor, the
certainty of platform and podium, of knowing the right answers, to take a role
of teacher-student, to learn from the students.
Maintaining an open classroom atmosphere was a major challenge for the
author himself—partially when complex educational goals are pursued using illstructured Problems.

Using a musical analysis, throughout his teaching of this

pilot course, the author tried to teach students to play—not only to tune—their
instruments.

This was a complicated objective, and the author is content with

major defeats and measured progress—constantly learning to rejoice at small
victories.
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CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF A PILOT COURSE IN INTERNA¬
TIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS (IMAS)
Introduction
Given technological developments and international markets, adult gradu¬
ate education needs to revitalize teaching methodologies.

Possible improvements

included: a greater use of active teaching methods that involve students.

Case

study simulations can strengthen links between adult learning theories and teach¬
ing methods.

By combining simulations over an extended period of time with

case studies, adult learners can address ill-structured problems created by the
rapid changes in today’s business environment.
This chapter describes an experimental graduate business course using a
comprehensive business simulation.

Specifically, this course used newly devel¬

oped materials in a semester-long simulation.

The focus is on multinational ne¬

gotiations involving both profit-making firms and government agencies entering
major investments and long-term commitments. All instructional materials for
the course—entitled ’’International Military Aircraft Sales (MAS)—were devel¬
oped by the author, an associate professor, in the School of Management at the
Hartford Graduate Center during 1985-86 and was also taught by him on an
experimental basis during the Fall 1987 semester.

Other teachers may find the

approach and possible materials important sources when designing courses for
teaching ill-structured subject concerns.
Despite the unavoidable circularity that occasionally confuses the issue,
prospective writers of business simulations should note that the purpose of writ¬
ing a business simulation is not to settle some vexed question forever, but sim¬
ply to provide fodder for a rich discussion.

The researcher need not understand
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the workings of every detail of a simulation to write well and usefully.

In fact,

most people familiar with the use of business simulation in teaching agree:
"There are no answers.-l

The writer's challenge is to coax informants into pro-

viding vivid recollections, and then organize and present these so that readers
may find them challenging and interesting enough to draw their own conclusions.
Detailed in this chapter is an overview of the IMAS course including a
description of the course participants and the instructional support system, and
an outline of the materials selected for the course.

Also included in this chap¬

ter is the evaluation of the pilot course, an analysis of the findings of the attitudinal instrument used in the evaluation, and finally, a summary of findings and
personal reflections about teaching this course.

Overview of the IMAS Course
The IMAS course for prospective international business negotiators was
offered with the approval of the Dean of the School of Management at the
Hartford Graduate Center as an elective course in the MBA curriculum. The
Hartford Graduate Center is an accredited graduate school, affiliated with
Rensselear Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in Troy, New York.

As such the Graduate

Center has the authority to offer RPI degrees in Hartford, Connecticut.

The

MAS course was offered on an experimental basis during the Fall 1987 semes¬
ter.

The experimental design of the course allowed for the necessary flexibility

to try out different types of materials and teaching methods to determine work¬
able strategies and content.
The course was fifteen weeks in duration, meeting eight houfs on alter¬
nate Saturdays for a total of forty five instructional hours.

Students were also

required to meet outside scheduled class meetings to prepare for the sessions or
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to meet with individual representatives. The course was equivalent to three
graduate credit hours and would ordinarily be taken after the student had com¬
pleted all MBA course requirements except for the last elective course. The to¬
tal required credit hours for an MBA degree is forty five.
Participants for the IMAS course were selected from a list of students
who were in their last semester of graduate school, majoring in International
Business. This ensured that students had been exposed to a similar program of
study and interests. Ar

-tempt was made to include students with different

cultural backgrounds to provide diversity of input during the negotiation ses¬
sions. Another requirement was that each participant should have had three
years of experience as a manager in one or two functional areas of business.
Twenty five students participated. They were advised that participation in
this study was voluntary. Anonymity in the reporting of their evaluation was
also guaranteed. Students who agreed to participate signed consent forms that
delineated the research project and advised them of their rights. The consent
form is included in the Appendix.
Supporting this IMAS course was an instructional system which included
computer equipment (hardware), and a management decision program (soft¬
ware). A video teleconferencing center (two-way) was available upon request at
two of the local area companies.

Students who availed themselves of these fa¬

cilities did not report to the campus site for the sessions, but were linked to the
Graduate Center via two-way satellite television.
The IMAS course was made possible through the use of the Sic-Simulator on the Sun Network computer at the Hartford Graduate Center. The Sun
Network stations are individual computers each with their own processor and
primary memory. The models used in the course have a 68020 microprocessor
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and four megabytes of RAM memory. Two different models are available for
student use, the Sun 3/50 and the Sun 3/52. The 3/50 is a diskless machine us¬
ing a file serving host machine to provide disk space. The 3/52 also uses the file
server, but also has a 71 megabyte disk and cartridge tape drive. The cartridge
tape is useful for individual backups and could be used by students at their
place of work.
All workstations are connected together in a network. Each workstation is
part of a subnetwork containing several IBM AT or AT&T PC running PC-NFS.
All students are able to dial into the network from their homes or offices via an
electronic modem and are able to leave messages using electronic mail. Incom¬
ing mail is sroted in a standard file for each student, called the system mailbox
for that student. When mail is called to read messages, the mailbox is the de¬
fault place to find them. As messages are read by the students, they are
marked to be moved to a secondary file for storage and can be read by the stu¬
dent and teacher.
At the Hartford Graduate Center, all students have access to most com¬
mercially available software. Lotus 123, DBase, and word processing software
are available on the academic network and others can be checked out for use on
the non-networked PCs. The specific software names are omitted in this study
because their titles include names of software companies.
Curriculum Materials

The materials for instruction employed in this course consisted of a series
of handouts reproduced for each student. All student materials are included in
Part II of this study. The materials consist of an introduction to set the stage
for the negotiation process, the role descriptions for each students, and back-
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ground readings on the situation, and the specific businesses and governments
involved.
Each student will be involved as a participant in a recently announced
fighter competition being conducted by Greece, (or any other country which has
a Request For Proposal, RFP). The students need to familiarize themselves thor¬
oughly with the dynamics of the sales competition so they can play the roles as¬
signed to them during the actual negotiating sessions. The introductory materi¬
als are mailed to each student two weeks before the first class session. At that
point they are not yet aware of the role they will be assigned. A central frame
of reference of this course is the class as an organization which is similar in
many basic ways to all organizations. In order to make the parallels clear and
explicit as well as to achieve the course objectives, each student receives a job
description to establish a parameter of their role during the negotiations and
also to identify expectations. The following examples of role descriptions taken
from Appendix C appear in a form which can be reproduced directly for distri¬
bution to students. They are handed out on the day that the negotiation teams
are formed.
Biographical Sketch:
Christiane Carney, Secretary of State.
You are the first woman in the history of the United States to be ap¬
pointed Secretary of State. Though you were originally a member of the Demo¬
cratic Party, your strong anti-communist views made you a perfect choice for
the Reagan Administration.
As a professor at Georgetown University before accepting your present
role, you cultivated a wide circle of friends including Secretary of the Air Force,
David Dell.

Secretary of the Navy, Naomi Segal, who was a member of the
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Georgetown faculty before accepting her present post, is also a close friend.
Amy Cardamore, who is presently a high-ranking minister of the Italian Govern¬
ment, was a student of yours when you first began teaching at Georgetown in
1963. The two of you have remained close since then. Another former student
of yours is Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat from Minnesota.
Your appointment as Secretary of State was not without controversy.
Your appointment was approved in the Senate by only 3 votes. Much of the
controversy was generated behind the scenes by the present Secretary of De¬
fense, Carmen Marino. Marino, who has a number of friends in the Senate,
coveted the role of Secretary of State for himself and worked very discreetly to
have your nomination rejected by the Senate. Since your appointment, Marino
has worked through his Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, An¬
nette Boyle, to gain the upper hand in formulating foreign policy. As of July
1982, you have the complete confidence of the President. Your two assistants,
Under Secretary Kositsky and Ambassador Codo are both loyal to your pro¬
grams and policy.
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YOUR GOALS:
(1) Formulate a viable United States’ Foreign Policy towards Greece.
This policy should comprise the following sub-goals:
(a) negotiate a new military base rights treaty with Greece
(b) attempt to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey

(c) maintain/improve United States, relations with Greece
(2) Hold on to your power to formulate United States. Foreign Policy.
Each role description includes a list of readings to provide students with
details on the actual role they will play during the negotiation sessions.
Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to undermine your ability to con¬
trol the formulation of United States’ foreign policy vis a vis Greece.
(3) Attempt to gain greater influence with the president in matters con¬
cerning national security.
(4) Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to effectively deprive you of
your power to determine whether major weapons sales should be approved.
Your Under-Secretary Kositsky should be the overall coordinator in any
review of a major sale. Take care that he maintains that role.
DUTIES:
You possess the authority to convene the Arm Transfer Management
Group. This group comprises Under Secretary Kositsky, who chairs the group,
Assistant Secretary of Defense Boyle, and Chief of the Arms Control Disarma¬
ment Agency, Sheri Rosenfeld. You are also a member of the National Security
Council which is convened by the President upon the advice of either you or the
Secretary of Defense.
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Intelligence Report on Greek Government: A recent CIA document that
you had commissioned indicates that Foreign minister Baroutas is a tough nego¬
tiator who often will refuse so see opposite negotiators as a means of frustrating
them. Apparently, he insists on doing his only negotiating at lunch. Do not ex¬
pect to see him more than once a week during the negotiation. Prime Minister
Papandreous on the other hand is more readily available than the FOREIGN
MISTER. However, Papendreous will defer to his foreign minister’s judgment in
most cases.
BUDGET:
You have an expense budget of one thousand dollars for diplomatic
luncheons with members of the Greek Government.

See (NAME) at Office of

Management and Budget for reimbursement.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Concentrate initially on the following readings:
1. Briefing Book on Greece, particularly the New York Times clip¬
pings at the back of the book.
2. The Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece.
Biographical Sketch:
David Kositsky, Under-Secretary for Security Assistance.
You are the administration’s chief spokesman for its arms transfer policy.
Before being asked to join the Reagan Administration, you were chairman of the
Heritage Foundation’s Defense Studies Committee. While at the Heritage Foun¬
dation, you became good friends with another member of the committee, Har¬
riet Madoff, who has since gone back to her home in St. Louis where she was
elected to Congress in 1980.
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Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, you served for 27 years with the
United States. Air Force. One of your tours was spent in Greece where you be¬
came good friends with the present Chief Genera] of the Hellenic Air Force,
Thomas Cheneterous. You ended your Air Force career as the top Air Force
officer in the Defense Security Assistance Agency under the Ford and Carter
Administrations. You retired from the Air Force a major general and joined the
Heritage Foundation in 1978.
Your father, who is now deceased, rose to the rank of Colonel in the
Army Air Corps. His classmate and good friend was Robert McDonald, the
present CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. Both your father and Mr.
McDonald received their wings in 1924 as members of Army Air Service class
24-6.
GOALS:
1. With guidance from the Secretary of State, implement the President’s
policy on arms transfers.
There are reports of a move afoot in Congress to require that United
States, contractors submit their offset proposals before the Congress before ma¬
jor arms sales would be approved under the Arms Control Disarmament
Agency. You must lobby Congress on behalf the administration to ensure that
legislation which would hurt the competitiveness of United States’ Corporations
is not passed.
2. Maintain your authority as chief coordinator of United States, arms
transfer policy.
It is rumored that the Secretary of Defense covets the post of Secretary
of State and will attempt to erode State’s authority by attempting to frame for¬
eign policy questions as questions of national security. To assist him, the Secre-
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tary of Defense has an able assistant, Annette Boyle. Her job is to coordinate
foreign arms transfers at DOD. It’s a job which is practically a mirror of yours.
Do not allow Boyle to become defacto overseer of the process.
DUTIES:
1. Grant or deny permission to United States. Aircraft Corporations to
approach the Greek government and make sales proposals.
2. Review any literature the aircraft companies wish to use in their sales
presentations.
3. Review any sales proposals made by United States, aircraft companies
to Greece.
4. Chair the Arms Transfer Management Group whenever meetings of
that body are called by the Secretary of State. Other members include Assistant
Secretary of Internal Security Policy, Boyle, and Arms Control Disarmament
Agency, Rosenfeld.
INITIAL ACTIONS:
As you start the game, the first question you must decide is whether
it is in the best interest of the United States, to sell either the F-16 or F-18 to
Greece. Keep in mind that Turkey is also requesting these aircraft. Also keep
in mind that if you delay too long in granting United States, corporations the
opportunity to approach the Greek government, you may put them at a competi¬
tive disadvantage.
* Consult with the Secretary of State on whether the United States,
wishes to sell these aircraft to Greece.
* Get a sense for what DOD thinks on this matter prior to meeting with
the Secretary.
* Also get a sense of what Congressional attitude is towards this matter.
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* If there aPPears to be any controversy over this matter, you might want
to recommend that the Secretary convene a meeting of the Arms Transfer Man¬
agement Group.
Note that Greece, despite its more recent behavior is a NATO ally. De¬
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports that it’s Air Force is surely in need of
modernization if Greece is to be an effective NATO partner.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1. Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft”. This is the
original case handout.
2. The LaFalce Letter
3. Military Offsets
4. Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on New York Times, articles
in the back of the student materials section.
5. Economic Intelligence Unit reports on Greece.
6. Modern Air Combat.

(Large Handout) Be sure you are familiar with

the competing aircraft as well as the basic components of all fighter aircraft.
During each meeting students were also be provided with News Releases
and Interoffice Memos to update them on what was going on in industry or gov¬
ernment during their negotiation sessions which might impact their future strat¬
egy. All supporting reading materials were placed on reserve in the Hartford
Graduate Center Library. The following are some sample memoranda (see Ap¬
pendix C for additional illustrations)

74

Sample Memorandum
TO: Congressman Steven Swanson
FROM: Your Staff
SUBJ: F-16 & F-18 Production: District Subcontractors
What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce
parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18.
MIDDLESEX GENERAL INDUSTRIES
Part:

District revenue

per aircraft:
Wing Panels (F-18)
$ 440,000
Landing Gear Doors (F-18)
80,000
Fuselage Panels (F-18)
240,000
TOTAL

$760.000

ADAMS RUSSELL CORP.
District revenue per aircraft:

Part:
Radar Wave Guides (F-18)

$110.000

HYCOR INC.
District revenue per aircraft:

Part:
Electroluminescent Display (F-16 & F-18)

$ 57.000

COBB & DREW INC.
Part:
Rivets (F-16)

District revenue per aircraft:
$ 38.700
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AVCO SYSTEMS INC.
Part:

District revenue per aircraft:

Radome: (F-18)

£ 350,000

JAMESBURY CORP.
Part:

District revenue per aircraft:

Hydraulic Actuators (F-16)

$

33.500

NORTON CO.
Part:

District revenue per aircraft:

Bearings (F-16 & F-18)
TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE

$

78.000

F-16

F-l-18 PER AIRCRAFT:

$207,200

$1,355,000
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: The staff econo¬
mist has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and
contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is generated in Massachusetts. This
means that total income accruing to the state for the purchase of a single F-18
is:
2.02 * $1,355,000 = $2,737,000
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the state’s in¬
come creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single F-18 cre¬
ates:

$2,737,000/$280,000 = 9.78 new jobs
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a whole.

However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district.
The following is a sample of ’’Top Secret” information Memos created by
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the author to force students to analyze all pertinent information before deciding
on their strategy.
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Sample Top Secret Information Memorandum
FLASH/TOP SECRET/NOFORN
BT//MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY TO:

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM:
RE:
1.

GENERAL DELL SACAFRE,

Secretary of the Air Force

SOVIET INFILTRATION OF GREEK MILITARY
In light of the proposed sale of American fighter aircraft to the Greek

government, General Secafre is gravely concerned by the CIA discovery of So¬
viet agents in the highest echelons of the Greek Air Force.

Ultimately, Soviet

infiltration brings into question the secu- rity of NATO operations throughout
the Eastern
2.

Mediterranean.

the Secretary of the Air Force continues to believe sale of weapons to

Greek government is of strategic importance both for American and NATO se¬
curity in Eastern Mediterranean The Greek Air Force currently operating obso¬
lete and poorly maintained equipment in an area of vital importance to the
safety of southern Balkans, eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

Strength of

Greece should be maintained as a deterrent to Soviet military action as well as
Turkish ambitions in Aegean.

Sale of arms demonstrates to Greece a continu¬

ing American friendship, reinforces the bonds of the NATO alliance and exhib¬
its both to other NATO allies and to the Soviets strong American commitment
to western defense.
3. Secondary considerations in the economic sphere should also be
weighed.

Aircraft sales entail considerable economic benefit for further Ameri¬

can growth and defense preparedness. As it appears Greek AirForce has se-
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lected the F-16, such a sale would reduce unit costs for the USAF as well, a
matter of congressional concern.
4.

Within the context of overall NATO planning and operations, sale of

the F-16 furthers the Secretary of the Air Force’s policy of RSI of alliance
equipment.
5.

Should we fail to sell American aircraft it seems likely the Greek Air

Force will purchase the MIRAGE 2000 from the French.
apparent:
States.

Three drawbacks are

United States’ loses any economic benefit to be gained;

United

NATO solidarity appears weakened, especially in light of traditional

Gaullist attitudes of French-United States government has been working to
stem similar tide in Greek government;

potential for technology loss is not re¬

moved—French jets incorporate much American technology and design. More¬
over as F-16 is clearly superior, the United States leaves Greece in more vul¬
nerable position vis a vis Soviets due to inferior equipment.
6.

This does not however deny the Secretary of the Air Force’s genuine

concern regarding the loss of high level American military technology due to So
viet presence in Greek AirForce.
stake,

Both American and NATO security are at

the Secretary of the Air Force however does not believe Greek AirForce

has fallen under control of leftist factions within Greece. Security breach not
only could be contained but used to our advantage through disinformation possi
bilities.

POLICY OPTIONS
1.

Let Congress stop sale entirely.

2.

Inform Greek P.M. and Chief General Cheneterous of Soviet

presence.
3.

Sell less than state of the art technology
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4.

Make sale conditional upon United States, participation in security

arrangements for any co-production and rework facilities.
a)

As noted in sec.5 non sale has serious ramifications of security

b)

Security interests of United States, are paramount-if need be, we

should inform Greeks to preserve national and NATO security.

Defectors wife

and family should not represent an American concern.
c)

General Dynamics has already been told to release only data on

F-16 A/C versions and are willing to co-operate on further technology precau¬
tions.
d)

Potential already exists for theft or capture of F-16 from Israel,

Egypt or Turkey.

Sale to Greeks does not increase this problem.

The Secretary

of the Air Force is more concerned with problems of secret strategic planning in
Aegean, Balkan and East Europe regions.

Overview of the Design Process
The process of design can be thought of as consisting of five stages.
Stage I: setting the objectives and parameters
Stage II: model development
Stage IH: decision about student representation
Stage IV: construction and modification of the simulation
Stage V: preparation for use of others
Each of these stages entails a number of steps that will be briefly de¬
scribed further.
At the outset it was crucial to consider carefully what I wanted to try to
do and to what ends.

This meant first delimiting as clearly as possible the sub¬

ject matter, purpose, intended participants, and the context of use for the pro¬
posed simulation.

This stage was often skipped or undertaken casually, and my
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initial enthusiasm was translated into vague formulation such as "I want to de¬
sign a simulation about international negotiations,”

with no thought to what the

simulation was supposed to convey, to whom, and under what conditions. The
result was often total failure or a product that was totally inappropriate for the
intended audience. It is critical to make these decisions before anything further
is done, and the good designer will spend considerable time formulating such a
statement, for it offers much needed guidance later in the process.

Wise

choices among alternatives in Stage m could be made only by referring to crite¬
ria that were explicit in Stage I specifications.
In Stage ID, I had to assess the constraints of time, budget, academic re¬
quirements and other resources for development and utilization.

This may be

too obvious to warrant stating, but the novices are likely to find they have tre¬
mendously underestimated needed resources for effective completion of the pro¬
ject.

The resources of potential users must also be assessed.

Later decisions

about levels of abstraction, time reduction, specificity, complexity, parapherna¬
lia, and computing methods, and so on cannot be made soundly without estima¬
tions of the knowledge, time, and monetary resources of the educational institu¬
tion.
In working with the design of the MAS simulation, I found it helpful to
force myself to develop a brief but cogent set of responses to these questions
before proceeding to model development.

The same demands made upon my¬

self have likewise forced me to develop greater clarity about what I was propos¬
ing to undertake.
It may also be stressed that the answers to these questions may lead to
abandon the project.

Simulations may prove to be an inappropriate medium for

your message, or the resources may be deemed insufficient for the task. In
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some instances modification of the intent or inflation of the resources may be
possible, but often this will not be feasible or desirable.

Then the project

should be scrapped and shelved for some future time.
The second stage entails developing a conceptual model of the system to
be simulated and deciding which elements are to be included in the simulation.
To me, this was the most critical phase, and the point at which the simulations
might fail to achieve its effectiveness.

During this stage, I needed to spell out

the system as I understood it from experience or other sources—that is, indicate
the substantive content of the real-world system.

Here roles, goals, activities,

constants, consequences, and external factors were identified.
Although psychological factors can be brought in by participants who are
stressed in the same way their real-world counterparts are stressed, this necessi¬
tated that the most critical of these factors needed to be identified, and roles,
goals, constraints, and contingencies that created them, be identified as well, so
that the sources of the stresses could be simulated.

Consultation with others at

this point was helpful to unearth omissions or inaccuracies of conceptualization.
When the basic model was developed and decisions about elements to be
included were made, I was ready to proceed with translating it into an operating
model.

Here decisions had to be made that related to both style and form.

At

this point, a review of existing simulations gave a sense of their basic style.
Second, the form of the simulation components were determined.

Here deci¬

sions were made about how each model element that was selected for inclusion
in the simulation was to be represented.

Each element can appear in several

ways: in the scenario, in the roles, or in the procedures and rules.
At this stage the actual simulation put together and appropriate date were
located into it.

In stage HI, I decided which pieces needed to be included in the
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scenario and which in roles; now scenarios and role descriptions were written.
Other simulation elements were likewise constructed and materials acquired.
When all parts were assembled to a protoype, the simulation was tested in class.
1 suggest considerable trials and retrials before the simulation can generate the
behaviors and outcome characteristics of the referent system.

Each ’’bug” led

me to reexamination of the conceptual model and the design decisions as well
as to possible failures in the construction process, in search of a missing ele¬
ment or one inacurately linked to others.

Here considerable creativity and forti¬

tude are required, for the point at which you are ’’almost there” may be more
frustrating than the initial stages when you knew a final product was far distant.
When I was satisfied with the design, it needed to be prepared to be used
in the degree program.
successful run.

This meant all the materials had to be reproduced for a

Students with the appropriate backgrounds were selected and

permission to participate in the research project were solidified.
often complicated problems.

These were

Consequently, many fine simulations have never

been made available beyond the limited circle of colleagues.
There are two additional points that must be made here.

First, the

sketch presents the process as unidirectional: The designer moves from one
stage to the next.
stages.

In fact there was much moving back and forth among these

Likewise, insights developed in the design and construction phases

about the complexity of the simulation and the cost of high realism led to the
redefinition of the objectives and parameters, as decision made earlier proved
impractical.
The second caveat is that this is an outline of how simulations should be
created rather than a description of the process used in creating the MAS simu¬
lation.

As described, the process entails a high degree of discipline.

Having
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taken both routes, however—stumbling along doing things in varying sequence,
and following these guidelines—I must stress vigorously that the second approach was much more efficient and effective.
Teaching Format for the IMAS Course
The IMAS simulation employs Participative Management Techniques to
give students full authority-responsibility for carrying out all aspects of the ne¬
gotiation sessions, including its presentation, analysis, and student evaluation.2
The central premise in the development of this teaching method is the observa¬
tion that business managers appear to graduate through a hierarchy of learning
needs which culminate in a self-actualizing stage.3 At this level of learning, stu¬
dents can be given an opportunity to circumvent the sometimes stifling effects
of the instructor/student dyad because they have accumulated enough knowledge
and experience to enter into problem-solving activity of their own.
The IMAS simulation employs structured procedures which guide students
in case analysis, while giving them a free rein to round out the development of
their problem-solving abilities, which include communication, persuasion, leader¬
ship, synthesis, analysis, and creativity skills. Managers who participate in the
IMAS simulation are provided with invaluable experience in using Participative
Management Techniques to arrive at group decisions which, according to long¬
standing research, provide higher quality solutions than determinations made
through authoritarian means.4
The use of Participative Management Techniques to give students auton¬
omy in carrying out the international negotiation sessions is not new or original.
But the structured procedures employed in the IMAS simulation to channel the
student’s effort into productive outcomes are unique, because the procedures
have been carefully designed to encourage the students to achieve a zenith in
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productivity (learning by doing) through synergistic group interaction.5

Addi¬

tionally, the IMAS simulation tries to accommodate a wide range of simulated
real-world problems and the use of Participative Management Techniques as a
basic for group decision making.

Individuals can behave as they wish, keeping

in mind that there are a number of managerial issues or problems that they
might choose to address.
The business venture team concept provides a means for organizing the
roles of the instructor, business managers and government representatives into
an integrated effort for the MAS simulation sessions. These individuals perform
their roles under the assumption that their group represents their company,
state, military, or other government interest group, which can be weakened by
poor performance or made to operate efficiently through sound, decision-mak¬
ing.
In this competitive environment, the students learn to police all aspects of
the participation in the simulation so that everyone has a fair opportunity to
make contributions as well as develop their problem-solving skills. Although
each of the students must do the analysis necessary to resolve the negotiation
issues, the managers are expected to undertake the most comprehensive prepa¬
ration. The simulation must be carried out in a professional environment where
a majority vote, establishing an atmosphere of open-mindedness, settles the di¬
verse issues which arise.6
The IMAS simulation incorporates the use of a problem-solving itinerary
to guide students through the simulation. The major subject areas of this agenda
are the: scenario (dialogue performed between the different companies and the
government representatives); situation analysis (systematic mapping of all factors
which focus on the problem); problem statement ( a concise, concrete, correct,
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yet unique statement of the problem at hand); alternatives (broad courses of ac¬
tion which might eliminate some of the factors contributing to the problem); al¬
ternative strategy (course of action which offers the best cost/benefit advantage
for the company); and program goal(s), constraints/resources, strategies and tac¬
tics for implementing the decided upon strategy).7
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the roles
of the instructor, managers, other participants, and the determination of grades
for for the course.
Scenario

The participants were introduced to the simulation through a short de¬
scription of where they are and what the problem that they will be coping with
is. This was done by the instructor, but also can be done on a cassette, illus¬
trated through a slide show, or handed out to the participants to read. All par¬
ticipants were given a ’’stage setting,” and then introduced to their particular
roles. This presentation to the common scenario was followed by subdivision
into groups, each of which received a second scenario (e.g., Government em¬
ployees, Industry managers). This scenario also made reference to what they
needed to do in the course of the simulation, to the objectives, and to the main
roles represented. When they are to be in a hypothetical country or town (e.g.,
their respective meeting places). These scenarios could be very simple or quite
complex depending on the background of the students.
Student Roles

Players were given roles to play, including goals to strive for, resources
available for them to control or allocate, and an overview of the activities in
which they will engage during the semester, (see sample role descriptions). Not
all roles identified in the conceptual model were represented by the students.
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Indeed only those persons who make decisions that effect the outcome should
generally be included in the role set. Student in different roles had different
learning experiences (see Greenblat, 1980, and Linderman, 1983, for elabora¬
tion) and students who were not getting involved in the negotiation sessions or
any preliminary sessions are likely not to learn much. The decisions of roles
that were not played were incorporated in the role of the instructor, into external events, or into the accounting system.
Role of the Instructor

The primary duties of the instructor during the IMAS simulation was to
make updated information available during the sessions. Although the instructor
played a passive role during the negotiating sessions, he/she can influence the
group’s performance in three ways. First the instructor was responsible for ex¬
plaining the operation of the MAS simulation module. Secondly, prior to the
negotiation sessions, the managers and other key government officials met with
the instructor to discuss all relevant aspects of the proposal(s). Thirdly, during
the sessions, the instructor interacted with the students by making observations,
expressing opinions and asking pointed questions when the managers or partici¬
pants were clearly off track. The instructor then decided whether outside con¬
sultants were needed to help clarify the issue(s) at hand. The instructor served
as the chief executive officer (CEO) and was responsible for the overall func¬
tioning of the different teams. In addition, each of the teams had managers
who reported to the instructor on the activities and progress of the teams.
However, when everything is running smoothly during the sessions, the instruc¬
tor is ideally reduced to a prop. Over the semester, these teams of students/
managers worked independently and negotiated with other teams from industry
and government. There was a great deal of commitment involved on the part of
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the instructor. I would suggest that he/she would not teach any other courses
during the semester to enable him/her to deal with unavoidable circumstances
such as illness, room reservations, meetings with the managers, etc.
The Role of the Managers

Individuals who serve as managers are selected by the instructor so that
negotiating teams are of equal caliber and each student has at least one chance
to serve in this role. Once individuals received their role assignments, the
team managers schedule all the meetings prior and during the negotiating ses¬
sions. The managers also assign specific duties to each member of the team.
These duties include, preparation of qualitative and quantitative analysis, secon¬
dary (library) research, visual aids, developing the theme for the negotiating ses¬
sion, and other tasks considered useful to the team. Throughout the semester,
four to five meetings between the instructor and the managers are held outside
the class to discuss the progress of the groups and develop strategies for team
performance. To schedule a meeting, the instructor periodically checks with the
team managers to see if a meeting would be helpful. On those occasions when
a meeting is considered desirable, a mutually convenient time and location is
arranged and a formal memo confirming the time and place was forwarded to
the teams. The managerial meetings serve to familiarize the instructor with the
teams’ operations and improve communications between the instructor and the
teams. During these meetings, managers often ask the instructor for clarifica¬
tion of an assignment or inquire about methods of motivating a low performing
member. In addition, these meetings facilitate planning, provide greater control
at both levels of management and serve as a formal arena for decision making
activities.

Rather than viewing these meetings as time consuming, managers can

view them to be a valuable opportunity for obtaining advise from their peers
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and the instructor which can subsequently be applied to improve group perform¬
ance. Since the quality of the negotiation session can generally be no better
than the quality of the preparation, it is important the students come into the
sessions with facts, sound logic, and rigorous investigation.
The MAS simulation works best when all participants strive to contribute
to the discussion with timely, relevant, accurate comments, expert opinion drawn
from research and quantitative analysis where it is relevant. If participants at¬
tempt to accumulate points with erroneous and/or reduntant contributions, peers
have the responsibility to correct these individuals by pointing out discrepancies.
Under these circumstances, participants earn points for expediting and raising
the quality of the analysis. Once given their respective roles in the negotiating
process, the members of the workteam (company) are required to cooperate
with each other and the team manager in performing the assigned activities.
This work group setting is designed to provide members with experience in
working with a ’’boss” and their peers to accomplish specific goals.
Procedure and Rules

Having decided on the overall structure of the simulation, the instructor
must now determine what is to happen in the full time from the briefing to the
debriefing.

Since the simulation was interactive and negotiations took place in

cycles, the steps each participant engaged in was initially the same from one
round to the next, but it should be pointed out that the cumulative effects of
earlier decisions and events effected what he/she did next.
It was sometimes possible (and often desirable) to begin with a simple
first round and then add new elements (such as offset, impact of decisions on
local economy). When this was done, the instructor deemed it necessary to in¬
form the participants that there will be additional rules or options introduced
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later. Otherwise they are likely to turn to their managers with complaints that it
was not fair, because they did not know what would come next when they
planned their strategy.

(In a few instances, such warnings were deliberately not

given, as emphasis in the simulation was on some ’’unfairness” of foreign gov¬
ernments and the way they operate). An extremely important dimension of pro¬
cedures and rules involved communication between players. Communication
may be open, restricted to written messages, or in some cases nonexistent. For
example if participants represent foreign government officials they should be
free to communicate only with members from other governments at particular
point of the negotiations. To make communications realistic, letters sometimes
went astray or were not answered for long period of time; the parties were often
not available when called; telephone messages were sometimes not delivered or
were ignored; and ’’wrong numbers” were often reached.
It was also important to guard against artificial ends of interaction.
Sometimes the end was obvious and reasonable: a period of time given to the
culminating negotiation session, and the session ends when the decision is
reached. In other instances, especially where there was a high degree of inter¬
action, the ’’end” was not so obvious.
As mentioned earlier, not all roles have to be played and not all external
factors have to be introduced in the scenario. As the negotiations progressed,
other factors, natural events, or social changes (e.g., change in government due
to elections), may affect the options available to the students. These were intro¬
duced according to a predetermined sequence; or they could appear by chance.
Too often the last option was used, to the detriment of the realism and impact
of the simulation.
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Grading the Course

The MAS simulation employed a closed-loop grading procedure which is
designed to allow each student and opportunity to evaluate the performance of
his or her peers during the simulation. This grading system requires the managers to appraise the quality of performance by the participants and the partici¬
pants to evaluate the proficiency of the managers in conducting the sessions.
The instructor awards ’’gross” performance points to the managers in a lump
sum amount (e.g., 100 pts.) which is standard for each session. The participants
earn gross points from the instructor, based on the quality and quantity of their
participation during the sessions.
At the culmination of three sessions, grading ’’chits” are passed out to
the managers and participants. Each participant is required to evaluate the qual¬
ity of the manager’s performance by circling the attained level of proficiency
associated with each of the attributes on the grading chit. Taking the average of
the participants’ composite score times the manager’s gross points produces net
points which are distributed by the managers to each other, according to their
contribution to the team effort.
In turn, the managers are also responsible for using grading chits to
evaluate the salient aspect of the participants’ performance. By calculating the
the average of the managers’ composite proficiency scores for the participants
and multiplying this figure times the gross participation points awarded by the
instructor, the net points earned by each of the participants can be determined.
Evaluation of the IMAS Course

As in many other professional fields, it is difficult to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of management education.8 The test elements used in evaluating
learning measure only partial elements of practice, perhaps the less important
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ones. Christine Me Guire puts the point dramatically: "After thirty years of
professional research we do not have a satisfactory methodology for evaluating
professional habits and attitudes. Perhaps a radical new approach is required to
achieve any progress in this area. . . Work on the development of an acceptable
theory of unifying conception of competence is urgent. ”9 Grade designations do
little more than sort out individuals who perform well and less well in acade¬
mia. As J. Sterling Livingston and others have pointed out, there is little direct
relationship between academic and practical accomplishments. 10
Nathaniel Cantor wondered whether most curriculum is not shaped by a
teacher s sense of what he/she can teach well rather than by the needs of prac¬
tice:
Logic and mathematics do not begin to exhaust the nature of reality. Yet
most of us have grown up in the tradition that the solution to human problems is
found in statements, logical propositions. Our formal education is primarily in¬
tellectual. We learn answers, general propositions, abstract concepts. We accu¬
mulate facts but continue behaving pretty much the same as the generations of
biblical times. Knowledge does not seem to make much differencedi
Whether or not Livingston is correct, it is undoubtedly difficult to predict
long-term results of any educational effort. To paraphrase Amy Lowell, teach¬
ing is like dropping ideas into the letterbox of the human unconscious: you
know when they are posted but never know when they will be received or in
what form.
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Course Evaluation Instrument
The evaluation of the MAS course sought to determine the suitability and
effectiveness of using the international negotiation case simulation to teach man¬
agers the total process of the negotiation format.

A ’’Course Evaluation” ques¬

tionnaire administered to the course participants attempted to answer the teach¬
ing methodology question as well as the effectiveness of the teaching of the
course.
This instrument contained 34 items in four major categories:
1. Course content
(Items 4,6,9,10,12,13,14,18,19,20,23,27,30)
2.

Methods of teaching
(Items 3,5,8,10,11,16,23,25,29)

3.

Organization of the course
(Items 17,21,26,28)

4.

Usefulness of the Course
(Items 1,2,7,15,22)

Students were asked to respond in four categories: strongly agree, agree,
disagree, strongly disagree.
anonymous.

Participants completing the questionnaire remained

It is hoped that anonymity produced a maximum likelihood of se¬

curing honest responses.
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Course Evaluation Form
Question

SA

A

D

SD

1. It was a waste of time

0

0

0

25

2.

10

15

0

0

911

2

3

10

14

1

0

0

0

12

13

9

13

3

0

0

1

8

16

10

13

2

0

9

12

2

2

0

0

8

17

0

0

16

9

12. The content was excellent

12

8

4

1

13. My attention was held throughout

5

17

3

0

14. Uninteresting course

0

1

10

14

15. The course was very worthwhile

8

14

2

1

0

1

14

10

Overall the course was good

3. More courses should be taught this
way
4. The course held my interest
5. I would have preferred another
method of teaching
6. It was very easy to remain involved
due to participation
7. Not much was gained by this
course
8. The instructor encouraged the de¬
velopment of new viewpoints
9

The simulation was real world re¬
lated

10. It was difficult to keep attentive
11. There was not enough student
participation in this course

16.

Some aspects of simulation were
not well explained
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17. This course results in better
learning than lecturing

2

16

4

3

0

0

15

10

0

0

6

19

20. Materials were easy to follow

4

16

2

3

21. Materials were poorly organized

0

0

4

21

22.

Simulation was not applicable

0

3

10

12

23.

Simulation was very interesting

4

16

3

2

24. I think the facilitator helped us

8

14

1

2

25. I would prefer more lecture

0

0

18

7

26. At time I was confused

5

16

4

0

27. Excellent course content

6

16

3

0

11

0

0

8

3

2

0

16

9

18. The simulation was too difficult
19. One of the worsts courses in
MBA program

28. The simulation was too much work 14
29. More time would be needed

12

30. The materials were not appropriate 0
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An analysis of the data showed that students thought very highly of the
course content in terms of its appropriateness and its usefulness. All partici¬
pants (one hundred percent) of the IMAS course felt that they had gained from
the course, and that the content of the course was excellent.
Reactions to the organization and methods of teaching the IMAS course
were more varied. The majority of the students (ninety percent) preferred the
simulation method of teaching and all (one hundred percent) said they would
take another course that was taught this way if it was dealing with ill-structured
problems. Although there was agreement that the course was generally well or¬
ganized, eighty percent said that at times they were confused by the information
given to them. Informal interviews with the participants revealed that part of
this confusion was due to the accelerated pace taken in the later part of the se¬
mester.
At the completion of the pilot course, students were also asked by the
instructor, to evaluate the course by responding to the following statement:
’’Would you please give us your perception of this course and how the
learning applies to your job.”
Here are some of their perceptions:
I learned something about myself; I really uncovered a blind spot in the
way I deal with others.
Learning how to prepare a proposal was a real mystery until. .. explained
it to our group. Professor never could. I may go into the consulting business now.
I didn’t realize their were so many different ways of dealing with this ’’situ¬
ation,” and there are lots of ’’situations” that we had to consider. I have to get
away from single track thinking.
This model on negotiations taught me a lot. It isn’t just that I can under¬
stand variance analysis; more importantly, I could stand the pressure of not know-
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mg - not making any progress for weeks. They were hell, but I didn’t quit.
Funny, I’ve gotten a lesson in patience and perseverance.
I went into the first negotiation session with one point of view; it came
under attack! In the old days I would have dropped my idea immediately, but I
stuck in there, gave ground where I saw it was weak, and came away having
convinced most of my group that our plan was right. I can do it!
I m now confident that I have a framework of understanding, how to un¬
derstand and get things done when working with government people. The sessions
gave me the final know-how on ways of working in a complicated multinational
environment.
I sure goofed! My proposal was a good one and I had spent hours working
it through with our V.P. of International. Yeah — but we ignored the key element:
how was I going to convince other that doing it was in their best interest?
These comments illustrate the rich and varied nature of student learning
experiences in a simulation setting. They do justice to student’s substantive
learning experiences, they emphasize the development of personal insight into
individual strengths and weaknesses, reaffirmation of the importance of qualities
perhaps not fully appreciated—patience and persuasion, and confidence in one’s
own capacities to endure stress. Instructors must wonder how much of this can
be planned or even predicted. Few instructors set out to teach students patience
or tolerance for uncertainty. Faculty members assume, understandability and
appropriately, the primacy of academic objectives. What and when adults learn
is often only directly related to formal teaching plans.
Beatrice Neugarten was correct when he said that we do not have a good
way of understanding or evaluating how people learn. 12 But in the author’s
brief excursion into the world of ill-structured problems, I found a good bit of
agreement between teacher and students as to the elements of an effective busi-
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ness simulation. Both felt the ultimate teaching objective was the student's de¬
velopment of a personally tested, intuitive pattern of understanding and acting in
complex situations.
To emphasize the importance of process is not to denigrate the value of
knowledge. It is the relationship of knowledge to practice that is critical for any
manager. The sophisticated analysis was as follows: management and negotia¬
tions are learned on the job. When the outcome of a negotiation was millions
or hundreds of millions in bottom line results as well as maker share in techno¬
logical advances, few companies can gamble with inexperience—yet how does
one learn without doing it? The answer is through simulations. The military
does war games and simulations for the same reasons.
great physician, makes the point that:

Sir William Osier, the

”To study the phenomena of disease

without books is to sail an uncharted sea. While to study books without pa¬
tients, is not to go to sea at all.”13
For a teacher of adult management students, the interplay of knowledge
and the discussion process is critical. Like two scissor blades, both elements
must work together for incisive learning.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to design and use a simulation in a
graduate course in international business negotiations in which experience was a
must. The situation was designed in such a way that no single teacher could be
expert or teach the subject matter. There are a number of instructional meth¬
ods and techniques that can be used to teach international business negotiations.
Lectures and reading assignments tend to serve as the foundation of most
graduate business cources. To supplement this approach cases and/or simula¬
tions are often added as an integral part of the course. Among the rationale
supporting case studies and simulations as useful teaching strategies is the idea
that simulated environments provide adult learners with a dynamic content that
has to be experienced cognitively and affectively. The more involved and active
students are in the simulation the more experience they gain to help solve realworld problems. Negotiations are inherently uncertain and long running com¬
plex negotiations among diverse interest groups typically proceed with many ups
and downs.
Experience may induce learning in two ways. The first results simply
form the students’ exposure to certain facts not necessarily related to the out¬
come of the simulation. At some point after several classes, students learn
about the complexity of the simulation and start using the experience of their
classmates. The second way experience may induce learning is by demonstrat¬
ing that certain consequences (offset, win the contract, or loose it) depend on
certain behaviors (the participation of the student). This encourages the stu¬
dents to discriminate between different behaviors and strategies in order to find
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the strategy providing the most favorable consequences for all parties involved.
The evidence presented in this study supports the hypothesis that experience-in¬
duced learning is an effective way to resolve ill-structured problems. The kind
of experience-induced learning with which this study was concerned is that in
which the consequences of certain behavior are demonstrated to the students.
The more innovative a new technique is, the greater the difficulties of
dissemination—and simulations certainly fall toward the ’’more” end of the in¬
novation continuum. The physical format alone demands significant departures
form standard classroom arrangements. Chairs and tables get moved around,
students move about the room freely or gather in small groups to argue over
points of strategy. Sending information via fax machines and running meetings
via satalite is new to most people.

Simulations closely fit Dewey’s ideal of the

’’active learner,” and classrooms are often noisy and apparently less well organ¬
ized than in the conventional lecture-recitation situation.
A second and, perhaps more radical, change is the teacher-student rela¬
tionship. If teachers use simulations in the matter intended, they should familiar¬
ize themselves with the rules, but also change their perception of students. An
important assumption underlying this teaching method is that students can be
autonomous, self-motivating, and self-regulating with regard to their own learn¬
ing to a much greater extend than is normally assumed—or allowed. While this
shift in control may lead to a more productive exchange between students and
teachers, it also may be very threatening to those (both teachers and students)
accustomed to more authoritarian methods of teaching.
Third, the type of problem posed by an International Negotiation simula¬
tion differs from the type of problem usually presented in a case situation.
Teachers and students alike are familiar with the textbook problems which cov-
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ers one or a few specific points and might have one unambiguous "right an¬
swer." They will probably also have tried "discussions” about ill-structured
problems. An International sumulation presents a rather complex problem, and
there is, in contrast to the textbook problem, usually more than one winning
strategy. At the same time unlike the "discussion," some strategies are clearly
much superior to others. This kind of problem is often encountered by managers in real life situations.

Recommendations

Most research reports conclude with a few paragraphs on gaps in the ex¬
isting knowledge in the field with suggestions for further research. The author
will not follow this line in any detail because the research described in this pa¬
per is clearly not complete. The newness and complexities of the field of adult
learning are such that any well-thought-out evaluative research will make a
genuine contribution to our knowledge (and, of course, replications of much of
the work reported here would be of great use).
At the high tide of American economic expansion, American firms found
a seemingly unlimited and uncontested outlet for their products in their own do¬
mestic market. The home market was large, unified, and familiar. Foreign
markets were small, segmented, and protected not only by tariff barriers but
also by impenetrable distribution systems. Above all, they were foreign: operat¬
ing in them required linguistic and cultural skills that Americans did not have
and did not wish to acquire. Hence, most foreign markets and foreign competi¬
tors were largely ignored.
Today the global business strategies of European and Asian firms have
fundamentally changed the game (see Chapter I). The nation is extremely
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linked to the rest of the advanced industrial world. However, Americans have
not taken seriously the needs and preferences of other societies, at least in part
because they simply have not those needs and preferences. Parochialism has
been an economic handicap, because it cripples efforts to sell to foreign mar¬
kets. Many Americans pat scant attention to life beyond the nation's borders.
Graduate schools even have reinforced this inward-looking bias and failed to
open windows into the world. 1
Because of the increased dispersion of technology and managerial innova¬
tion among countries and the need for firms to match global best practice, the
author agrees with the recommendations of the MIT Commission on Industrial
Productivity which states that future managers must be skilled in all of the fol¬
lowing: (1) operating in an international economic, political, legal, social, and
information era; (2) operating in a number of national environments and social
structures: (3) managing international flows of goods, people, technology, infor¬
mation, and financial resources and the institutions that facilitate and regulate
these flows: and (4) learning across borders, by which we mean identifying,
analyzing, and adapting the world’s best management practices wherever they
happen to be found.
To develop these skills, the commission recommends the following:
. . . three changes are needed in educational programs. First, the interna¬
tional content must be deepened in the required courses taken by all management
students. Second, linkages with regional-study programs and with universities in
other countries should be strenghtened to foster broader exchanges of ideas,
knowledge, students, and faculty.2
To provide this deeper international exposure and skill to students, more
management faculty members will need to be directly exposed to, and expert in,
international developments, practices, and theories in their specific discipline or
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specialty. Creation of curriculum materials such as this simulation needs to be
encouraged. For this to happen, the reward criteria used to evaluate faculty pro¬
motion and tenure will need to be revised to reflect the longer lead times required to do high-quality scholarly work of this kind.
Finally, going beyond the question of how universities can contribute to
to goal of internationalizing its curriculum, we believe that our own productivity
at the Hartford Graduate Center as an educational institution is hampered by
several of the weaknesses that led to the decline of the American industry. For
example, we are subject to short-term pressures in setting goals and in measur¬
ing the success of students, faculty members, and programs; we do not have
adequate resources in place to manage educational change effectively. In short,
we call on our colleagues at the Graduate Center to continue the effort this
study has started..

Personal Reflections

It is always rewarding to witness the timid, unsure students, gain in self¬
assuredness to emerge competent and confident learners. The beauty of this
transformation lies in the knowledge that the change process means a letting go
of security and an embracing of momentary insecurity, while leaving the self
open to criticism from other students. It is difficult, if not impossible, to cap¬
ture in writing or relay with any degree of accuracy to non-eyewitnesses these
instances of vulnerabilities shared between learners and observers. Although the
findings reported on the aforementioned instrument suggest positive kinds of
changes in competencies, the statistical date only expresses static states of a
learner’s development, while empirical techniques come closer to capture the
instances of change. The author witnessed two basic kinds of changes: changes
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in cognitive growth and changes in affective growth. Students in the IMAS
course shared moments of their vulnerabilities with this author. Most of the
students came into this experimental course expressing verbal and nonverbal
fears about participating in a non-structured class, but in observations of these
students throughout the semester, some of these fear were assuaged. Students
who were frightened began to steadily develop positive feelings and attitudes
about the non-structured sessions.
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PART II

CURRICULUM MATERIALS FOR CASE STUDY SIMULATION

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
F-18 Wins Spanish Fighter Competition

July 23, 1982. Madrid — The Spanish government today announced
that it has reached agreement with Mc-Donnell-Douglas Aircraft to purchase
eighty four F-18A aircraft. The cost of this weapons purchase is estimated to
be $3 billion, which makes it the largest in Spain’s history. To help Spain de¬
fray this cost, the United States has agreed to provide Spain low interest loans
as part of a USA-Spain bilateral defense pact. McDonnell-Douglas will also
assist Spain by providing counter-trade and offsets worth 100 percent of the con¬
tract price.

Supposedly, McDonnell-Douglas will buy $100 million of Spanish

made shoes as a part of this offset deal.
The Spanish government’s announcement ends competition among three
aircraft manufacturers, McDonnell-Douglas, manufacturer of the F-18A, General
Dynamics, maker of the F-16A, and Dassault-Brequet of France, maker of the
Mirage 2000. Final choice was between the F-16 and F-18. This is the third
time since 1980 that General Dynamics has lost an international sales competi¬
tion to McDonnell-Douglas. Canada chose the F-18 for its Air Force in 1980,
and Australia followed suit in 1981.
The Spanish Government and McDonnell-Douglas have yet to finalize the
details of the agreement, and whether they will be able to do so before the up¬
coming October elections is questionable. Spokespersons for the Spanish Social¬
ist Worker Party (PSOE) have previously expressed that Spain would prefer to
purchase a European aircraft. PSOE, which is opposed to Spain’s membership
in NATO, and which is growing in popularity, would likely either try to cancel
or demand significant revisions in any agreement
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negotiated by the present government.
When asked to comment on the impact on this contract of the PSOE
coming to power in October. General Garcia Conde of the Spanish Air Ministry
argued that defense matters must be held above party politics. "The best has
been chosen.”
The Fighter Competition; Complex Process, High Stakes Game

A fighter aircraft sales competition is a complex weave of business and
politics. Because of the many dimensions involved in choosing the winning
fighter

the comparative combat capabilities of each competing aircraft, the val¬

ues of the offset packages offered by competing corporations and countries, the
political and military benefits of purchasing the aircraft of one country versus
another—choices involve a marketing calculus not easily followed by outside
analysts. The stakes for the companies and countries involved are enormous.
For the sellers, a fighter competition is a zero-sum game. The winning com¬
pany can stretch out its production and thereby reduce its costs and increase its
profits. The winning country benefits from closer diplomatic and military rela¬
tions with the purchasing country, decreased defense costs, increased domestic
employment and an inflow of foreign exchange. The losers get none of these. 1
All risk, however, does not rest with the sellers. Should they choose the
wrong aircraft, decision makers for the purchasing country stand to lose not
only their peace of mind, but also their jobs. Choosing an aircraft that is illequipped for the country’s air force can result in scores of pilots being killed in
training alone.2 On the other hand, foregoing a more generous offset package
in order to purchase the most combat-capable aircraft can cost the economy
thousands of jobs, new technology and needed foreign exchange. Perceived in-
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competence and corruption on the part of these decision makers is powerful political ammunition for parties out of power.
As one of the chief participants in the recently announced fighter competmon being conducted by Greece, (or any other country which has a Request for
Proposal) you must become thoroughly familiar with the dynamics of these sales
competitions. This compendium of potentially useful information has been written to assist you in that task.
Objectives and Descriptions

IMAS is a business negotiation simulation developed to familiarize the
participant with most of the issues, strategies, and pressures involved in interna¬
tional military aircraft negotiations. It combines the political, as well as the eco¬
nomic, forces at work and illustrates the necessity for careful consideration to
the ramifications of negotiated issues. It is not designed to teach ’’international
negotiations” as such, but rather to give students a practical approach to the
strategy and substantive information required in these negotiations. It enables
them to experience the dynamics of international military aircraft negotiations.
As participants in these negotiations, students will be members of either
the U.S. government, a foreign government, or one of the businesses involved.
The goal of their team will be to negotiate an agreement based on the demands
which it believes to be most important. The team will continuously receive state¬
ments of its perspective and outlook on certain important issues.
Opening Observations

A sales agreement is the end result of a fighter competition. The country
holding the competition selects one of the competing aircraft and agrees with
the winning company and country on the terms of the sale based on:
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1. the economic, political and military goals of the purchasing govern¬
ment;
2. the economic, political and military goals of the selling government;
3. the economic, political and military goals of the military and civilian
hierarchies and legislative committees which compete within the governments of
both the purchasing and selling countries to determine the goals of each; the
economic and political goals of competing aerospace companies;
4. the goals of all other organizations which perceive themselves as af¬
fected by the competition and who were motivated by those perceptions to take
action. The competitive process by which a sales agreement is reached is
driven by individual decision makers possessing varying degrees of influence
within these governmental and corporate organizations. These people must work
within the following constraints:
a. national law
b. the written standard operating procedures of the organization for
which they work
c. the unwritten rules, customs and procedures of the various participat¬
ing organization and
d. their personal perceptions of relevant political and economic environ¬
ments. These perceptions are based on information gathered through both the
media and personal sources.
If one could know the evolving goals of all the individuals in all the par¬
ticipating organizations, then one might, with a phenomenally sophisticated com¬
puter model, be able to come close on the price/offset package.Or one might
construct a table of assumptions for price/offset packages which would show
what values would yield a tie among the competing companies. Attempting
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such a feat, however, would be too time consuming to be practical. Neverthe¬
less, it is possible to overlay a framework on the process and thereby create an
heuristic model for understanding the competition’s dynamics.
Building the Model

Step One: Identify the Key Players

The first step in constructing a model is identifying the key people in the
competition. The key people are those who have the greatest influence on what
aircraft is finally selected by the purchasing country. Key people for the pur¬
chasing country might be the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the For¬
eign Minister, or the Chief General of the Air Force. For a selling country such
as the United States the key people might be the Secretaries of the Navy or Air
Force, the Secretary of State or a particular senator or congressman. Each or¬
ganization that is actively participating in the process has key people working
for it. Additionally, the laws and procedures of selling and purchasing countries
usually mandate particular individuals taking significant roles in the process.
Step Two: Identify the Key Players’s Goals

The second step is to determine the goals of each of these key players.
This model assumes key players are dynamic individuals with strong egos who
have achieved their present positions through setting goals for both themselves
and their organizations. It further assumes they have goals they believe the out¬
come of the competition will effect. These goals vary depending upon the roles
of each key player. A CEO for an aerospace company has profit goals for his
corporation; a finance minister for a purchasing country has goals for economic
growth. Knowing the goals of the key players in the competition is critical in
determining the outcome.
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Step Three: Classifying the Goals

The third step requires classifying each key player’s goals according to
three categories: national, subnational and transnational. These three categories are defined as follows:3
National: These are goals which are of overriding concern to the country
as a whole. They include, but are not limited to: building a strong national de¬
fense, increasing the nation s international influence; increasing national employ¬
ment, and increasing economic growth.
Subnational: These are goals which aim at benefiting political constitu¬
ency that is a subelement of the national policy. Subnational goals are often
stated in such a way as to appear as contributing to the achievement of national
goals. Consequently, they are often difficult to separate from national goals.
Transnational: These are goals that relate to the transnational opera¬
tions of competing aerospace companies and transnational organizations such as
NATO and the EEC.
By the nature of their positions, some key players will have goals that
predominantly fall into one category. For example, the goals of the President of
the United States are primarily national. Other key players may have goals in
two or three categories. For example, a national goal of the Secretary of De¬
fense is to strengthen the country’s national security. However, he/she desires
adequate funds in the budget for specific defense programs. His/her goals relat¬
ing to specific projects might be categorized as subnational. Other examples
are congressmen from states producing major portions of one of the competing
aircraft. They might support the sale because they firmly believe it will
strengthen NATO (transnational) and also strengthen U.S. national security (na-
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tional).They most certainly support it because of the desire to increase employment in their district (subnational).
Why break down each key player’s goals by these categories? Going
through this exercise forces one to think carefully about the goals and under¬
stand their nature. Besides to directly note how this breakdown may suggest
how different package mix may reduce opposition or build support. For exam¬
ple, the aforementioned congressman might profess supporting a sale for na¬
tional and transnational reasons. Are these actually goals of the congressman,
or simply arguments he is using to help him achieve his subnational goal of in¬
creasing employment in his district?
Step Four: Classify Goal Sets

The fourth step entails classifying each set of national, subnational and
transnational goals as political, military or economic in nature. This is done be¬
cause most arguments either in favor or against a particular sale are framed in
political, military and economic terms. Table 1

identifies some key players ac¬

cording to the goal categories in which their goals predominantly fall, and the
predominant classifications of those goals within those categories.4 For exam¬
ple, the Congress (and each congressman and senator as a member of it) has
political, military and economic goals at the national level; an individual con¬
gressman has political and economic goals at the subnational level.
Step Five: Determine Cost/Benefits of Sale

Once the goals of key players have been categorized, the next step re¬
quires examining all facets of each proposed sales agreement and judging the
costs and benefits of each to each player. If the sale positively affects a player’s
national political goals when taken together, a +1 is assigned to that goalset; if it
negatively affects it, -1; if it has no effect on it, 0. (see Table 2). This is done
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for all goals sets of all key players. For example, the aforementioned congress¬
man faces the following situation: He is a liberal Democrat representing a dis¬
trict which is home to a large defense contractor. This contractor is the largest
employer in the state and needs foreign sales to maintain high levels of employ¬
ment. However, a large percentage of voters in the district are opposed to the
U.S. selling any arms overseas. The congressman favors a strong national de¬
fense and a strong NATO alliance. The congressman’s district derives
$3,000,000 benefit for each F-18 sold overseas
This step is important and difficult. It requires weighing the relative im¬
portance of each key player in the competition. As a start, one should look at
the position each player holds in the hierarchy of the process. In doing this, re¬
member that all players have certain restraints upon their ability to act. Weights
can be assigned on any scale desired by the analyst. For example, assume that
the aforementioned congressman is Tip O’Neill.
On a scale of 0 to 1, O’Neill might receive a weight of .8.

(see Table 3).

As time passes, people both gain and lose influence. The changing influence of
players is sometimes a natural part of the process.
For example, one of the first things the government of the purchasing
country does is evaluate competing aircraft. Usually the country’s air force per¬
forms this evaluation. In this role the air force has the power to eliminate any
of the competing aircraft for military and technical reasons. Once the air force
validates particular aircraft is meeting military requirements, it loses some of its
power over the final choice.
The changing influence of players can also result from events totally un¬
related to the competition itself. For example, if a strong labor leader who was
close friends with the president and who was a strong supporter of the United
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States selling the F-16 versus the F-18 to another country were suddenly indicted
on racketeering charges, it would probably undermine his influence over a final
decision.
Step Six: Use Fighter Competition Matrix

The final step requires inserting each player's weight and goal scores in a
competition matrix similar to the one shown in Table 3. Such a matrix can be
built easily on Lotus 1-2-3. By adding the matrix both down and across, the
analyst can derive the following information:
1.

An estimate of the potential intensity of eachkey player’s support for,

or opposition to, a particular proposal;
2. Information on why each key player supports or opposes a proposal;
3.

A breakdown of the specific political, military and economic

strengths and weaknesses of a particular proposal according to national, subna¬
tional and transnational categories.This information is valuable in formulating a
strategy for steering the competition a particular way. Of course, this model is
not a magic answering machine. One must carefully analyze the sensitivity of
each variable before reaching an answer which can be both time consuming and
imprecise. Nevertheless, the model provides a means of finding one’s way
through a maze of complexity.
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CHAPTER II
COST BENEFITS OF A MAJOR AIRCRAFT SALES AGREEMENT

To use the model presented in the previous section, one must be able to
discern the costs and benefits to the key players of each possible sales agree¬
ment. Because every competition can involve different countries, corporations
and personalities, it is impossible to present all of the potential costs and bene¬
fits which might arise in a particular competition. However, generalizations
about potential costs and benefits are possible. What follows is a delineation
and discussion of the political, military and economic costs and benefits that can
arise from a major weapons sale.
Political Costs and Benefits

An arms transaction is just one in a stream of events that makes up the
relationship between two nations. It can either mark the beginning of a coopera¬
tive relationship or contribute to its continuation. This portion of the compen¬
dium addresses the political costs and benefits of a major weapons sale that are
derived by the selling country.
Political Benefits

The political benefits of arms transactions manifest themselves in three
ways:
1. As a symbolic gesture of friendship and support
2. As a means by which the selling country furthers its influence with
the purchasing country;
3. As a means by which the selling country acquires leverage in deter¬
mining the specific political behavior of the purchaser. 1
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Symbolism and Friendship
Arms are an important symbol of statehood. Making them available to
another country symbolizes a strong recognition by the selling country of the le¬
gitimacy of the purchasing country’s government.

It tangibly evidences support

for the independence and territorial integrity of the purchasing country.
thermore, it indicates a mutually beneficial political relationship.

Fur¬

Consequently,

a major arms sale is one means of strengthening political relationships with an¬
other country.
Influence.
Political influence manifests itself in two forms.

One is through the dif¬

ferent types of specific influence that arise directly from the arms transfer rela¬
tionship. For example, this could derive from the impact that the selling coun¬
try’s military training has upon the attitude and behavior of the purchasing
country’s military establishment.

The other form arises from the additional

day-to-day access government and corporate officials of the selling country
have to the officials of the purchasing country’s government.

There may be a

tendency, however, to exaggerate the specific influence created by arms transac¬
tions.

In some cases the selling country may find itself compelled to make a

sale just so it can maintain the influence it has with the purchaser.
Leverage.
Leverage provides the selling country with a means of extracting specific
political behavior from the purchasing country.

It is exercised in the extreme in

two ways: (1) the selling country agrees to sell more arms to the purchasing
country in return for specific political behavior; (2) the selling country embar¬
goes all arms sales to the purchasing country if it continues specific political be¬
havior.

Whether leverage is a viable benefit of an established seller/buyer rela-
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tionship is questionable. By establishing a close arms relationship, the seller en¬
ters into a political bond with the buyer in which trust becomes an important
factor. Consequently, attempting to exercise whatever leverage exists often
gives rise to negative consequences. Exercising the leverage disrupts political
relationships between buyer and seller by damaging the trust and friendship fos¬
tered by the earlier sales. Often the buyer will turn to other countries for its
purchases, many times to the political and economic detriment of the original
selling country.
Political Costs

There are three obvious potential political costs of arms transfers:2
1. Identification of the seller with repressive regimes.
2. Loss of prestige due to the purchasing country’s poor performance in
combat;
3. Creation of a potential hostage population in the purchasing country.
Repressive Regimes.

Selling arms to a country run by a repressive government identifies the
selling country with the policies of that government. For example, the recent
United States’ arms sale to Iran led directly to a disastrous turn in the United
States-Iranian relations after the overthrow of the Shah.
Loss of Prestige.

When a close arms transfer relationship exists between two countries, the
combat success or failure of the purchasing country’s armed forces directly re¬
flects on the military power and prestige of the selling country. Egypt’s debacle
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a serious blow to Soviet prestige, as was
South Vietnam’s final fall in 1975 a blow to American prestige.

120

Hostages.
Selling a fleet of sophisticated fighter aircraft to a nation often requires
the selling country sending its citizens to the purchasing country to provide
training and technical assistance on the use and maintenance of the aircraft.
This population of teachers and technicians becomes a potential hostage popula¬
tion if relations between the seller and the buyer radically change.

For exam¬

ple, before the Shah’s overthrow, there were between 25,000 and 30,000 Ameri¬
cans in Iran working on arms transfer related programs.3
Military Costs and Benefits

Military costs and benefits are a national concern. This section will dis¬
cuss these national concerns as they affect the selling country.
Military Benefits.
There are four direct and two indirect military benefits derived from sell¬
ing sophisticated weapons systems to other countries:4
Direct.
1.

strengthens allied forces;

2.

strengthens the forces of friendly nations;

3.

in some instances it might be a means by which the selling country

can obtain military base rights from the purchaser;
4.

it is a means by which the selling country can obtain intelligence

gathering rights.
Indirect.
5.

may curb nuclear proliferation;

6.

may provide a means by which selling country can test its combat

equipment.
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Support for Allies
Arms sales are a critical ingredient in the defense bond between allied
countries. First, they can help create relative peace and stability in otherwise
potentially explosive, strategically important areas.

For example, United States'

arms assistance and sales to both Europe through NATO and to South Korea
have significantly contributed to the maintenance of peace in those regions.
Second, in the event that war occurs, providing one’s allies with arms ensures
they will be effective partners in combat because their arms are compatible with
one’s own arms.

This facilitates joint operations with allied armed forces. Also,

the development process for hi—technology arms might also create an opportu¬
nity for coproduction with allied nations.
Support for Friends.
Friendly countries are those the selling country hopes would win an
armed conflict but with which it is not obligated by alliances to fight alongside
of.

In the case of the United States, arming friends is a means of reducing the

level of direct United States’ military commitments abroad, thereby reducing the
monetary and manpower burden inherent in honoring international obligations.
Nevertheless, supplying arms to friendly countries is no guarantee that those
arms will be used for purposes intended by the selling country. For example,
the United States did not supply both Pakistan and India with arms so they
could use them against each other as they did in the mid 1960s. Moreover, sup¬
plying friendly countries can sometimes be the first step to direct intervention by
the supplying country, as is argued was the United States’ experience in Viet¬
nam.
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Base Rights.
Bases can be used as a bargaining chip for negotiating base rights in an¬
other country.

An excellent example of this is the base rights treaty the United

States and Spain negotiated as a part of Spain’s purchase of the F—18.

Never¬

theless there are other means of securing base rights, including cash payments,
loans and other economic assistance.
Intelligence Gathering Rights.
In essence, this is part of the benefit derived from using arms sales to
secure basing rights.

However, because of the strategic importance of intelli¬

gence gathering and because of the way it potentially alters the nature of rela¬
tionships between a purchasing country and its neighbors, it should be viewed as
a separate benefit.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
An argument can be made that this is an indirect benefit of arms sales.
The logic is that if a potential nuclear power has a sufficient conventional arse¬
nal to ensure its security, it will have less incentive to develop nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately,

there are many other reasons to become a nuclear power,

among which are prestige, the desire to match regional competition, and the de¬
sire to attain regional dominance.

What might, in fact, result in creation in the

region of both a conventional arms race and nuclear arms race.
Test Combat Equipment.
This is also argued to be an indirect benefit of arms sales.

It too is a

questionable benefit at best because any testing usually takes place accidentally.
The supplier usually does not know for certain whether the arms supplied will
be used in combat.

Additionally, testing environments are often poor because

of the different military strategies, tactics, levels of training and technical com-
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petence of the forces of a user country. Equipment testing has never been
openly used by the United States as a justification for arms sales.
Military Costs

There are at least three military costs a country potentially incurs by sell¬
ing arms to another country:5
1. sales of arms by a country may hurt its military readiness;
2. arms sold by a country may eventually be used against its own forces;
and
3. technology transferred as a part of the sale may fall into the hands of
the selling country’s enemies.
Military Readiness.

Arms sales can hurt a country's military readiness in two ways. The first
occurs when sales are made directly from the military stocks of the selling coun¬
try, thereby reducing the weapons and supplies it has to equip its own forces.
The second occurs when manufacturers of weapons systems which are in high
demand are not able to produce enough of them to supply the demands of the
selling country’s armed forces.6
Use Against Seller.

The best example of this problem comes from the recent Falklands crisis.
In the three years leading up to the conflict, the United Kingdom sold Argentina
warships and electronics valued at $200 million. Ironically one-fourth of the
Exocet missile components used by the Argentine Air Force to sink two British
ships, were manufactured in Britain.7
Technology Theft by Hostile Powers.

In cases where the military and industrial security of a purchasing coun¬
try are not as good as they are in the selling country, opportunities exist for
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hostile powers to steal both actual weapons and weapons manufacturing technol¬
ogy. This problem has become a grave concern of the United States in recent
years. Presently, safeguarding technology is a major consideration of the De¬
fense Department in deciding whether to approve the export of an advanced
weapons system
Economic Costs and Benefits

Economic costs and benefits permeate every sales agreement, and affect
players on national, subnational and transnational levels.
National Perspective

At the national level, the economic costs and benefits are measurable in
terms of Gross National Product (GNP), Balance of Payments (BOP), national
unemployment, and growth within targeted sectors of the economy. These costs
and benefits can be derived by looking at the relevant economic statistics for
both the selling and purchasing countries.
Selling Country:

United States.

Table 3 describes the relationship between the United States’ economy
and the import/export of weaponry.8 The export of arms is not overwhelmingly
important to the United States national economy. In 1983, for example, arms
exports comprised only 5.3% of all United States’ exports.9 Nevertheless, the
United States can hardly afford to ignore the positive economic effects accruing
from arms sales. Making certain economic assumptions, it is possible to graph
United States GNP both with and without arms sales overseas. 10
Such a graphing, as shown in Figure 1, illustrates that the exclusion of
arms exports would have significantly reduced United States’ GNP. These GNP
differences translate into a gain of almost 26,000 jobs in the United States’
economy for every $1 billion arms exported. 11 It is easy to see how exporting
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100 jet fighters worth over $3 billion provides an economic benefit that easily
translates into a political benefit. The possible alternatives make the ’’visible”
gain probably much less in reality.
The second major economic benefit accruing to the United States is a
lower cost of defense. By political necessity, the United States must maintain
its own defense industry. In the case of fighter aircraft, only a limited number
of United States’ corporations are capable of designing, developing and build¬
ing aircraft capable enough for the mission requirements of the Navy and the
Air Force. Keeping these companies financially solvent required the United
States’ Government’s providing them with adequate markets for their aircraft.
However, it is not politically viable for the government to purchase more aircraft
than are minimally required by the armed services.
All of this presents the government with a dilemma: If the extra aircraft
are purchased, the added expenditure will heavily increase the deficit; if the air¬
craft are not purchased, the companies may face bankruptcy and need federal
assistance as Lockheed did during early 1970.12 One way out of this dilemma is
allowing these companies to export aircraft.
Exporting has an additional benefit in this regard it provides the United
States with money to defray the research and development costs associated with
developing new aircraft. In some cases, the United States makes a profit on
collecting these ’’recoupement” fees normally paid to the United States by coun¬
tries purchasing United States aircraft. Overall, especially in light of the pre¬
sent deficit debate, the savings arising from all arms exports looms large as not
only an economic but also as a political benefit.
The size of the economic benefit was empirically derived by the Defense
Department in early 1970 for all United States arms exports. For every $11 bil-
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lion dollars in arms the United States government exports, it saves $770 mil¬
lion. 13
Purchasing Country:

Spain.

The economic costs or benefits of a major arms purchase to a country
like Spain depend largely upon the terms of the sales agreement. Two features
of sales agreements, financing (specifically United States’ Foreign Military
Sales financing) and the offset packaging can turn purchases which would be
overall detriments to the national economy into overall benefits.
Purchase Made Without Financing and Offset
%

Just as arms exports help the United States’ economy, arms imports hurt
the Spanish economy. Table 3 and Figure 1 both illustrate why the Spanish
Government cannot afford to ignore the economic costs of arms imports. 14
Purchase Made With Financing and Offset

Arms import agreements may turn from costs into benefits when financ¬
ing and offsets are included. The United States’ Foreigm Military Sales financ¬
ing program, the biggest of its kind in the world, provides both credit guaran¬
tees and direct credit to purchasing nations such as Spain. This financing signifi¬
cantly reduces import of arms sales on international balance of payments. Table
5 shows that Spain has received considerable Foreigm Military Sales funding
since 1972. Comparing the size of amounts of Foreigm Military Sales credits
granted to the size of Spanish arms imports over these years bears witness to
this. 15 Offsets, however, may provide even more economic benefit than financ¬
ing for a given purchase.

’’Offset” is a generic term commonly used to refer to

economic benefit package both selling countries and companies offer a purchas¬
ing country. The package is designed to counteract or ’’offset” the detrimental
impact of huge outflow of capital,

($ 3 billion in the case of Spains s F-18
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purchase) would have on the economy. However, balancing international cash
flow is not the only benefit a country’s economy derives from offset. In addi¬
tion, the purchasing country may acquire the right to coproduce the aircraft it
purchases. The new technologies often acquired through these coproduction
agreements aid the purchasing country’s efforts to further develop its economy.
Finally, many offset packages require the contracting company’s finding new
markets for goods produced by the purchasing country’s economy.
All in all, once financing and offset are considered, a major arms pur¬
chase often results in a net benefit to the purchasing country’s economy.
Subnational Perspective.

This perspective is a function of the infrastructure of the countries in¬
volved in the competition.

Consequently, to appreciate the subnational eco¬

nomic cost/benefit implications of a particular salesagreement, it is necessary to
understand the infrastructure of the participating countries. Analysis should be¬
gin with a careful review of the political and industrial situation of the selling
and purchasing countries.
Selling Country:

United States.

The political substructure of the United States is made up of states and
congressional districts. The industrial structure is primarily made up of the con¬
tracting and subcontracting aerospace corporations, aerospace and defense re¬
lated industrial associations and labor unions. The key players with the most sig¬
nificant subnational concerns are usually legislators and corporate executives.
The national economic costs/benefit of a particular sales agreement are
magnified in those states hosting major defense contractors and subcontractors
such as Texas (General Dynamics) and Missouri (McDonnell Douglas). Table 5
reflects the ranking of the top ten states for Fiscal Year 1981 in terms of the im-
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portance they attach to defense spending in general and weapons exports in particular.16
To focus more narrowly, consider the State of Connecticut, which is
home of United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division and General
Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division. A regional breakdown by DOD (Department
of Defense) spending per worker reveals that DOD spends more than $1000 per
worker annually in the state. By applying the same economic methodology ap¬
plied previously, one discovers that total income generated by DOD spendinc
exceeds the entire amount of taxes collected by the state.17
Given this economic motivation, it should come as no surprise that legis¬
lators from such regions are often in the forefront of debates on weapons pro¬
curement and sales. Nor does the political persuasion of politicians on other
matters always decide their stance on these matters. Liberal senators like Alan
Cranston, Howard Metzenbaum and Ted Kennedy have voted repeatedly for
weapons procurement contracts and weapons export sales. Their votes might
seem out of character politically, but annually serve to put billions of dollars
into their respective states.18
Perhaps even more motivating to some representatives is the potential
benefit that contributions from aerospace industrial associations and Political Ac¬
tion Committees (PAC) can have for their campaigns. Every major weapons
contractor and subcontractor in the United States maintains a PAC and contrib¬
utes both through its own PAC and those of its associations to those candidates
who best represent the industry on issues of weapons procurement and weapons
sales overseas.19
Two major subnational forces are the Navy and the Air Force. The eco¬
nomic benefits both services derive from exporting their aircraft include reduced
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cost for those aircraft due to learning curve efficiencies and recoupement of the
research and development money expended designing them. The magnitude of
these cost savings is dramatically illustrated in Figure Four, which shows that
sales of theF-18 to Canada, Australia and Spain saved the United States Navy
an estimated $1.8 billion. The political twist to this economic benefit arises in
cases where the unit cost of anew aircraft is so expensive that Congress may be
unwilling to approve funds for its purchase. If foreign friends and allies can be
persuaded to purchase the new aircraft, its price might be reduced to where it
becomes acceptable to Congress. Another economic benefit to the Navy and
Air Force from export sales derives from logistical considerations. All aircraft
must be overhauled periodically. The overhaul work is done in what are called
rework centers which normally are located in the United States. However, if
another country is flying the service’s airplane, the service can have its aircraft
overhauled in that country. Many times it is shorter flying distance to these for¬
eign overhaul depots. Furthermore, because of lower labor costs overseas, it is
often less expensive to have overhaul work done in a foreign depot.
Purchasing Country:

Spain.

The Spanish military, specifically the Spanish Air Force was the most im¬
portant subnational actor in Spain’s fighter competition. Although the Spanish
military is part of the government, the costs and benefits it derives from select¬
ing a particular fighter do not flow from macroeconomic changes such as GNP
or level of employment. The Spanish Military works on a fixed budget, and
must make its armaments purchases with appropriated funds. Consequently, it is
primarily concerned with purchase financing (such as Foreigm Military Sales)
and the final price of the aircraft.
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The second most powerful subnational organization in Spain is a govern¬
ment affiliated industrial group entitled Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI),
which is a state holding company promoting industrial growth and making its
investments directed at developing both basic and high technology industries.
INI has two firms which are primary contractors for the Spanish Ministry of De¬
fense, Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENCASA) and Empresa
Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares. These two firms, supported
by several smaller firms which act as their subcontractors, constitute the pri¬
mary subnational force outside the government. These associations realize that
to grow and compete in the international marketplace, Spain’s economy must
not only grow, but also grow in the right directions. Consequently, they strongly
favor industrial participation and coproduction agreements that provide technol¬
ogy transfer not only in defense industries but commercial industries as well.20
Transnational Perspective.

Over the past fifteen years, aerospace corporations both in the United
States and abroad have become more and more dependent upon transnational
operations as a means of doing business. This is attributable to four factors:
1. The evolution of a global economy;
2. domestic laws mandating subcomponent production and/or processing
within the the company’s host country;
3.

growing need for coproduction and licensing agreements as a part of

offset packages;
4.

growing pressure on contractors to help reduce United States de¬

fense costs.
The outgrowth of this combination of factors is a bundle of transnational
economic costs and benefits to the corporation. In pulling apart this bundle,
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notice how potential economic benefits to different national and subnational
groups politically tie the package together.
Global Economy.

The goal of any business is to keep production costs down so as to
maximize profit. As the world economy continues to sprout an ever increasing
number of companies capable of building components that are usable in modern
weapons systems, arms manufacturers are increasingly tempted to turn to for¬
eign sourcing as a means of reducing their costs.21 This allows the manufactur¬
ers to take advantage of the value-added chain in their production, and thereby
use comparative advantage to their benefit.
Domestic Production & Processing Requirements.

The manufacturers are prevented from taking full advantage of the global
economy by national laws which require that particular components which either
are or can be produced in the manufacturer’s home country are not sourced out
to a foreign manufacturer.
Coproduction Requirements.

Foreign customers of domestically produced advanced weapons systems
are increasingly demanding some participation in the production of the weapons
they purchase. They often demand contracts to produce components for all of
the systems that will be sold worldwide by the manufacturer. The best example
of this is the 40-10-15 percent offset arrangement which was the keystone to the
huge F-16 sale in 1975 to Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. Un¬
der this arrangement, 10 percent of the parts used in United States Air Force
F-16’s are produced by the Europeans.
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Increased Pressure To Cut Defense Costs.

This is a factor particularly applicable to the United States in recent
years. The federal government often sets the profit margin that defense con¬
tractors earn on a given contract. Many times the contract is written so that the
contractor and DOD share cost savings. Consequently, if the contractor is able
to reduce its costs due to learning curve efficiencies, both DOD and the contrac¬
tor benefit. However, if costs exceed a certain fixed ceiling, the contractor can
find itself without a profit. Such contract terms become particularly significant
when considered in conjunction with the coproduction demands of purchasing
countries. These countries do not necessarily base their coproduction demands
on what they can most efficiently produce but on what will provide them the
greatest amount of new technology. Consequently, subcomponent assemblies
that might be more efficiently performed in the United States are transferred to
another country. This increases the cost of aircraft the contractor sells to the
United States. Because the United States does not pay for these incremental
cost increases, they cut into the contractor’s profits for aircraft sold domesti¬
cally. Another way a potentially beneficial contract can suddenly change into a
costly venture is if the purchasing country suddenly undergoes a radical change
in governmentand, as a consequence, defaults on the contract. To help guard
against this, United States corporations commission extensive research into the
political underpinnings of the purchasing government as well as the demographic
factors of the society over which it governs. Factors such as the strength of an
incumbent government, the overpopulation of urban centers, and the presence or
absence of xenophobia, although not economic in nature, may spell the differ¬
ence between a lucrative sale and a catastrophic loss. Table Six shows the po¬
litical risk analysis used by the General Dynamics/Pratt & Whitney team during
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their attempt to sell the F-16 to Spain. Notice both the short term and long
term perspective addressed by the table. To put the Spanish calculation in per¬
spective, similar surveys have been conducted for other countries purchasing the
F-16. The high or least risky score was 32.0 for Belgium; the lowscore was
14.50 for Egypt.22
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CHAPTER

III

THE SELLERS
This part of the study examines the countries and companies which com¬
peted to sell their respective aircraft to Spain.
United States.

It focuses primarily on the

However, France and its nationalized producer Dassault-Brequet

as well as Great Britain, Italy and Germany which are the member countries of
the Panavia Consortium will also be discussed.
The United States Government
Throughout the twentieth century, arms transfers have been a significant
feature of United States foreign policy. Some of the most important decisions
determining United Statesinvolvement abroad over the past 65 years have been
directly related to the transfer of arms and munitions to foreign governments.i
Concern for the national security of the United States

has been the pri¬

mary rationale for government controls on arms exports as well as the primary
justification for the United States Government’s authority to sell, give or loan
arms to other nations.2

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to state that United

States policy makers, especially between 1960 - 1970, turned a blind eye to the
potential economic benefits arising from weapons sales to foreign powers.3
Because of the President’s constitutionally vested power to direct United
States’ foreign policy, the executive branch has dominated the process of formu¬
lating United States arms transfer policy.

Nevertheless, the Congress has not

hesitated to exert its power to achieve its own goals whenever it has deemed it
necessary to do so, even when they conflict with those of the President.

Conse¬

quently, resulting policy has been a product of both conflict and cooperation be¬
tween the two branches.
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As the ’’Arsenal of Democracy”, the United States exported almost S2.2
billion of arms from August 1914 to March 1917 and emerged from World War 1
as a leading participant in the international trade in arms.4 After the war, this
country continued to be a major participant in the arms trade, accounting for
more than 52% of global arms exports.5 As United States’ arms transfers grew,
however, so did the controversies surrounding the arms industry.

During the

1920’s and 1930’s a growing number of people both here and abroad came to
believe in what was called the ’’devil theory of war”.

According to this theory,

arms manufacturers in both the United States and Europe conspired to both
start and prolong World War 1.6
United States

This theory gave birth to the belief that the

had been drawn into WW I to protect the interests of the ’’inter¬

national arms industry.”
In 1934, as a growing wave of pacifism and isolationism swept across the
United States, the Congress resolved to investigate the arms industry.7 On
April 1, 1934, the Senate approved the motion of North Dakota Senator Gerald
P. Nye to begin hearings.
arms industry grew.8

As the hearings progressed, public disgust with the

The Nye hearings helped inspire Congress to pass the

Neutrality Act of 1935 which, among other items, compelled the president to em¬
bargo all arms shipments to belligerents in any foreign war.9

Included in the

bill was a provision creating the Munitions Control Board to supervise American
arms exports.

This provision did not give the government power to prohibit

arms transfers in peacetime. 10
The White House initially welcomed the investigation, and later welcomed
those provisions of the Neutrality Act which created the Munitions Control
Board. 11

However, it was horrified when Nye, ”an isolationist of the deepest

dye” was appointed to lead the investigation.12 In reaction to the hearings, Sec-
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retary of State Cordell Hull recorded in his memoirs that ’’The majority of the
committee in effect dug the ground out from under those of us who had the in¬
ternational viewpoint and who argued that, if the peace of the world was to be
maintained, the United States had to take its share in the effort.” 13 in another
passage Hull wrote:

”It is doubtful that any congressional committee has ever

had a more unfortunate effect on our foreign relations. . .”14
Congressional attitudes towards arms transfers slowly began to change
with the outbreak of World War H.

In November, 1939, United States’ neutrality

laws were revised to allow for the sale of munitions to any belligerent nation on
a ’’cash and carry” basis. 15

This aided the allied nations who had not pro¬

gressed as far as Germany had in rearming. 16
In September of 1940, after German forces occupied France, President
Roosevelt made an executive agreement with the British Government to swap
fifty World War I destroyers for the right to 99-year leases on British naval and
air bases in Newfoundland and the Caribbean. 17

Six months later, after strenu¬

ous debate, the Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act.

Under this legislation,

the President was authorized to ’’lease, lend or otherwise dispose of” to any
country whose defense was vital to the United States, arms and other equipment
and supplies to an extent of an initial appropriation of $7 billion. 18 When the
United States finally entered World War H, Lend-Lease became the official ve¬
hicle by which it helped equip allied armed forces.

Under Lend-Lease, the

United States transferred arms worth tens of billions of dollars between 1941
and 1945.19
In the Post-War era and continuing into the Cold-War, arms transfers
were one of the central components of the United States’ strategy of containing
Communist expansion.20

In 1947, President Truman declared under the
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’’Truman Doctrine” that the United States would provide assistance to countries
threatened by the Soviet Union.21

As a direct follow-on of the Truman Doc¬

trine, the Congress passed Public Law 75 which provided arms transfer and
other military assistance to the governments of Greece and Turkey.22 Following
the formation of NATO in 1949, the Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assis¬
tance Act, which provided for additional military assistance, including arms
transfers, tothe new alliance.23 Military assistance (or weapons transfers) were
called ’’the mortar of the NATO alliance.”24 United States’ military assistance
policy expended alongside United States containment policy to other geographic
regions. Both the Korean War and the Soviet Union’s support of Egypt changed
the focus of United States’ assistance, thereby motivating the United States to
transfer increasing quantities of arms to Southeast Asia and the Middle East.26
Of all the transfers during this period the majority were made ’’free of charge”
under what became the Military Assistance Program (MAP).26
During the 1960’s the form of United States’ arms exports changed from
grants of World War II surplus equipment to sales of new equipment.27 In
1961, military grant aid was twice as large as sales.

By 1966, sales figures were

double those for military aid, excluding South Vietnam.28 This shift in empha¬
sis in United States’ arms export policy was made because many more develop¬
ing countries were making sufficient economic progress to assume a greater
share of the financial burden of their defense.29

Policy makers began appreci¬

ating the potential economic benefits of arms sales for the United States’ balance-of-payments position and the domestic arms industry.30 Grant aid contin¬
ued to decline while the number of sales recipients continued to increase.

In

FY 1966, fifty-nine nations received foreign military sales (FMS) deliveries in
1975, seventy-four did.

Commercial deliveries increased from fifty-one coun-
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tries in FY 1966 to seventy-seven.3l

Policy rationale for this continuing in-

crease in sales is best expressed in the Nixon Doctrine of 1969,

which shifted

the emphasis of policy from stationing United States’ troops in friendly nations
to providing friendly nations with the weapons and assistance necessary for
them in order to defend themselves.32
Also during the 1960’s the Congress was becoming more and more con¬
cerned with the nature and consequences of United States’ arms transfers.

One

problem was how foreign powers were using United States supplied arms.

In

the mid-1960’s, India and Pakistan fought each other with United States made
weapons.33

In the late 60’s Congress began reflecting public disapproval of the

authoritarian repression and corruption witnessed in such military aid recipients
as Vietnam, Greece, Korea and the Philippines.34
Because of the Vietnam experience, which had begun as a military assis¬
tance program only to be transformed into a United States war, many in Con¬
gress were concerned that United States military assistance to a region was the
first step towards the eventual involvement of United States’ forces.
In 1968, Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act.

This legislation

required administrations to emphasize foreign policy considerations, as opposed
to economic considerations, when formulating their arms transfer policies.36
Reflecting Congress’ growing concern with how foreign governments were using
United States weapons, this act also prohibited sales togovernments that engaged
in human rights violations orimpeded social progress.37 Partially due to Con¬
gressional concern, administrations of this period adopted a basic policy of de¬
nying sales of sophisticated weapons to countries that needed their financial re¬
sources for economic development and did not have serious threats to their se¬
curity.38
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During the early 1970’s the rising dollar value of United States’ arms
sale,

the increasing sophistication of weapons sold and what was perceived as

an over-casual attitude on the part of United States’ policy makers towards
arms sales caused increasing Congressional concern.39

’’Arms sales appeared

to have become a tool of politics rather than a policy for security, and the arms
traffic appeared to be out of control.”40

One example cited is President

Nixon’s instructions in 1972 to honor all Iranian arms requests, a policy that cir¬
cumvented review by the State and Defense Departments of the potential conse¬
quences of such sales.41

Another example cited is President Ford’s selling to

Israel in 1976 equipment previously banned from foreign sale.42 The force and
impact of Congressional action increased alongside its concern. In

1971 Con¬

gress expressed its sense that the President should: Immediately institute a com¬
prehensive review of military assistance and sales programs; initiate arms trade
control talks with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy;
commence a debate in the United Nations on the arms trade; and ’’use the
power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to
work actively with all nations to check and control the international sales and
distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction.”43 In 1975 Con¬
gress tacked the Nelson amendment to the FY 1975 foreign aid authorization.
This required the President to report military sales of $25 million or more to the
Congress which would then have twenty days to veto the sale of joint resolu¬
tion.44

Congressional action culminated in 1976 with the passage of the Interna¬

tional Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act.45
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) was designed to shift the emphasis from selling arms to controlling the
sales of arms.46

It attempted to accomplish this by specifying Congressional
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guidelines for United States arms sales policy.47 The act includes the following
provisions:

Congress has the right to veto proposed arms sales 30 days prior to

a sale; commercial sales (sales by a United States company directly to a foreign
government) cannot exceed $25 million if the purchasing country is not a mem¬
ber of NATO; 48 the President is required to submit to congress quarterly in¬
formation on arms transfers; and the President is encouraged to initiate negotia¬
tions which would result in a reduction in international arms traffic.49 The
AECA is still the controlling legislation on United States arms sales.
The arms transfer policies of President Carter were an affirmation of the
congressional initiatives embodied in AECA.50

The President’s policy was that

conventional arms transfers would be viewed as an ’’exceptional foreign policy
implement,

to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated

that the transfer contributes to our national security interests.”51
President Carter established controls on transfers to all nations except
NATO member countries and Japan, Australia and New Zealand.52

Carter’s

basic guidelines as expressed in his policy statement included the following:
1.

An effort would be made to promote respect for human rights in re¬

cipient nations. . . .
2.

The economic impact of arms transfers to countries receiving United

States economic assistance considered.
3.

The United States would not permit development or significant modi¬

fication of advanced weapons systems solely for export.
4.

The United States would not permit coproduction agreements for sig¬

nificant weapons, equipment and major components.
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5.

An attempt would be made to remove the economic incentives for

arms sales,

such as lower per unit costs for Defense Department procurement

of similar items.
6.

United States’ government employees were forbidden to help arms

salesmen abroad without express authorization from Washington. (What soon
became known as the ’’leprosy letter”).
7.

An attempt would be made to reduce international arms traffic

through multilateral negotiations.53
The Carter administration initiated the Convention of Arms Transfer
Talks in addition to its other policies.

The administration first approached its

allies, the major Western European suppliers,
through negotiations on arms restraints.

to see what might be achieved

These suppliers said that restraint

could pose serious problems for them and they wanted assurances of Soviet in¬
terest in arms sales restraint before they could consider restraint measures
themselves.54

The administration proceeded to initiate talks with the Soviets

which lasted through four rounds until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended
any prospect for an agreement.55

As the talks proceeded, the major Western

European allies continued their customary arms sales practices and were not
brought into the negotiations.56
The Carter administration achieved some modest reduction in the dollar
volume of United States’ arms transfers, turning down arms requests from over
60 countries valued at over $1 billion.57 These included denying both Greece
and Turkey the opportunity to purchase the F—16.58

Nevertheless, the Carter

administration made almost S40 billion of arms transfer agreements with the
Third World, which was about the same value of arms transfers in the previous
four years under Presidents Nixon and Ford.59

The trends for the Soviet Un-
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ion and the major Western European suppliers are notably different.

In the

Carter period the value of their arms transfer agreements generally moved up¬
ward.

The Soviet Union nearly doubled its transfer agreements in 1977-1980

from their 1973-1976 totals.

The French, from 1977-1980 more than tripled their

agreement values from the 1973-1976 period. The United Kingdom, West Ger¬
many and Italy each doubled the values of their transfer agreements in 1977-180
from their previous four year totals.60
In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president and United States’ arms
transfer goals and policy entered a new era.
Present Goals and Policy of the United States
The arms transfer policy of the Reagan Administration is an about-face
from the Carter policy.- In his first official statement on the matter on July 8,
1981, President Reagan underlined the need for flexibility in arms sales and fo¬
cused on the use of arms sales to counter the Soviet global challenge.61

The

United States, he said, would be ’’guided by principle as well as practical neces¬
sity.

We will deal with the world as it is rather than as we would like it to

be.”62
A presidential directive issued soon after the July 8 statement stated the
United States must ’’not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be pre¬
pared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of
conventional arms and other forms of security

assistance.”63

Conventional arms

transfers would be ”an essential element of [the administration’s] global defense
posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy. 64
The stated goals of the Reagan policy are:
1.
allies;

to help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends and
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2.

to increase military effectiveness by improving America’s ability in

conjunction with allies and friends, ”to project power in response to threats
posed by mutual adversaries.”
3.

to strengthen and revitalize United States’ mutual security relation¬

ships through support of efforts to foster the capability of our forces to deploy
and operate with those of our friends and allies;
4.

demonstrate the enduring interest the United States has in the security

of its partners and friends and that ”it will not allow them to be at a military
disadvantage.”
5.

to ’’foster regional and internal stability, thus encouraging peaceful

resolution of disputes and evolutionary change.”
6.

to ’’help to enhance United States’ defense production capabilities and

efficiency.”65
The Reagan policy directive emphasizes that the United States will
’’evaluate requests primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deter¬
rence and defense.”

Arms transfer decisions will be made after giving due con¬

sideration to a broad range of factors including:
1.

the degree to which the transfer is an appropriate response to the

’’military threats confronting the recipient.”

whether the transfer will enhance

the ability of the recipient to participate with the United States in collective se¬
curity effort;
2.

whether the transfer will promote mutual interests through countering

externally supported aggression;
3.

whether the transfer is consistent with United States’ interests ”in

maintaining stability within regions where friends of the United States may have
differing objectives.”

146

4.

whether items transferred "can be absorbed by the recipient nation

without overburdening its military support system or financial resources."
whether the "positive contributions" to United States' "interests and objectives”
more than counterbalance ’’any detrimental effects of the transfer.”66
In a direct turnaround from the Carter policy,

the Reagan policy stipu¬

lates that coproduction will be allowed, but requests for such would ’’receive
special scrutiny” taking into consideration the following factors:
1.

’’economic and industrial factors” for both the United States and the

participating nations;
2.

’’the importance of arms cooperation with NATO and other close

friends and allies;
3. ’’potential third party transfer. .
4. ’’the protection of sensitive technology and military capabilities.”
Finally, the Reagan policy revokes Carter’s so called ’’Leprosy Letter”.
United States’ representatives overseas are now required ”to provide the same
courtesies and assistance to firms that. . . [market arms] as they would to those
marketing other American products.”67
United States Corporations and Their Products
Profits v. Patriotism.
”1 build airplanes for the United States Government! I’m not selling air¬
planes to foreigners unless the United States’ Government tells me to!”68
said James ”Mr. McDonnell Jr.,
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft.

So

founder and, until his death, Chairman of

As for General Dynamics, it was ’’reluctantly

dragged into the fray” of the 1974-1975 European Fighter competition, being to¬
tally content to let ’’Uncle

Sam do the

lobbying.”69

The statement by Mr.

McDonnell and the behavior of General Dynamics are indicative of the attitudes
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that characterized the management of both companies concerning overseas sales
prior to their becoming involved in the fighter competitions of the past ten
years.

To some extent, these same attitudes are still prevalent today.70 One

very important reason for this attitude is marketplace reality. Both companies
know that their primary customer is the United States’ Government. Conse¬
quently both are very conscious of their need to comply with the desires of their
chief customer.
In all fairness to both companies, however, a considerable amount of
their motivation derives from patriotism.

The workers and management of both

companies take a great deal of pride in designing and building what they feel to
be the best fighter aircraft in the world.
greater pride in the United States.

This pride carries over into an even

A major factor adding to this patriotism is

that many of the employees of both companies are former military officers. In
marketing these aircraft overseas the representatives of each company are ”constantly aware that [they] are selling instruments of foreign policy and [they]
often find it a little intimidating.”71
The implication of this patriotism is that both companies are at the beck
and call of the United States Government.

Their attitudes towards international

sales implies that though they will compete fiercely against both each other and
foreign competition they will probably not violate the rules for overseas market¬
ing set down by the policymakers within the United States State and Defense
Departments.
un-American.

They feel doing so would not only be bad business but also

General Dynamics and the F-16.
General Dynamics is the largest defense contractor in the United States.
Along with aircraft, it produces Trident Class submarines at its Electric Boat Di¬
vision in Connecticut and the Army’s Ml main battle tank in its Land Systems
Division located in Ohio.

Nonetheless,

it is the FA16 that is the big money

maker for G.D., accounting for 41.5 percent of its total sales in 198172
A quick glance at Table 7 explains why.
had sold 1,786 F-16s to ten different countries.
was $224 million for 1981.

By 1982, General Dynamics
Operating income from F-16s

Prospects for additional sales were excellent, be¬

cause the government had given General Dynamics permission to approach 24
additional countries concerning future sales. Past success does not guarantee fu¬
ture success, however, as General Dynamics had learned in competitions re¬
cently conducted in Australia and Canada where it lost to McDonald Douglas in
competition against the F-18.

As in all previous competitions, General Dynam¬

ics teamed with the F-16 engine maker, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of
United Technologies, in making both its aircraft and offset proposals to Spain.
The F-16 Falcon is a ’’brilliantly capable multi-role fighter which, in the
eyes of most observers is number one in the western

world.”73

came out, it was hailed as the ’’fighter pilot’s fighter”.
flying it this way:

When it first

One test pilot described

’’You feel like you’re riding on top of the airplane... you feel

it might run out from under you...it’s like driving the world’s fastest drag
racer.”74

The F-16A, which was the original aircraft sold to the Europeans in

1975, is capable of speeds exceeding ’mach 2’ or twice the speed of sound.

It is

armed with both a twenty millimeter cannon capable of shooting 6000 rounds
per minute and with Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles.
ble of carrying 25 500 lb. bombs.

Additionally, it is capa¬

An accurate bomber, the F-16 was used by
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Israeli pilots to attack and destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

If the F-16

had one weakness going into the Spanish competition, it was its lack of a radar
missile capability.

The F-16A could not shoot down long range targets.

To

deal with this problem, General Dynamics developed a follow-on to the F-16A,
the F-16C (figure 6).

This aircraft has both the radar and the missiles neces¬

sary to attack threat aircraft at ranges exceeding 20 miles. The F-16C was the
aircraft General Dynamics offered to Spain.
McDonnell Douglas and the F-L8
McDonnell Douglas Corporation is one of the major forces in military
aviation.

Formed in St. Louis in 1939 as McDonnell Aircraft, it has designed

and produced a wide variety of aircraft and aerospace products, including the
Mercury space capsule that carried John Glenn into orbit around the earth.
1967,

In

McDonnell Aircraft merged with Douglas Aircraft, a major producer of

commercial aircraft, to form the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
McDonnell Douglas has an outstanding reputation for building fighters.
Its most famous fighter, the F-4 Phantomll,

was a work horse for the Marine

Corps, Navy and Air Force in Vietnam, and was eventually purchased by nine
other nations.75

More recently McDonnell Douglas has developed the F—15 for

the Air Force and worked with British Aerospace to develop the AV-BB Harrier
for both the Marine Corps and the British Royal Air Force.

Military aircraft

sales were $3.7 billion in 1981, or 49 percent of the corporation’s revenue. This
figure included not only F—18 sales, but also F-15sales, AV-88 sales and pay¬
ments on a multi-year 2.8 billion dollar contract for 44 KC-10 tanker cargo air¬
craft (a derivative of the DC-10) for the United States Air Force.

As it had in

the Canadian and Australian competitions, McDonnell Douglas teamed with the
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F 18 engine maker, General Electric, in making both its aircraft and offset pro¬
posals to Spain.
The F—18 Hornet is ”a double answer to United States and free world de¬
fense needs —a durable, dependable strike fighter that is superior for both
fighter and attack missions.”76

Some say that it won both the Canadian and

Australian competitions almost entirely because of its ability to kill hostile air¬
craft at long range.77

Unlike the original F-16A,

the F-18 was capable of car¬

rying the Sparrow Missile, which makes it able to shoot down aircraft at a ranee
beyond twenty miles.

In addition to Sparrow, the F-18 fires a 20 millimeter

cannon and carries the Sidewinder heat-seeking missile.

An extremely accurate

bomber, the F-18 is capable of carrying a payload of bombs exceeding 9 tons.
As 1982 began, the F-18 entered full scale production and had begun opera¬
tional flying with both Navy and Marine ‘Corps squadrons.

Fifty-four of the

1,377 F-18s contracted for by the United States Navy had been delivered, with
McDonnell Douglas producing them at a rate of four per month.

McDonnell

Douglas had already delivered the first 3 of 138 Hornets to the Canadian Air
Force, and would begin delivering 75 Hornets to Australia in 1986. (Figure 7)
The European Competition
The Countries:

U.K.; F.R.G.; ITALY & FRANCE

In June 1976 the [British] ministry of defense mounted an exhibition at
Aldershot of military equipment. . . to help push up arms sales to a new target
of 1750 million a year.

It was a cozy occasion with marquees and plenty of re¬

freshments like a sports day or a horticultural show.

After some modest pro¬

tests from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade it went ahead peacefully.
Chieftain tanks were lined up along the lawn while wives and children of sol¬
diers clambered over them and popped up in the turret.

Mortars and guns were
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laid out on neat gravel or clipped grass, like sports goods in a shop.
new kind of barbed wire called a

'Barbed Tape Concertina'

across a lawn, shining brightly in the sun like gay bunting.
notice the word ’kill’.

A painful

was stretched
Nowhere could I

Stalls were decorated with artists’ impressions of banles,

in the style of boys’ comics... The eagerness for foreign clients was visible everywhere.”78
Arms are an important business in Europe.
pend on arms exports.79

In France, 67,500 jobs de¬

During the oil crises of the 1970’s arms were one of

Britain’s few growing exports.80

Consequently, there is a much closer relation¬

ship in Europe between the arms industries and governments. ’’Foreign compa¬
nies dealing in [arms] can usually deliver their governments, and their govern¬
ments can usually deliver their industries.
States.”81

The opposite is true with the United

Why is there such close cooperation between European governments

and their armaments industries? The answer is military, economic and political
necessity.

To design and build modern weapons systems requires enormous ex¬

penditures on research and development.

The individual domestic markets of

France, U.K., F.R.G. and Italy are not large enough to make domestic produc¬
tion of new fighter aircraft feasible.

The alternative, of course, is to purchase

all aircraft from the United States.

This, however, is neither economically nor

politically feasible.

Notwithstanding either coproduction or licensed production,

purchasing aircraft from the United States would, in effect, cede to the United
States all of the employment presently accounted for by military aviation.
Moreover, in ceding all research and development activities to the United States,
these countries undermine their technological base.
A strong political factor arises from the pride each of these nation’s re¬
tains in its past Old World glory.

It is a blow to that pride to announce that
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one’s country is no longer economically capable of producing the arms it needs
to defend itself.

The two countries exemplifying the close relationship between

the government and the arms industry are the United Kingdom and France.
Britain this relationship is both intimate and private.

In

Though arms sales may be

carefully scrutinized by diplomats and defense officials in private, the British
Parliament is not allowed to share in the decisions or to know how the sales are
apportioned.82

British weapons are designed with the export market specifi¬

cally in mind.
The Defense Sales Office has formal representation on both the Opera¬
tional Requirements Committee and the Weapons Development Committee.83
Each volume of Britain’s Defense Equipment Catalogue has emblazoned on its
cover the crests of Britain’s three services; each contains photographs of and
specifications for everything from hand guns to fighters to warships.84

The

French are the most aggressive and successful exporters of arms in Europe.
French arms sales are directed from the Direction des Affaires Internationales
(DIA)

which is a special export department of the Delegation Ministerielle pour

1’Armament (DMA).

American companies have been obsessed by the belief in

French cunning and bribery, and have used it to justify their being allowed to
do the same.85

The French government sees its arms industry as an instru¬

ment of diplomacy, a means of developing engineering skills and a means of
developing new technology.86

More importantly, through exporting the French

are able to maintain a more self-equipped and therefore independent defense
force than most other European countries.

Both Italy and West Germany were

forbidden to rearm in the years following World War n.

However, with the for¬

mation of NATO, their rearmament became a necessity.

The Italians have be¬

come aggressive sellers in the export market, some would say to the point of
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being unscrupulous.87
exports.

German governments have attempted to restrict arms

In 1969, then Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt insisted that he would

"m no way act as an aide to the sales manager of German industry".88

Never¬

theless, German governments of the late 1970’s came under increased pressure
from trade unionists to support export sales.89
The Countries and their Aircraft
DASSAULT-BREGUET & THE MIRAGE 2000.
Dassault-Breguet is very much the creation of one man —Marcel Das¬
sault.

Dassault first entered the aircraft industry during the First World War,

starting his own company,
ended.

which began mass producing aircraft just as the war

His first company collapsed with the post-war collapse of France’s avia¬

tion industry.

Dassault started another company in the early ’30s which built

aircraft both for the French post office and, eventually, the French Air Ministry.
However, with the crushing defeat of France in 1940, Dassault was once again
out of business.

Taken prisoner, he became a national hero by refusing to de¬

sign aircraft for the Nazis in return for being set free.

After the war, largely

due to his heroic exploits, he became a close friend and supporter of Charles de
Gaulle; until his death, he enjoyed the closest of ties with the French govern¬
ment.90

With the end of World War D, Dassault built what is presently Das¬

sault-Breguet.

The company developed several fighters in the 1950’s,

famous of which was the Mach 2

Mirage ID. (figure 8)

the most

This aircraft was fol¬

lowed in the 1960’s by the even more capable Mirage FI, which competed
against the F-16 in the 1974-75 European Fighter Competition.
ID and Mirage FI have been very successfully exported.

Both the Mirage

Between the two, they

have flown more than two million hours with the air forces of twenty five coun¬

tries. 91
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The Mirage 2000 is the follow-on to these two aircraft.

"It incorporates

the best of recent aerodynamics, electronic and propulsion technology to achieve
impressive gains in performance, maneuverability and overall handling quali¬
ties”, and ’’compares favorably with other new Western fighters” like the F-16
and F-18.92

Dassault claims the Mirage 2000 is "the pre-eminent multi-role

fighter of the latest generation” noting that it is ’’the only single engine Mach

2.3 fighter capable of both long and short range interception.”93 The 2000 is
armed with two 30 millimeter cannons and can carry up to four heat-seeking
and radar missiles.

Though it was initially developed as an interceptor and air

superiority fighter, it is also capable of performing bombing missions.

The Mi-

rage 2000 is the primary combat aircraft of the French Air Force.94
PANAVIA & THE TORNADO.
The Panavia consortium was developed as a response to the aforemen¬
tioned problem of individual domestic markets being too small for individual
European countries to develop their own fighters.

Unlike France, which fi¬

nanced the Mirage 2000 through export sales, Britain, West Germany and Italy
combined their markets to support development of the Tornado.

On March 26,

1969, these three countries formed a joint organization known as NAMMO, the
NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Management and Production Organization.
From NAMMO sprung the conglomerate corporation Panavia, a consor¬
tium of the three nationally cosponsored aircraft companies British Aerospace,
Aeritalia, and MBB.
Panavia has faced a number of disadvantages in entering these competi¬
tions, first and foremost of which is that as a conglomerate,
company has tended to look more to its own advantage.
of control of the three companies were as follows:

each component

The respective levels

British Aerospace, 42.5%;
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MBB, 42.5%; Aeritalia, 15.0%.

Panavia is not the only consortium in which Brit¬

ish Aerospace is involved.

It also builds a light attack aircraft, the Jaguar, in

conjunction with Dassault.

Perhaps a second disadvantage that Panavia faces in

these competitions is the Tornado itself.

The aircraft designers faced the chal¬

lenge of building a plane to meet the needs of three air forces. In the end, they
designed two models of the Tornado, the IDS and ADV, to meet all of the con¬
sortium’s needs.

The IDS is designed to fly at very low level at very high speed

to a heavily defended target, make a single bomb run, and return home, (figure
9)

The ADV was designed to intercept and destroy Soviet bombers at long

range.

Dogfighting capability, which would have downgraded the ADV’s per¬

formance as a bomber destroyer, was not a consideration in its design.95 Con¬
sequently, in mock dogfights against aircraft such as the F-16, Mirage 2000 and
F-18, the Tornado usually loses.

The IDS and ADV do what they are designed

to do very well.

At low altitudes (200 feet) both can reach aspeed of greater

than 920 mph.

The IDS has a bomb payload of nine tons and carries two 27

millimeter cannon internally. The ADV has excellent ”on station time” (time an
aircraft can patrol at slow speed while searching with its radar for hostile air¬
craft).

It is armed with one 27 millimeter cannon, and can carry four long

range radar missiles and two short range heat-seeking missiles.

At the time of

the Spanish competition, only the three consortium countries had ordered the
Tornado.

The Royal Air Force ordered 385, the German Luftwaffe 212 and the

Italian Air Force 100.

Although Spain did not seriously consider purchasing the

Tornado, Greece is very interested in it.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SALES PROCESS
This section discusses the pattern of events in a typical competition, the
United States’ laws and regulations governingforeign sales by United States’ cor¬
porations, and the process by which the United States Government reviews
fighter aircraft sales requests. The laws and regulations of France, U.K., F.R.G.
and Italy will not be discussed , since we only deal with United States Military
sales. 1
Overview of a Fighter Sales Competition.2
A fighter competition, such as the one just conducted in Spain or the one
which is about to be conducted in Greece, should be viewed in the wider con¬
text of the foreign policy relationships of the competing selling countries vis a
vis the purchasing country. However, notwithstanding the consequent political,
military and economic dimensions involved, each competition is characterized
by a typical pattern of events. These events can be viewed as occurring in two
phases: The Pre-Announcement Phase and the Post-Announcement Phase. The
announcement is the formal announcement by the purchasing country it will be
buying fighter aircraft and will be requesting different countries and companies
to submit bids for the sale.
Pre-Announcement Phase.
The pre-announcement phase occurs during that undefined period before
the formal competition is announced.3 The duration of this period is difficult to
predict.

It is largely dependent on the age and degree of obsolescence of the

purchasing country’s air force. During this phase the goal of the aircraft com¬
pany is to prepare the potential military and civilian judges of a competition, to
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be particularly receptive to its presentations once the formal competition be¬
gins.4
The companies hire agents in potential purchasing countries.

These

agents, who are often natives of the country, make it their business to familiar¬
ize potential military and civilian decision makers with their company’s prod¬
ucts, as well as build a rapport with these same people. In addition to in-country representatives, the companies have international sales representatives who
travel to potential purchasers and provide them with more detailed information
on specific weapons systems.

The amount of information these representatives

can present is, in the case of the United States, highly regulated by the State
Department.
The governments of the companies also play an important role in this
phase.

Government influence during this phase is often exercised at the em¬

bassy level through its resident military advisors. For example, the United
States, has Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in those countries re¬
ceiving United States’ aid.

These military advisors build friendships with mili¬

tary officers in the purchasing country.

Advisors are inclined to prefer those

arms built in their own countries, and communicate this preference both for¬
mally through defense briefings they provide on behalf of their governments and
informally through friendly conversations.

Both planned and unplanned events

also can effect the predispositions of a purchaser.
event is the Paris Air Show.

An example of a planned

Perhaps the largest and most famous of its kind, it

is an international aerospace fair where manufacturers from all over the world
display their products.

Many of the highlights of recent Paris Air Shows have

been demonstration flights of the newer fighter aircraft such as the F—16, and
Mirage 2000.

Thrilling performances of these aircraft can create lasting impres-
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sions with government officials who will later decide competitions.

An example

of an unplanned event which has a direct impact on sales, is the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon.

During the Bekaa Valley Air Battle, Israeli pilots flying McDonnell

Douglas F-15s and General Dynamics F-16s shot down Syrian flown Soviet built
aircraft at a ratio of 50:1.

Such scores make even more lasting impressions.

Post-Announcement Phase.
At some point in time, the purchaser announces it will purchase new
fighter aircraft for its armed forces.

As a part of this announcement, it will

usually announce which aircraft it is considering buying. With this announce¬
ment, the formal fighter competition begins.
The purchasing country must now evaluate the competing aircraft.

Its

four main criteria for selecting an aircraft are combat capability, price, financ¬
ing and offset.
Combat Capability.
The primary goal of a country in buying new fighters is strengthening its
air force.

It wants aircraft that will perform those missions the country thinks

are vital to its national defense.

Aircraft are compared in terms of their speed,

maneuverability and weapons systems.
reliability and maintainability.

Two other important considerations are

Countries want aircraft that need few repairs be¬

tween flights and are easy to maintain.5
Price.
Price varies depending on the airplane, the manufacturer and the selling
country.

In the United States, price is based primarily on cost.

Three cost fig¬

ures are relevant: Procurement cost, program cost and life cycle cost.

Procure¬

ment cost is essentially the cost of producing the aircraft plus the cost of the
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spare parts, training and equipment needed to operate them.

Program cost is

procurement cost plus a percentage portion of the aircraft’s research and devel¬
opment cost.

Life cycle cost is the program cost plus the costs associated with

maintenance and aircrew labor, fuel, and munitions for training.
turer’s profit is usually negotiated as a percentage of cost.

The manufac¬

Figure Ten illus¬

trates these United States cost breakdowns.
Financing.
Financing is a key element in these negotiations.

The United States pro¬

vides funding assistance through a variety of programs, the most often used be¬
ing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Other countries, such as France,

finance these sales through their export-importbanks.
Offset:
Primarily, offset entails transactions which counterbalance the large out¬
flow of foreign exchange that normally results with such a large purchase.

Off¬

set packages may take several forms.6
Coproduction:
Overseas production based upon government to government agreements
which permit a foreign government or producer to acquire the technical informa¬
tion and know-how to manufacture all or part of an item of United States
equipment.

It includes government to government licensed production but ex¬

cludes production based upon direct commercial arrangements by United Statesmanufacturers.

(See Figure 11)

Licensed Production:
Overseas production of all or part of an item of United States equipment
based upon transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrange-
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ment between a United States manufacturer and a foreign government or pro¬
ducer.
Subcontractor Productions:
Overseas production of a part or an item of United Statesequipment.
The subcontract does not involve license of technical information and is usually
a direct commercial arrangement. (Figure 10)
Overseas Investment:
Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the form of capital
invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign coun¬
try.
Technology Transfer:
(Other than license production and coproduction) Transfer for technology
occurring as a result of an offset agreement that may take the form of:
1.

Research and development conducted abroad;

2.

Technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of

overseas investment;
3.

Other activities under direct commercial arrangement between the

United States

manufacturer and a foreign entity.

Country Trade:
Purchase of goods and services from the buyer country as a condition of
the offset agreement, excluding purchases under coproduction or licensed or
subcontractor production.7

Once the proposals of the various competitors have

been submitted, the government of the purchasing country must perform the
monumental task of choosing an aircraft.

Some countries, such as Spain, estab¬

lish a formal judging procedure before the competition commences.
ceed less formally.

Others pro¬

In a typical plan, the purchasing country devises a judging
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formula which accounts for the relative importance the government places on
aircraft capability and offset.

When the government announces its decision it

will often claim its decision was based solely on the relative merits of each
competing aircraft.

This is largely done for political reasons.

Governments

take great pains to ensure no appearance of impropriety surrounds the selection.
Doing otherwise, would invite a storm of public criticism. However, the actual
criteria for a final decision are significantly influenced by the whole range of
political relationships between the purchasing government and the governments
of competing countries.
Once selection is made, the purchasing country makes a down payment
to the winning aircraft corporation to secure the agreement.

This down payment

is normally equal to the cost the company must immediately incur in preparing
for production of the country’s aircraft.
the full term of the contract.

Payment is annually, apportioned over

Delivery of the aircraft and completion of the off¬

set agreements can take up to ten years.8
U.S. Government Impact on the Competition
Because of the desirability of United States aircraft, the United StatesGovernment (USG) plays an important part in many fighter competitions. The
impact of the USG depends on four factors:
(1)

existing United States law at the time of the competition;

(2)

desired manner by which, in the context of United States law, the

purchasing country wishes to make the purchase - as an FMS Sale or a Com¬
mercial Sale;
(3)

the actions of all concerned elements of the executive branch in re¬

viewing a potential sale;
(4)

the denial or approval of the sale by Congress.
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United States Law
The state of United States

law at the time of a competition provides the

framework within which all actors except for foreign sellers must pursue their
goals.

United States law changes depending on the political, military and eco¬

nomic exigencies of the time.

Notwithstanding this process of historical evolu¬

tion, however, United States law as it presently stands provides the ultimate
rules of the game.

United States law provides for and regulates the two means

by which United States aerospace corporations may sell their aircraft:
Military Sales (FMS) and Comercial Sales.

An FMS sale is one that is made

directly between the USG and the foreign buyer.
the United States

Foreign

The USG buys aircraft from

corporation and then sells them to the purchasing country.

A

commercial sale is one made directly between the United States corporation
and the foreign buyer.
by the USG.

Before this sale can be completed, it must beapproved

Officials within the executive branch are the primary actors in

processing and reviewing the proposed sale whether it follows the FMS or Com¬
mercial process.

Nevertheless, United States law, specifically the Arms Export

Control Act of 1976 (AECA),

places the following restrictions on the executive

branch:9
1.

the President cannot allow a sale to a country unless he feels it will

strengthen the security and promote world peace;
2.

arms sales can be made only to enhance the internal security and

self-defense capability of the buying country and to promote regional collective
defense arrangements;
3.

countries purchasing United States arms must agree not to transfer

arms to another country without permission of the USG.
abreast of any such granting of permission;

Congress must be kept
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4.

the consequences for arms control must be considered when evaluat¬

ing all arms sales;
5.

Congress must be advised before coproduction or licensed production

agreements financed under the FMS program are completed. Information on
the probable impact of such agreements on United States employment and pro¬
duction must be provided to Congress.
6.

All major defense related sales (ie. all fighter aircraft sales) must be

reported to Congress. For NATO allies,

Congress has 15 days in which to block

the sale by joint resolution.
Preference of Purchaser
Purchasing countries have the choice of following either the FMS or
Commercial process.

A majority of buyers, Spain was one, choose FMS.

One

reason for this preference is the assistance the buyer gets from the United
States Department of Defense(DOD) in determining what its defense needs are
and how it can meet these needs with United States equipment.

Another reason

is the FMS process provides the purchasing country with the same legal and
contractual safeguards against the contractor that are afforded the United States
government.

Nevertheless, some countries prefer to purchase equipment com¬

mercially because they feel it is less expensive. 10
FMS Sale - Process and Review
There are generally five steps in an FMS sale (See Figure 12). These
are:
1.

Foreign government requests information on a particular United States

aircraft;
2. The executive (primarily state & defense) reviews the request and de¬
cides whether to release the information;
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3. Foreign government evaluates the aircraft.

If satisfied, it submits a

formal purchase request to USG;
4. Executive review of the request and decision whether to offer the air¬
craft for sale;
5.

Congress reviews the executive’s offer of sale;

Request for Information
The country’s government first requests PLANNING AND REVIEW DATA
(P&R DATA).

It can make this request through theUnited States Embassy or

the Military Assistance and Advisory Group; a third way is for the country’s em¬
bassy in Washington D.C. to contact DOD’s Defense Security Assistance
Agency.

P&R data is preliminary information on the model aircraft (ie. F-16A

or F-16C) which the United States might make available for purchase as well
and on the estimated price of the aircraft. (Figure 12).
Review of Information Request
When data is released by the United States, it is usually perceived by the
purchasing country as an indication that the United States will sell the aircraft.
Consequently, the executive carefully considers these requests before releasing
the data.

Moreover, if and when it issues the data, the executive makes it clear

to the potential purchaser that the United States reserves the right to not sell the
aircraft.
Review of Aircraft & Request to Purchase
The potential buyer evaluates the P&R data and decide whether it wishes
to buy the aircraft.

If so, it makes aformal request to the USG for a Letter of

Offer and Acceptance (LOA).

This LOA is processed through the same chan¬

nels as the requests for P&R data.

170

Executive Review of LOA Request
The executive branch reviews the request for an LOA in the same man¬
ner it reviews the requests for information.
State Department approval, n

No LOA can be issued without

Executive approval of the LOA request is tanta¬

mount to executive approval of the sale.
Congressional Review
Under the AECA, fighter aircraft are major defense equipment and,
therefore, can only be sold with Congressional approval.

If the president has

decided to issue the requesting country an LOA, he must inform the Congress
of his intention to do so.

By law the Congress has 15 days for NATO countries

after receiving formal notification to block the sale by joint resolution. If it
does not do so, the executive may issue the LOA to the purchasing country. 12
(figure 12)
Commercial Sale Progress
The pattern of events in a commercial sale is illustrated in Figure 13.

It

is similar to the FMS process in the following ways:
1.

the executive must first approve the release of any information which

is not public information, ie., information found in magazines and newspapers.
2.
craft;

the executive must give final approval for the sale of any fighter air¬

the congress has final review over the sale.
For commercial sales, the executive reviews the sale through the State

Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC).

This office, after thorough

review by other offices of the executive, issues licenses to the contractor for the
release of information.

Should the potential buyer wish to purchase the aircraft,

the aircraft corporation requests amunitions license from OMC. Upon request
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of the contractor and after approval by both the executive and the congress,
OMC issues the export license for the sale and export of the aircraft.
Review by the Executive Branch.
In the previous section, it was mentioned how individuals within the ex¬
ecutive branch review both the release of information and the sale. This section
takes a more detailed look at who is involved in the review process.

Figure 14

shows the key individuals and offices that are party to this process. What fol¬
lows is a description of the executive review process for both types of sales.
FMS Review
Requests for information and requests for LOAs are directed to the Bu¬
reau of Politico-Military Affairs (BPM).

The director of BPM solicits the views

of those interested offices within the State and Defense Departments.

For

non-controversial sales, these are usually the State Department regional bureau
in which the country is located, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) and the Defense Department’s Defense Security Assistance Agency
(DSAA).

DSAA consults the concerned service (the Air Force for the sale of

F-16s, the Navy for F-18s) for their comments.

Figure 15

shows a possible

flow of information for the review of a noncontroversial information request and
sale.
Should there be any objection to the sale or information request by any
of the offices consulted, the request is sent to the next higher level for review.
For the State Department this would be the Under Secretary for Security Assis¬
tance, Science technology (USSA) and for Defense Department, the Assistant
Secretary for International Security Policy (ASIP).13 If both approve the sale/re¬
quest, then the issue is resolved.

If not resolved at this level, then the Secretar-
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ies of State and Defense may become involved. In the most controversial cases,
the President will participate.
As a case becomes more and more controversial, it may be reviewed by
two interdepartmental committees. The Arms Transfer Management Group
(ATMG) is the first such committee. It is chaired by USSA and includes repre¬
sentatives of the State, Defense and Treasury departments; the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; ACDA; the National Security Council (NEC); the Agency for International
Development; CIA; and the Office of Management and Budget. Even more
controversial sales may be reviewed by the NSC’s Senior Interdepartmental
Group (SIG). The chairman of SIG is the Deputy Secretary of State and its
other members include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, thePresident’s National
Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of
the CIA. Cases are rarely controversial enough to warrant a meeting of SIG.
Commercial Review

The State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC) has primary
responsibility for overseeing commercial sales. OMC consults PM, DSAA and
ACDA on information release requests. All of the offices mentioned in the
FMS review can become involved on requests for munitions licenses.
Except for the involvement of OMC, this review process is very similar to
FMS review. 14
Congressional Review

The Congress is notified of major arms sales through the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Upon notifica¬
tion,

it has 15 days forsales to NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and

30 days for all other countries to pass a concurrent resolution blocking the sale.
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The Congress has never passed such a resolution. 15 Figure 16 shows the
United States process overlaid upon the complete sales process.
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CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH CASE

Introduction
In November of 1979, the Spanish Government solicited proposals for the
sale of 144 fighter aircraft.

Three companies, General Dynamics, McDonnell

Douglas and Dassault-Breguet responded.
lected the F—18 over the two other aircraft.

On July 23, 1982, the Spanish se¬
How and why did Spain pick the

F—18?
As is the case with most countries, Spain was buying new aircraft in or¬
der to modernize its air force.
Phantom’s.

The new aircraft would replace Spain’s old F-4

Politically it was an opportune time for this modernization. The

United States strongly desired that Spain join the NATO alliance.

As a NATO

member, Spain would play a vital role in defending the Western Mediterranean
and part of the Atlantic extending to the Canary Islands.

Furthermore, the

United States needed access to vital air and naval bases in Spain. It saw a ma¬
jor weapons sale such as this as another means of establishing a long term rela¬
tionship with the Spanish Government.!

The United States would more likely

than not provide Spain with generous security assistance for the purchase of
new aircraft.

Though Spain’s primary motivation was to strengthen its military,

its criteria for judging the competition indicates that strengthening its economy
was a strong secondary consideration.

Offset was considered as equally impor¬

tant as aircraft capability in the formal judging procedure.

In its solicitation for

proposals, the Spanish specified they desired offsets in four categories:
1.

coproduction of the aircraft eventually purchased,

2.

production of other defense related items,
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3.

technology transfers to help Spain build its fledgling defense electron¬

ics industry;
4. commercial offsets, including technology transfer and tourism and ex¬
port promotion.2
The Spanish planned to have its air force judge the aircraft and the Di¬
rector General of Armament Material (DGAM) judge the offset proposals.

Both

of these offices came under the Minister of Defense. FACA, Spain’s national¬
ized aircraft company, as well as INI, the government affiliated industrial hold¬
ing group, had a significant say in judging the overall quality of competing off¬
set packages.

All information from these groups was to be submitted to an in-

terministerial commission, which would make the final aircraft selection. (Figure
17 shows a flow chart of the Spanish procurement system.)3
General Dynamics entered this contest confident they had the better air¬
plane.

Though the F-18 was itself an impressive airplane, it could not match

the F-16 in pure dogfightting ability.
airplane” like the F-18.4

Furthermore, the F-16 was not a ”paper

Hard data from over three years of operational use

with five air forces supported General Dynamics’ claims that its F-16 was a
highly capable and easily maintainable fighter.

Some criticized the F-16s inabil¬

ity to attack targets at a long range because the original F-16A lacked a radar
missile capability.

G.D. rectified this by offering Spain the new F-16C which

could fire either the ’’Sparrow” or ’’AMRAAM” long range radar missiles.
If General Dynamics had a concern entering this competition, it was its
ability to compete with McDonnell Douglas in the area of offset.

General Dy¬

namics did not have the excellent reputation McDonnell Douglas had for its off
set programs, despite the comprehensive program of coproduction G.D. had de-
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signed for the original foreign buyers of the F-16, Belgium, Denmark, Norway
and the Netherlands.5
As the Spanish competition progressed, G.D. lost competitions to McDon¬
nell Douglas in Canada and Australia, losses some attributed to the quality of
G.D.s offset packages.6

G.D.

did not intend to lose Spain due to offset.

Working with its teammate, the engine maker of the F-16, United Technologies,
G.D. assembled an impressive offset package that provided Spain a positive bal¬
ance of payments for this particular purchase as well as increased employment.
The package included the following: Final assembly of 136 of the 144 aircraft
Spain would buy, construction of major structural components requiring a trans¬
fer of composite technology and manufacture of electronics systems for the
F-16s fire control computer; Westinghouse, producer of the F-16 radar, planned
to form a major electronic repair center in Spain;

Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and

TRW planned to build a turbine compressor and airfoil repair center that would
give the Spanish access to several new technologies; Inmont Corporation, a sub¬
sidiary of United Technologies took the initiative to buy a graphics ink manufac¬
turer in Spain and planned to introduce new technologies through that purchase;
General Dynamics and United Technologies would offer Spanish vacation pack¬
ages to their combined total of over 500,000 employees; rounding out the pack¬
age were commercial purchases of Spanish made parts for auto carburetors,
sewing machines and refrigerators.7 By March of 1981, over a year before
Spain made its final decision, General Dynamics had secured firm commitments
from 96% of the Spanish companies it needed for carrying out its offset pro¬
posal.
In selling its offset package, General Dynamics made presentations to
everyone it could talk to in INI, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of
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Industry.

By these presentations, G.D. hoped to create a groundswell of support

for the General Dynamics program.8
McDonnell Douglas had equal confidence in its product, the F-18. This
confidence was bolstered as M.D. proceeded towin the Canadian and Australian
competitions from General Dynamics.
F-16,

Though it could not turn as well as the

theF-18 was originally designed with radar missile capability.

To those

who claimed that the F-18 was a ’’paper airplane”, M.D.s response was so was
the F-16C.

Furthermore,

the F-18 boasted a bigger radar, two engines (versus

one in the F-16) and more advanced avionics.9

The Situation
McDonnell Douglas was equally confident in its ability to beat General
Dynamics’ offset package.

McDonnell Douglas was reputed to be one of the

best in the offset game, and some would say proved this in the Canadian and
Australian competitions.
In selling its airplane, McDonnell Douglas had better contacts with key
people in the Spanish Government than General Dynamics.

The most famous

of these contacts was with the King of Spain, Juan Carlos, which was made
through Ricky Fuster,

who McDonnell Douglas had employed as a salaried em¬

ployee for several years.

Fuster was good friends with the King for several

years prior to the competition and played golf with him often. 10 The King him¬
self is a pilot, and his favorite service is the Spanish Air Force.

In assembling

its offset proposal, however, some observers felt that McDonnell Douglas was
not keeping pace with General Dynamics.n

Dassault-Breguet with the full

backing of the French Government, made a credible presentation of its Mirage
2000.

The Mirage, however, was outshone by both the Falcon and the Hornet.
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Because of the Spanish Air Force’s desire for an American airplane,
rage was not competitive.
sion.

the Mi¬

The French, nevertheless, did affect the final deci¬

They programmed a computer model the Spanish Air Force used to com¬

pare the competing aircraft. 12
In July of 1981, the competitors expected a decision from the Spanish
government.

Instead, Spain announced that due to budgetary constraints, it

would cut the number of airplanes it bought from 144 to 96. Then in March of
1982, a Deputy Minister of Defense was appointed to supervise the entire com¬
petition.

According to General Dynamics, he proceeded to redefine the offset

competition.

Despite these redefinitions,

very competitive offset packages. 13

G.D. was able to continue presenting

In the meantime, G.D.representatives

marketing the F-16 itself were beginning to sense that the Spanish Air Force
was not interested in their airplane.14

On July 23, 1982, the Spanish Govern¬

ment announced it would purchase the F—18.
Was McDonnell Douglas, with its ’’direct line” to the King able to ”rig
the match?”

To suppose such would be unfair to McDonnell Douglas, especially

before the role of one particular player, heretofore unmentioned, is described.
That player was Secretary of the Navy John Lehman.
Both General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas report that the United
States government, both DOD and DOS, were wholly neutral during the course
of the contest.

Both companies expected the service secretaries, Lehman for the

Navy and Mr.Vern Orr for the Air Force to support their respective service’s
airplanes.

In light of the Navy’s past history as an international marketer, how¬

ever, Lehman’s salesmanship was extraordinary. 15

He is rumored to have vis¬

ited the King himself in an effort to sell the F—18 to Spain. 16

Why was Secre-
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tary Lehman such a staunch supporter of the F-18? Because the F-18 program
was facing possible termination in the House of Representatives.
With a life cycle cost of nearly $30 million a copy in 1981, the F-18 was
considered an expensive airplane.

Some members of Congress felt the Navy

was not getting its money’s worth.

One such representative, Representative

Bruce Vento, 4th District Minnesota, vigorously campaigned against the F-18.
In June of 1981, Vento managed to attach a rider to a defense appropriations
bill which would have forbidden the Navy to use any of its aviation funding to
purchase F-18s.

Vento argued that the F-18 was not cost effective. However,

supporters of the F-18 argued that it would be improper to cancel the F-18 pro¬
gram after the United States had agreed to allow Canada to buy the airplane.
Vento’s proposal failed to carry and the Navy became an even more vigorous
international marketer of its F-18.17
One more interesting point about the services needs to be mentioned.
The Air Force was not the positive international marketing force that it had tra¬
ditionally been.

In previous sales,

and friends to buy the F—16.

the Air Force was eager for foreign allies

In the Spanish competition, the Air Force gave the

impression that involving itself with Spain would be an ’’administrative head¬
ache.” 18

As one of the decision makers in the fighter competition Greece is

conducting, you are particularly interested in why the Spanish competition went
as it did.
F-18,

Greece is interested in purchasing the following aircraft: The F-16,

Mirage2000 and Tornado.

Offset will be a decisive factor.

As you sit in your office, you ask yourself how the decision in Spain was
made?

Who were the key decision makers, and why did they act as they did?

What weight was given to aircraft capability? What weight to offset? Why was
a Deputy Minister of Defense appointed at the end of the competition? Further
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more, how might the Spanish case affect the competition in Greece? Good luck!
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TABLE 1
IDENTIFICATION OF KEY PLAYERS BY CATEGORY

CATEGORY

KEY PLAYERS

GOALS

President

Political

NATIONAL

SUBNATIONAL

TRANSNATIONAJLl

Economic
Military
Secretary of State

Military
Political

!

Congress

Political
Military
Economic

Secretary of Defense

Political

.

U.S. Representative

Political
Economic

j
I

Secretary of the Navy

Political
Military

|
1

Secretary of the Air Force

Military
Economic

;
;

Aerospace Corporation

Economic
Political

j
j

Labor Union

Economic

Aerospace Corporation

Economic

Secretary of Defense

Political
Military

j
j

\
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TABLE 2
A CONGRESSMAN’S SCORING FOR AN F-18 SALES AGREEMENT

LEVEL

GOALS

RATING

Political

-1 Stated goal is to reduce
U.S. arms sales abroad

Military

+1 Stated goal is to omprove
national defense. Sale
will do this.

NATIONAL

Economic

Political

SUBNATIONAL
Military

0 No direct effect on any of
of the congressman’s
goals.
-1 Sale is opposed by large
percentage of his/her
constituents.
0 No direct effect on any of
of the congressman’s
goals.

Economic

+1 Sale helps keep the voters
employed.

Political

+ 1 Sale strenghtens relations
between U.S. and NATO.

Military

+ 1 Sale strenghtens NATO’s
military capability.

Economic

0 No direct effect on any of
of the congressman’s
goals.

j
i
j
j

|

j
|
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TABLE 3
FIGHTER COMPETITION MATRIX
KEY PLAYER
NATIONAL
WEIGHT
P

M

TRANSNAT’L
SUBNAT’L

E

p

M

TOTAL

E

p

1

M

E

1

|

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

5

0.8

j

1

1 1

0

-1

0

0

1

0

0

1.6

I TT Q Q A Q T

0.5

|

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

AMBSSDR/
SPAIN

0.4

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0.7

1

1

0

-1

-1

-1

0

0

0

-0.7

0.6

-1

1

0

-1

1.2

0.3

0

0

0

0.3

0

0

o

0.2

0

0

0 !

0.8

-i

0

0

| PRESIDENT

SEC/STATE

SEC.DEFENSE

| A.S.I.S.P.

SEC/AIR FORCE

1 SEC/NAVY

I A.C.D.A.

ItIP O’NEILL

1

I

1

0

0

0

2

2

0

1

1

1

0

i

0

0

0

0 <

0

0

!

o

0

0 1

0 !

o

0

0

0

0

0 1

0

0

o j

i

1 j

0

1.6

1
;

-1

!

i

1

CONGRESS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CONGRESS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1-3

0

5

4

3

CONGRESS

TOTALS

1

12.7
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TABLE 4
IMPACT ON UNITED STATES ECONOMY OF MILITARY
AIRCRAFT SALES
1 YEAR
S

1972
1973
1974

ARMS IMPORTS ARMS EXPORTS NET ARMS EXPORTS 1
$ 160

$ 4000

170

4900

120

4600

1975

140

j

1976

110

5900

1977

120

6800

1978

120

1979

130

1980

140

6500

1981

210

8300

1982

430

9500

j

j

j

4730

j

j

$
3840

GNP W/EXPORTS

4480

!

4660

!

5790

j

6680

!

6280

|

6170

j

6360

j

8090

1

9070

|

JOBS FROM EXPORTS

|

4800

6400
6300

GNP W/0 EXPORTS

1972

$ 228202

$ 220445

976804

}

1973

260331

250776

1116192

|

1974

279997

270947

1068934

1975

300956

201543

1128140

1976

329486

317790

1353211

j

1977

322286

339332

1540893

|

1978

322272

379586

1399404

|

1980

434217

421754

1437103

J

1981

465482

452635

1413800

|

1

1982

531606

513285

2046169

|

\

DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

I

|
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TABLE 5
IMPACT OF MILITARY AIRPLANE IMPORTS
ON SPANISH ECONOMY

YEAR
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
YEAR

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

ARMS IMPORTS

ARMS EXPORTS

$ 80
110
100
160
220
300
160
200
250
390
470

$ 10
10
20
80
90
30
70
60
80
100
550

NET IMPORTS
$ 70
100
80
80
130

j

|
1

270

90
140
170
290
-80

i
i
;

GNP W/IMPORTS GNP W/O IMPORTS JOBS LOST W/IMPORTS

$ 74078
74567
97484
107162
116388
127132
139007
151659
167445
183691
197175

DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

$ 73811
74186
97179
106857
115893
126103
138664
151126
166797
182286
197480

63667
84912
64823
64950
103705
211711
70081
109552
132346
227394
-62280

i

j
!
!
I
;
!
;
i;
j
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TABLE 6
SPANISH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS

1972

S 357,564,000

1973

$

1974

$ 150,599,000

1975

$

1976

$ 123,488,000

1977

$

1978

$ 192,560,000

1979

$

1980

$ 441,741,000

57,679,000

53,793,000

88,004,000

99,353,000
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TABLE 7
PRIMARY MILITARY AIRCRAFT CONTRACTORS
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TABLE 8
GENERAL DYNAMICS POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS
Factor

Weighted Value

Condition

Rating
1981 1986

1

.4

Inflation

2

.4

Balance of Payments

\

3

.4

Economic Growth

j

4.25

4.5

Infrastructure

j

3.0

4.0

|

1.75

1.75

4

4

j

1.0

2.0

5

.4

Natural Resources

6

A

Population Pressure

4.0

4.75

3.5

4.25

7

1.0

Internal Market

8

.4

4.75

4.75

9

.6

Agricultural Effi¬
ciency
Regulatory Environment
Government Stability

1.5

1.75

3.0

4.25

Attitude Towards Pri¬
vate Enterprise
Attitude Toaward
Foreign Owned Bus.
External Securiry
Threats
Level of Confidence
in Survey Results

4.5

4.5

3.5

3.5

4.5

4.5

|
10

1.0

\

1 11

.8

j

.8

j
|

12

.6
13

}
1.0

14

| Summation:

Total Weighted Value

90%

24.60 28.45
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TABLE 9
GENERAL DYNAMICS SALES OF F - 16
COUNTRY

UNITED
STATES

DELIVERED
1982

PREVIOUS
DELIVERIES

TOTAL
CONTRACTED

CURRENT
PLANNED

169

520

1,085

2,165

BELGIUM

21

71

160

160

DENMARK

15

48

58

58

HOLLAND

22

73

156

213

NORWAY

16

46

72

72

ISRAEL

0

75

75

150

EGYPT

22

22

80

80

PAKISTAN

6

6

40

40

VENEZUELA

0

0

24

24

KOREA

0

0

36

36

TOTALS
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BILLIONS OF $

FIGURE 1

UNITES STATES INCOME FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALES
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U.S. JOB YEARS IN MILLIONS

YEAR

FIGURE 2
DIRECT AND INDIRECT JOB - YEARS GAINED BY U.S.
ECONOMY FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALES
1972 - 1982
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-10
-12172
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
YEAR

FIGURE 3
INCOME LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY FROM AIRPLANE
PURCHASE

200

SPANISH JOB YEARS IN THOUSANDS

40
0

-40

-80

-120

-160

-200

-240

-280

-320
YEAR

FIGURE 4
JOB - YEARS LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY DUE TO NET
AIRPLANE SALES AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES

2.0
1,8
1.6
1.4

1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4

0.2
0
ASSUMED
USN
QUANTITY

83

87

84

85

86

84

108

156

180

181

24

41

79

78

76

46

87

125

256

227

81

82

60

63

18

78

88

89

186

186

186

186

ASSUMED

FOREIGN
QUANTITY

ASSUMED
TOTAL
QUANTITY

182 234

FIGURE 5
COST REDUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FOREIGN SALES
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FIGURE 6
GENERAL DYNAMICS F-16 FIGHTING FALCON
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F/A-18 Hornet
BUILT TO FLY IN HARM’S WAY.
DAY AFTER DAY
Survivability has been built into
every cranny of the Hornet,
from its tough twin engines,
advanced avionics and selfdefense missiles to its extra¬
strength airframe.
As both a fighter and an
attack plane-land based or
carrier-based-the Hornet can
use speed, maneuverability and
air-to air firepower to fight
through enemy fire fire to its tar¬
get.
Survivability is an investment
in defense that is never lost. Be¬
cause an airplane saved is a pilot
saved, and both can fight again.

MCD 0/fcWOL£FIGURE 7
F/A-18 HORNET
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air-to-air : long-armed

—

The MIRAGE 2000 is the pre-eminent multi¬
role fighter of the latest generation. For air-toair missions, the SUPER 530 D missile, in
conjunction with the aircraft’s weapon
system, intercepts and destroys any existing
adversary, whatever its speed and altitude.
TtsSNECM A M53 engineand
its advanced aerodynamics
make it the only singleengined aircraft of its genera^
non capjble of Hying at Mach *•
2 2 In air combat, its tlv-bv-wirc
control s>>tem and its Magic 2
missiles give it a decisive advantage.
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air-to-ground : iron-handed
For air-to-ground missions, its array of hightechnology armament is
offered by no other aircraft:
laser-guided bombs and
missiles, anti-radar mis¬
siles, air-to-surface missiles,
specialized anti-runway
and area weapons, etc...

The MIN \CL 2000 : multirole capability
through advanced technology.

AVIOSS MARCEL DASSAULT ■ BREGL’ET AVIATIOS

FIGURE 8
MIRAGE 2000 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT
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FIGURE 9
PAN AVI A TORNADO F.2

206

C/D H

FIGURE 10
LIFE CYCLE COST BREAKDOWN

B Composite Assemblies
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FIGURE 11
COMPONENTS FOR SPANISH INDUSTRY: F/A

-

18
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U. S. SALES PROCESS
MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALE TO A NATO COUNTRY
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PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF STATE
(SOS)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SOD)

UNDER SECRETARY
FOR SECURIRY ASSISTANCE

SECRETARY OF NAVY
(SECNAV)

NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)

SECRETARY OF
AIR FORCE
(SECAIR)

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
(USSA)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY
(ASIP)

ARMS TRANSFER
MANAGEMENT GROUP
(ATMG)
ARMS CONTROL
DISARMEMENT
AGENCY
(ACDA)

JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
(JCS)

BUREAU OF POLITICO
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(BPM)

DEFENSE SECURITY
ASSISTANCE AGENCY
(DSAA)

OFFICE OF
MUNITIONS
CONTROL
(OMC)

REGIONAL BUREAU
(RB)

IN-COUNTRY MILITARY

IN-COUNTRY
AMBASSADOR

ASSISTANCE & ADVISORY

(A)

GROUP (MAAG)

FIGURE 14
KEY PLAYERS IN EXECUTIVE REVIEW PROCESS
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FIGURE 15
FLOW OF REVIEW FOR UNCONTROVERSIAL SALE
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FIGURE 16
THE COMPETTITIVE PROCESS
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PRIME MINISTER

MINISTER OF
DEFENSE

MINISTER OF
INDUSTRY

Y

MINISTER OF
ECONOMY

i

-DEPUTY MINISTEROF DEFENSE

INA
(PUBLIC STRUCTURE)

T
FACA
OFFSET

SPANISH
AIR FORCE

KEY PERSONNEL

DGAM

WITHIN MINISTRY
OF ECONOMY

t

y
INTERMINISTERIAL
COMMISION

Y

t

INI
(PRIVATE INDUSTRIES)

FIGURE 17
SPAIN’S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
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The F-16 Offset Prog run has bate structurod to
maximize Spain's axport potantial and to roduca
imports of aorospaca products and palrolaum.
Progress toward these objectives io illustrated by:

• INCREASED SPANISH IMPORTS - Salts abroad will
off sot 110 parcont of lha F-16 air vehicle cost.
Those sales comprise high-technology, laborintensive aerospace products and services, as
well as products From a broad sector of Spanish
industry.

REDUCED F-16 TOTAL PROGRAM AND FUEL
COST - The increased total program cost of
competing aircraft and their )S percent
higher fuel uaeaga would produce ao
additional import cost to Spain equivalent
to 100 percent of the F-16 air vehicle cost
This analysis is based on the very conserv¬
ative assumption that future fuel prices
will not increase in constant year dollars.
An equivalent ratio of offset value to total
program and fuel useage cost for these
aircraft could only be achieved with an
offset program 70 percent greeter than
the f-16 offset commitment. If the same
net balance of payment value is desired,
an t6 percent greater offset prog!
would be necessary.

Reduced
Fuel
Coat

_

.

Import
Cost
ArwidsMcm

FIGURE 18
SPAIN S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
FOR F-16 OFFSET PROGRAM
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The strong and positive economic stimulus provided
by the F-16 Offset Program will have an impact on
more than Just the import-export sector of Span’s
economy
- Increase in Direct and Indirect Employment.
Nearly 16,000 direct man-years of employment in
manufacturing and an additional 14,000 manyears in indirect and administrative jobs will be
created.
- Creation of Secondary Employment - The F-16
offset economic stimulus will also affect other ba¬
sic elements of the Spanish economy such as agri¬
culture, consumer durables, and construction. An
additional 20,000 man-years of emplotment would
be created in these areas if an estimate based on
data from the United States’ economy is used to
represent an approximation of the Spanish impact.
- Incresed Tax Revenues - The taxes generated by
the F-16 offset economic activities couls return as
much as 25 percent of the F-16 air vehicle cost to
the Spanish government.

F-16 Offset Program Job Creation. . .
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FIGURE 19
SPAIN’S ECONOMIC BENEFITS
PROVIDED BY F-16 OFFSET PROGRAM

APPENDIX C
ROLE DESCRIPTIONS
U.S. GOVERNMENT CORRESPONDENCE
NEWS RELEASES

Note: Change in print and style represents actual inter-governmental office correspon
dence

SAMPLE ROLE DESCRIPTIONS
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

Christiane Carney, Secretary of State.You are the first woman in
the history of the United States to be appointed Secretary of State.
Though you were originally a member of the Democratic Party, your strong
anti- communistic views made you a perfect choice for the Reagan
Administra- tion.

As a professor at Georgetown University before accepting your
present role, you cultivared a wide circle of friends including Secretary of
the

Air Force, David Dell.

Secretary of the Navy, Naomi Segal, who was a

member of the Georgetown faculty before accepting her present post, is also
a close friend. Amy Cardamore, who is presently a high-ranking minsiter of
the Italian Government, was a student of yours when you first began teach¬
ing at Georgetown in 1963.

The two'of you have remained close since then.

Another former student of yours is Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat
from Minnesota.

Your appointment as Secretary of State was not without
controversy.

Your appointment was approved in the Senate by only 3 votes.

Much of the controversy was generated behind the scenes by the present
Secretary of Defense, Carmen Marino.

Marino, who has a number of

friends in the Senate, coveted the role of Secretary of State for himself and
worked very discreetly to have your nomination rejected by the Senate.
Since your appointment, Marino has worked through his Assistant Secretary
for International Security Policy, Annette Boyle, to gain the upper hand in
formulating foreign policy.
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As of July 1982, you have the complete confidence of the
President. Your two assistants, Under Secretary Kositsky and Ambassador
Codo are both loyal to your programs and policy.
YOUR GOALS:
(1)

FORMULATE A VIABLE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GREECE.
This policy should comprise the following sub-goals:

(2)

(a)

negotiate a new military base rights treaty with Greece

(b)

attempt to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey

(c)

maintain/improve U.S. relations with Greece

HOLD ON TO YOUR POWER TO FORMULATE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to undermine your ability to control
the formulation of U.S. foreign of U.S. foreign policy vis a vis Greece.
(3)

ATTEMPT TO GAIN GREATER INFLUENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT IN

MATTERS CONCERNING NATIONAL SECURITY.
(4)

DO NOT ALLOW THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO EFFECTIVELY

DEPRIVE YOU OF YOUR POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER MAJOR
WEAPONS SALES SHOULD BE APPROVED.
Your Under Secretary Kositsky should be the overall coordinator
in any review of a major sale.

Take care that he maintains that role.
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DUTIES:

You possess the authority to convene the Arm Transfer
Management Group.

This group comprises Under Secretary Kositsky, who

chairs the group, Assistant Secretary of Defense Boyle, and Chief of the
ACDA Sheri Rosenfeld.

You are also a member of the National Security

Council which is convened by the President upon the advice of either you or
the Secretary of Defense.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON GREEK GOVERNMENT:
A recent CIA document that you had commissioned indicates that

FOREIGN MINISTER BAROUTAS is a tough negotiator who OFTEN WILL
REFUSE TO SEE OPPOSITE NEGOTIATORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING
THEM. Apparently, he insists on only doing his negotiating at lunch. Do
not expect to see him more than once a week during the negotiation.

PRIME MINISTER PAPENDREOUS on the other hand is MORE READILY
AVAILABLE than the FOREIGN MISTER. However, Papendreous will defer
to his foreign minister’s judgement in most cases.

BUDGET:
You have an expense budget of $10.00 for diplomatic luncheons
with members of the Greek Government. See (NAME)
reimbursement.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:

Concentrate initially on the following readings:

at OMB for
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1.

Briefing Book on Greece, particularly the N.Y.T. clippings at the

back of the book.

2.

The Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece

3.

Execut
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
David Kositsky, Under Secretary for Security Assistance.

You are the administration’s chief spokesman for its arms transfer
policy.

Before being asked to join the Reagan Administration, you were

chairman of the Heritage Foundation’s Defense Studies Committee. While
at the Heritage Foundation, you became good friends with another member
of the committee, Harriet Madoff who has since gone back to her home in
St. Louis where she was elected to Congress in 1980.
Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, you served for 27 years
with the U.S. Air Force.

One of your tours was spent in Greece where you

became good friends with the present Chief General of the Hellenic Air
Force, Thomas Cheneterous. You ended your Air Force career as the top
Air Force Officer in the Defense Security Assistance Agency under the Ford
and Carter Administrations. You retired from the Air Force a major general
and joined the Heritage Foundation in 1978.
Your father, who is now deceased, rose to the rank of Colonel in
the Army Air Corps.

His classmate and good friend was Robert McDonald,

the present CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft.

Both your father and Mr.

McDonald received their wings in 1924 as members of Army Air Service
class 24-6.
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GOALS:

1.

WITH GUIDANCE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IMPLEMENT THE

PRESIDENT’S PLOICY ON ARMS TRANSFERS.

There are reports of a move afoot in Congress to require that
U.S. contractors submit their offset proposals before the Congress before
major arms sales would be approved under the AECA. You must lobby
Congress on behalf the administration to ensure that legislation which would
hurt the competitiveness of U.S. Corporations is not passed.

2.

MAINTAIN YOUR AUTHORITY AS CHIEF COORDINATOR OF U.S. ARMS

TRANSFER POLICY.

It is rumored that the Secretary of Defense covets the post of
Secretary of State and will attempt to erode State’s authority by attempting
to frame foreign policy questions as questions of national security. To
assist him, SecDef has an able assistant, Annette Boyle.
coordinate foreign arms transfers at DOD.

Her job is to

It’s a job which is practically a

mirror of yours.

DO NOT ALLOW BOYLE TO BECOME THE DE FACT OVERSEER OF
THE PROCESS.

DUTIES:
1.

Grant or deny permission to U.S. Aircraft Corporations to approach

the Greek government and make sales proposals.

2.

Review any literature the aircraft companies wish to use in their sales

presentations.
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3.

Review any sales proposals made by U.S. aircraft companies to

Greece.

4.

Chair the Arms Transfer Management Group whenever meetings of

that body are called by the Secretary of State. Other members include
ASDISP Boyle and ACDA Rosenfeld.
INITIAL ACTIONS:

As you start the game, the first question you must decide is
whether it is in the best interest of the U.S. to sell either the F-16 or F-18
to Greece.

Keep in mind that Turkey is also requesting these aircraft. Also

keep in mind that if you delay too long in granting U.S. corporations the
opportunity to approach the Greek Government, you may put
them at a competitive disadvantage.
■"Consult with the Secretary of State on whether the U.S. wishes to sell
these aircraft to Greece.
*Get a sense for what DOD thinks on this matter prior to meeting with
the Secretary.
■"Also get a sense of what Congressional attitude is towards this matter.
*If there appears to be any controversy over this matter, you might
want to recommend that the Secretary convene a meeting of the Arms
Transfer Management Group.

NOTE THAT GREECE, DESPITE ITS MORE RECENT BEHAVIOR IS A NATO
ALLY.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) REPORTS STATE THAT
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ITS AIR F0RCE JS SORELY IN NEED OF MODERNIZATION IF GREECE IS
TO BE AN EFFECTIVE NATO PARTNER.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft”. This is

the original case handout.
2.

The LaFalce Letter

3.

Military Offsets

4.

Briefing Book on Greece.

Concentrate on N.Y.T. articles at the

back of the book.

5.

Economic Intelligence Unit reports on Greece.

6.

Modern Air Combat.

(Large Handout)

with the competing aircraft as well as the
aircraft.

Be sure you are familiar

basic components of all fighter

226

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Christina Codo, Ambassador to Greece. You have been
Ambassador to Greece for the past five years. During that time you have
become good friends with Dr. Ralph Johnstonoutus, who presently directs
Hellenic Aviation Industries.

Though you were well acquainted with the

cabinet ministers of the Rallis government, you have not developed a
rapport with the ministers of Mr. Papendreou’s government.
You began your diplomatic career in 1961 in Paris. It was here
that you became good friends with Kevin Scott, a minister of the French
government.

After a stint in Paris, you were assigned in 1968 to the U.S.

Embassy in South Viet Nam where you served until 1972.

While in Saigon,

you became good drinking buddies with Captain Steven Swanson, U.S.
Navy, who was supervising the secret Women in Combat project. Swanson,
as you know, was forced to leave the Navy in 1977 when knowledge of this
program became public.

He immediatelygained fame as, of all things, a

feminist, and was elected to Congress from Massachusetts in 1978.
In 1972, you left State to pursue doctoral studies at Yale. While
there, you met Shari Rosenfeld, who has since become the director of the
Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

The two of you remain close friends

to this day.
Because you were appointed by President Carter, you are
particularly aware of the vulnerability of your position, especially in light of
rumors that Secretary of Defense Marino is urging the President to replace
Secretary of State Carney.

You feel that the President is keeping you on in

Greece because of your experience as a negotiator.

The administration is
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very anxious over negotiation of a new base rights treaty.

Your relations

with Secretary Carney are excellent.
GOALS:

YOUR PRIMARY GOAL IS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW MILITARY BASE RIGHTS
TREATY WITH GREECE.

DUTIES: ALONG WITH NEGOTIATING THE BASE RIGHTS TREATY, YOU
HAVE THE FOLLOWING
DUTIES:

'Providing assistance to U.S. aircraft companies competing for the
HAF sale.
YOU MUST BE SURE NOT TO ALLOW YOUR ASSISTANCE TO APPEAR AS
FAVORING ONE U.S. CONTRACTOR OVER ANOTHER.
•Delivering any protests the U.S. government might lodge with the
Greek government during the course of this period.
•Take any actions you see as necessary to carry forward the policies
formulated by the administration.

INITIAL TACTICS:
Your first priority should be to meet with either Foreign Minister
Baroutas or Prime Minister Papendreou.

The CIA reports that Mr. Baroutas

will be extremely difficult to contact as he ’’stone walls” diplomats from
other countries as a bargaining strategy.
more details.

See Secretary of State Carney for

Mr. Papendreou is likely to be more available.
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BUDGET:

The State Department has a one thousand dollars budget for
diplomatic luncheons.

See Secretary Carney.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

Briefing Book on Greece.

Focus on N.Y.T. new articlesat the

back of the book.

2.

Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece

3.

Readings on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

4.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

You have been a staunch supporter of Ronald Reagan for the last
5 years.

You thought you would be Reagan’s Secretary of State.

However,

in a compromise on the eve of the 1980 Republican Convention, the Reagan
camp agreed to appoint a Bush supporter to that post in return for Mr.
Bush’s joining Mr. Reagan on the Republican ticket.

Eventually, Mr. Bush’s

international affairs advisor Christiane Carney was nominated for State. This
was especially galling to you because she was of all things a Democrat.
Nevertheless, with her strong anti-communist views, and the growing clamor
among women’s groups for a say in government, she proved the most
politically viable choice.

You ostensibly went along with the selection.

However, behind the scenes you tried your best to subvert the nomination.
Carney’s nomination passed in the Senate by only three votes.
rumors spread of your attempts to subvert the nomination.

Since then,

Presently, you

and Secretary Carney are not on best of terms.

You are a graduate of the Yale Class of 1941 and entered the
Army at the outbreak of WWII.

During the war you served on General

Eisenhower’s staff where you became close friends with Secretary of the Air
Force David Dell, who was then a first lieutenant in the Army Air Corps.
Upon leaving the service in 1945, you attended Harvard Business School.
In 1947 you were hired by the Bechtol Corporation where you worked until
1970 when you were invited by the Nixon administration to serve as
Secretary of HEW.

After serving both the Nixon and Ford Administrations,

you left Washington in 1977 and taught at Harvard’s Kennedy School of
Government. While teaching at Harvard, you met Annette Boyle, a former
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Senate aid who was doing doctoral work at the Kennedy School. Impresssed
by Ms. Boyle’s astuteness as a political tactician, you included her on your
staff when you accepted the post of Secretary of Defense.

GOALS
1.

ENSURE THAT WHATEVER ACTIONS TAKEN ON THE MATTER OF

A SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO GREECE ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY.

Greece’s role in NATO should be of particular

concern to you.

2.

FRAME POLICY QUESTIONS CONCERNING GREECE IN TERMS

OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By so doing this, you will be drawing power
away from the Secretary of State.

3.

WORK TO HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ANY DECISION ON

ARMS TRANSFERS REST WITH YOUR OFFICE. Arguments you make to the
President may have an impact on how he decides to implement any changes
to the present arms

transfer review process.

WORK WITH ASDISP BOYLE

TO FORMULATE STRATEGIES WHICH WILL GIVE YOU DE FACTO
CONTROL OF THE PROCESS WITHIN THE PRESENT BUREAUCRATIC
STRUCTURE.
*

INITIAL TACTICS:
Thoroughly review Chapters 3-5 of the red casebook, ’’Foreign
Military Aircraft Sales”. Meet with the President as soon as possible and
recommend changes to the process.

Be sure to frame your arguments in

such a way that your changes can be viewed as helping the administration
to better achieve its stated goals.
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ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
You sit on the National Security Council along with the President
and the Secretary of State.

The President convenes meetings of the council

on the advice of either you or the Secretary of State.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft”

2.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

3.

Paper on Greece’s role in NATO

4.

Executive-Legislative Consultation on Arms Transfers

5.

Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981.

6. Briefing Book on Greece.
book.

Focus on N.Y.T. articles at back of the
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Annette Boyle, Ass’t. Sec., Int’l. Security Policy.

In December of 1980 you were sitting in your Cambridge apart¬
ment when you received a call from your former professor at the Kennedy
School of Government, Carmen Marino. Marino, who had just been selected
by President Elect Ronald Reagan to be Secretary of Defense wanted you to
serve as his Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy.

You

accepted the position, and have been serving in that capacity since.

Since

starting at DOD your influence has grown to the point where you are the
most powerful person in DOD after the secretary himself.

Your opponents

both at DOD and State refer to you as the ’’Princess of Darkness”.

Your career in Washington began in 1968 when you accepted a
position directly out of Smith College as a Senate aide for Senator Barry
Goldwater.

While working for Mr. Goldwater you became good friends with

two other aides, Yoshi Shigenari and Alex Kam.

Both have since gone on

to be Congressmen. Because of your close friendship with former Smith
classmate turned Washington Post reporter, Karen Baler, you became an
important ’’informed source” to the Washington press during your stint as a
senate aide.

In 1977, you left Washington to attend Harvard’s Kennedy School
of Government. While there, you took several courses under the former
Secretary of HEW, Carmen Marino, who was impressed with your
comprehension of the intricacies of operating within the federal bureaucracy.
Marino told you he thought you would make an excellent assistant should he
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ever return to Washington. Until you received his invitation to join DOD,
you had only half believed him.
You are committed to helping Secretary Marino achieve his goals
of taking de facto control over the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and of
pressuring Secretary Carney to leave her position as Secretary of State.

GOAL:
BY THE END OF THE GAME, HAVE TOTAL DE FACTO CONTROL OVER
THE U.S. ARMS TRANSFER PROCESS.

INITIAL TACTICS:
You have surmised that the Secretary of Defense will be
recommending to the President improvements to the Administration’s
present internal review process for arms transfers. An excellent first move
would be to prepare some recommendations which Secretary Marino can use
when he sees the President.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS BECOMING A

MAJOR CONCERN OF THE SERVICES, PARTICULARLY THE NAVY. THIS
MAY BE THE ANGLE FROM WHICH YOU CAN BEST APPROACH THIS
MATTER.

DUTIES:
You are now responsible for coordinating DOD review of requests
for arms transfers. As a courtesy to the Air Force and Navy, you have
been requesting their advice on the transfer of their particular weapons
systems. You are also a member of the Arms Transfer Management Group.
This group is chaired by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance
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Kositsky.

Shari Rosenfeld, the Director of ACDA is also a member of this

group.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

Section V, ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft” (The original

red casebook)

2.

Briefing book on Greece.

Concentrate on N.Y.T. articles at the

back of the book.

3. MODERN AIR COMBAT.

Pay particular attention sections on

propulsion and weapons technologies.
4.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

5.

’’Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short”.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
David Dell, Secretary of the Air Force.

Upon retiring as an Air Force General in 1978, you were hired by
BDM, a major Washington defense consultant, to head its Air Strategy
Department. When President Reagan was elected in 1980, you were
recommended for your present post by an old WWII drinking buddy of
yours, Carmen Marino. Marino had been selected by the President to be
his Secretary of Defense. Both you and Marino had served on General
Eisenhower’s staff. Marino had left the military to pursue a career in
business while you had made the military a career.

Your last years in the Air Force were spent in the Pentagon as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You became a regular on the
Washington party circuit during this period, and through these social
engagements developed a wide circle of friends, including former
Georgetown professor turned Secretary of State Christiane Carney. Other
friends include Kevin Scott, a minister of France and Amy Cardamore, a
minister of Italy, both of whom were previously stationed in Washington.

With the upcoming Greek fighter competition, it will soon be time
to strike up another old friendship, that with HAF General John
Schecteropous. You and John became close friends in 1947 when you were
part of the military advisory team sent by President Truman to help Greece
put down its communist insurgency. Since last seeing John in 1950, your
families have exchanged Christmas cards on a yearly basis.
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GOALS:
Both you and Secretary of the Navy Segal have a budgetary stake
in which aircraft, the F-16 or F-18, the Hellenic Air Force selects.

YOUR

GOAL IS TO PERSUADE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO PURCHASE THE
F-16.

INITIAL TACTICS:
As a first move you might want to make an appointment to see
your old friend John Schecteropous.

You might want to mention to him

that the Air Force needs an F-16 rework facility in the Med., and there is
an excellent chance that if Greece bought the F-16, it could get the Lion’s
share of this work for its fledgling aircraft industry.

General Dynamics must obtain permission from the State
Department before it can make a sales pitch to Greece on the F-16.

BECAUSE OF YOUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH SECRETARY MARINO AND
SECRETARY CARNEY, YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO FINESSE THIS
APPROVAL THROUGH THE BUREAUCRACY MORE QUICKLY THAN IT
WOULD OTHERWISE GO THROUGH.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

MODERN AIR COMBAT.

you can.

Become as familiar with this book as

General Schecteropous is an avid flyer.

Your ability to sell him

on the F-16 will depend on your familiarity with its capabilities.

2.

Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on the N.Y.T. articles near

the end of the book.

3. Military Offsets handout.

4.

White House Statement on Conventional Arms Transfers.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Naomi Segal, Secretary of the Navy.

You were the U.S. Navy’s first woman admiral, and are
considered one of the foremost experts in naval strategy in the United
States today.

You retired from your post as Chief of Navy Personnel in

1977 and were invited to join the faculty of Georgetown University as a
professor of strategic studies.

While on the Georgetown staff, you became

close friends with fellow professor Christiane Carney.

Soon after Ms.

Carney was invited to serve as Secretary of State, you were invited to serve
as Secretary of the Navy.

Throughout your career you have been a strong and vocal
advocate for a stronger navy.
power.

You feel the key to a strong navy is air

Consequently, you have lobbied for an increase in the number of

aircraft carriers and have been a strong supporter of the F-18.

In working

since 1981 to keep the F-18 program alive, you have become good friends
with Bob McDonald, the CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft.

The Spanish sale was important to saving the F-18. You made
several trips to Spain in the course of the competition, and crossed paths
several times with Diane Dickason, a French sales representative for
Dassault.

In several casual conversations with Dickason, the first European

woman to fly faster than the speed of sound, you found you shared much in
common.

A friendship between the two of you developed.

Another famous friend of yours is Chris Manos, who has just
been appointed by Greece’s primary minister Andreous Papandreou as
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Greece’s new minister of National Economy. Manos was a classmate of
yours at Harvard.

GOAL:
YOU ARE AMBIVALENT AS TO WHETHER YOU WANT THE U.S. TO SELL
THE F-18 TO GREECE. Although additional foreign sales will save the
Navy budget dollars, you feel that Greece is fast becoming a security risk.

THE SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE NAVY HAS AN
IMPORTANT BASE LOCATED IN GREECE. Sale of the F-18 may become
one of the bargaining chips in that negotiation. You would much rather sell
the F-18 to Greece than lose the base.

AS YOU SEE IT, YOUR GOAL IS TO SUBTLY PERSUADE BOTH THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT AND THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THAT F-16 IS A BETTER
AIRPLANE FOR GREECE.

INITIAL TACTICS:
First you might want to talk with Bob McDonald of McDonnell
Douglas and express to him your concerns about the national security
problems that might arise in selling the F-18 to Greece.

You might point

out that your old classmate Chris Manos has definite leftist leanings.

TELL

MCDONALD THAT YOU CANNOT WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT SALE OF
THE F-18 TO SPAIN. FURTHERMORE TELL HIM YOU WILL LOBBY ALL
THE HARDER FOR AN F-18 SALE TO TURKEY IF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
LETS GENERAL DYNAMICS WIN IN GREECE. The Turkish contract is for
291 aircraft.

Greece only wants to buy 100 aircraft and is rumored to be

planning on splitting its purchase between two manufacturers.
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Your next move might be to see ASDISP Annette Boyle and
USSA David Kositsky to express your concern over Greece being sold the
F-18.

These two players have a large say in when McDonnell Douglas will

get the opportunity to make its sales pitch to the Greek Air Force.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

MODERN AIR COMBAT.

the F-18.
for you to

You will want to be thoroughly familiar with

The more familiar you are with the aircraft, the easier it will be
convince both Boyle and Kositsky that they should block

McDonnell from selling the F-18.

2.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.

3.

Military Offsets.

4.

Countertrade:

A Serious Consideration.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Shari Rosenfeld, Director of Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

President Reagan appointed you to your present position in 1981.
Prior to this time you were a defense analyst for the Hudson Institute,
where you were considered one of the foremost experts in the U.S. on
conventional arms proliferation.

Your career in Washington began in 1968, when you served as a
legislative aid to Senator Jacob Javitts of New York. As a senate aid, you
became friends with aids Alexander Kam and Yoshi Shigenari, both of
whom went on to become Congressmen. In 1971, you left Washington to
pursue doctoral studies at Yale. As a student in operations research, you
met Christina Codo, a student in the School of International Relations. The
two of you remain close friends. Upon receiving your PhD in 1974, you
joined the Hudson Institute.
Since taking your present position with the Reagan Administration,
you have attended two conferences on world arms reduction where you have
established close acquaintances with both Kevin Scott, a minister of the
French Government and Dorothy Heisenberg, a minister of the British
Government.

GOALS:
The Reagan Administration is committed to strengthening its
friends and allies through arms transfers. This makes your job especially
difficult, because in advocating a reduction in all conventional arms t
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transfers you may be working against what the administration feels are its
best interests.

Nevertheless, you are appalled at the huge amounts of resources
committed worldwide to armaments. You told the president when he
appointed you that you would not disappear into the background or serve as
a smokescreen for an administration policy which would turn the U.S. into
’’the world’s biggest discount gun store”. You were surprised when the
president went ahead with appointing you.

Since taking your new post, the importance of your position has
appeared to shrink. Moreover, the Democrats are attempting to take
advantage of the arms proliferation issue. Some Democrats are arguing the
administration’s proposed plans to sell our modern aircraft (F-16 or F-18)
to both Greece and Turkey will only serve to exacerbate the tensions already
existing in that region and may lead to an arms race between the two.
YOUR GOALS ARE TO:
(1)

STUBBORNLY ENSURE THAT PROPER CONSIDERATION IS

GIVEN TO THE NEGATIVE IMPACT A SALE OF THESE AIRCRAFT COULD
HAVE ON REGIONAL STABILITY.
(2) BLUNT ANY INITIATIVES BY THE DEMOCRATS TO MAKE AN
ISSUE OF IRRESPONSIBLE TRANSFER POLICIES BY THE
ADMINISTRATION.
(3) EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION SO
YOUR PERSONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ARMS PROLIFERATION CAN BE
TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE ACTION.
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IMPORTANT READINGS:
1.

Democratic Policy Committee:

’’Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling

Ourselves Short”
2.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

3.

Mr. Buckley’s Williamsburg Speech of May, 1981.

4.

’’Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World”

5.

Briefing Book on Greece.

book.

Concentrate on N.Y.T. clippings at back of
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
StevenSwanson, Liberal Democratic Congressman from
Massachusetts.

As you look back, it is hard for you to believe how you, a once
self-avowed conservative right wing supporter of Barry Goldwater came to
become the leading advocate of the woman’s movement and the Democratic
congressman of the most liberal district in Massachusetts.

It all began in 1970, in Washington D.C., where as a Captain in
the U.S. Navy you were assigned to supervise the secret Women in Combat
project.

The Navy had forseen the women’s movement, and wanted to see

whether women could effectively fight in combat before the U.S. law
prohibiting such activity by women was challenged in congress.

The Navy

was specifically interested in whether women could become combat pilots.

From among 1000 candidates you selected Carmen Chuidian to be
the Navy’s first female combat pilot.

It was a good choice, as Chuidian

successfully flew over 90 combat missions in 1972.

In May of that year, on

her 53rd mission, she shot down a Mig 21 over Haiphong Harbor.

You had

monitored the activities of your female fighter pilot from the U.S. Embassy
in Saigon.

While there, you became good friends with Christina Codo, who

was with the State Department on assignment in Saigon.

For your work on the Women in Combat project, you were
promoted to admiral.

In 1977, just as you thought you would get command

of a carrier task force, the New York Times broke a story about Carmen s
exploits in Viet Nam.

The Navy, in an attempt to limit the damage of its
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having specifically violated U.S.law, forced you to resign. Maggie Baneser
the New York Times reporter who had written the original expose, followed
your case and through her stories made you the new martyr of the woman’s
movement. When you left the Navy and returned to your home in
Massachusetts, you were asked by the Democrats to run for congress.
Feeling betrayed by the Navy as well as the entire conservative camp, you
decided to accept the nomination, and won your district in the 1978 mid¬
term election by a landslide.

GOAL:
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER ’82 ELECTION.

INITIAL TACTICS:
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press
coverage. Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get
you media attention. REMEMBER, ITS 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE
MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION.
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES
THAT EXPORT JOBS OVERSEAS?

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON
YOUR DISTRICT: This information will be provided to you through the mail
over the break.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short

2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy
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3. LaFalce Letter
4. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy
5. Executive - Legislative Consultation
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TO:

Congressman Steven Swanson

FROM:
SUBJ:

Your Staff
F-16 & F-18 Production:

District Subcontractors

What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce
parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18.

MIDDLESEX GENERAL INDUSTRIES
Part:

District

revenue per aircraft:
Wing Panels (F-18)
$ 440,000
Landing Gear Doors (F-18)
80,000
Fuselage Panels (F-18)
240,000

TOTAL
$ 760.000

ADAMS RUSSELL CORP.

partrevenue per aircraft:
Radar Wave Guides (F-18)
$ 110,000

HYCOR INC.

District
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Part:

District

revenue per aircraft:
Electroluminescent Display (F-16 & F-18)
$57.000

COBB & DREW INC.

Part:

District

revenue per aircraft:
Rivets (F-16)
$

38.700

AVCO SYSTEMS INC.

Part:

District

revenue per aircraft:
Radome: (F-18)
$

350.000

JAMESBURY CORP.

District

Part:
revenue per aircraft:
Hydraulic Actuators (F-16)
$

33.500

NORTON CO.
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Part:

District

revenue per aircraft:
Bearings (F-16 & F-18)
$

78.000

TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE

F-16

F-18
PER AIRCRAFT:
$1,355,000

$207,200
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: The staff economist
has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and
contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is generated in Massachusetts.

This

means that total income accruing to the state for the purchase of a single
F-18 is:
2.02 * $1,355,000 = $2,737,000
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the
state’s income creates 1 additional job.

This means that the sale of a single

F-18 creates:
$2,737,000/$280,000 = 9.78 new jobs
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a
whole.

However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Alexander Kam, Liberal Democrat Congressman from Minnesota.
You are now serving your second term as a Congressman from
Minnesota, having first been elected to that position in 1978. Your career
in politics began while you were a student at the University of Minnesota.
In 1967 and 1968 you were an active campus organizer for Senator Eugene
McCarthy, who made an unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1968.

When you graduated, McCarthy asked you to join his

staff.

While working in the Congress, you made friends with three
people who eventually rose to prominence within Washington.
One was Annette Boyle.
Senator Barry Goldwater.

You met her when she was serving as an aide to
Though the two of you disagreed on just about

everything, a strong friendship developed.

Boyle is presently the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.
Shari Rosenfeld, who was an aide for Jacob Javitts.

Another friend is
She has since gone on

to become the head of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

A third

friend from your days as an aide is Yoshi Shigenari, who went on to be
elected to Congress from Fort Worth, Texas.
Perhaps your most influential acquaintance is Secretary of State
Christiane Carney, who was a professor of yours at Georgetown where you
did graduate work in 1970.
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GOALS:
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER ’82 ELECTION

GET OFFSET LEGISLATION PASSED.
When McDonnell Douglas negotiated its F-18 offset agreement
with Canada, businesses in your district lost work well over $1.4 million.
Consequently, it is important to your reelection that you push for legislation
that would bring some control by the federal government over the offset
packages offered purchasing nations by U.S. aircraft companies.

INITIAL TACTICS:
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press
coverage.

Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get

you media attention. REMEMBER, IT’S 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE

MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION.
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES
THAT SEND JOBS ABROAD?

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON YOUR
DISTRICT:

This information will be provided to you through the mail over
the break.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

LaFalce Letter:

This letter is a report by OMB on offset

written at your insistence.
2.

Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short
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3.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy

4.

Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy

5.

Executive - Legislative Consultation
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July 23, 1982
TO:

Congressman Alex Kam

FROM:
SUBJ:

1.

Your Staff
F-16 & F-18 Production:

District Subcontractors

What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce

parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18.

FIBERITE CORPORATION

Part:

District

revenue per aircraft
Speed Brake (F-18)
$

170,000

Dorsal Panels (F-18)
300,000
Horizontal Stabilizers (F-18
322,000
Rudder Panels (F-18)
260,000

TOTAL:

$ 1.052.000
SIFCO CUSTOM MACHINING CO.

Part:
revenue per aircraft

District
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Airconditioning Turbine (F-16
$

183,000

HONEYWELL INC. AEROSPACE & DEFENSE

Part-

District

revenue per aircraft
Radar Wave Guides (F-16)
110,000

$

Inertial Navigation System (F-16 or F-18)...
826,000

PARKER HANNIFLIN CORP.

District

Part:
revenue per aircraft:
Metal Hose (F-18)
$

17,000

TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE

F-16

F-18
PER AIRCRAFT SOLD:

$1,119,000

$1,895,000

2.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION:
The staff economist has determined that for every $1.00 the

district earns in subcontractor and contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is
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generated in Minnesota. This means that the total income accruing to the
state for the purchase of a single F-18 is :
2.02 * $1,895,000 = $3,827,900
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the
state’s income creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single
F-18 creates:
$3,827,900/ $280,000 = 13.67 new jobs
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a
whole. However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Yoshi Shigenari, Conservative Democratic Congressman from Fort

Worth

Texas.

From the time you were 10 years old, you had wanted to be a
Congressman.

In 1976, with the help of funding from General Dynamics’

political action committee,

THE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE AWARENESS,

you were elected to congress from Texas’ Fort Worth/Dallas area.

Over the

past six years, you have become very close friends with General Dynamics
CEO Stephen Daniel.

G.D.’s PAC has contributed a total of $135,000 to

your three campaigns.
from the 1980 election.

Unbeknownst to Daniel, you failed to report $5,000
Your accountant discovered this discrepancy just

recently, and you are presently trying to decide how to handle the oversight.

Your path to the Congress started at the University of Texas
where you were a scholar/athlete and president of your class. In your final
year, you were awarded a Rhodes Scholarship. While in England, you met
Dorothee Heisenberg, a doctoral student at the University of London.
Heisenberg has since become a minister in the British Government.

Upon finishing your studies abroad in 1968, you returned to the
United States to become a congressional aide.

While working in Congress,

you became friends with Shari Rosenfeld and Annette Boyle who also were
aides.

Rosenfeld has since become the Director of the Arms Control

Disarmament Agency. Boyle is now the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Policy.
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After serving as an aide for eight years, you successfully ran for
Congress in 1976. You were reelected in ’78 and ’80 by large majorities,
and expect to easily win your district in the upcoming November elections.

GOALS:

GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER 1982 ELECTION

STOP CONGRESS FROM PASSING ANY LEGISLATION REQUIRING
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF OFFSET PACKAGES.
Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat from Minnesota, has
proposed legislation which would require General Dynamics and McDonnell
Douglas to submit their offset proposals in foreign fighter competitions to
the Congress for approval.

Such a requirement would make it impossible

for either company to compete. SHOULD YOU FAIL TO STOP THIS
LEGISLATION, MANY OF YOUR CONSTITUENTS STAND TO LOSE THEIR
JOBS.

INITIAL TACTICS:
Presently before the House is legislation that would require U.S.
aircraft manufacturers to submit any foreign sales offset packages for
review by the congress. You recognize that such legislation would make it
extremely difficult for U.S. companies to compete with Dassault and
Panavia. Once the packages of U.S. companies were made public, they
could be easily matched by the foreign competition. THE LEGISLATION
WOULD ENCOURAGE FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO PURCHASE FIGHTER
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AIRCRAFT FROM NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S. Be ready with
arguments to support defeat of this legislation.

RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

LaFalce Letter

2.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy

3.

Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981

4.

Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short
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July 23, 1982
TO: Congressman Yoshi Shigenari
FROM: Your Staff
SUBJ: F-18 & F-16 Production: District Revenue
What follows is a list of those companies within the district that help to
produce the F-16 or F-18. Of course, the major employer in any area,
General Dynamics Fort Worth Division, is the prime contractor for the
F-16.
GENERAL DYNAMICS, FORT WORTH DIVISION
District revenue per aircraft Final Assembly, F-16.
$11,127,001
VOUGHT AEROPRODUCTS
Part:

District

revenue per aircraft
Rivets(F-18)
$

43,000

Wing Panels (F-16)
374,000
Landing Gear Doors (F-16)
68,000
Fuselage Panels (F-16)
204,000
TOTAL
S

689.000
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AVIALL INC.
Part:

District

revenue per aircraft
Circuit Breaker Panels (F-16 & F-18.
$

43,000

HONEYWELL OPTOELECTRONICS
Part:

District revenue per

aircraft

LED Display

(F-16 & F-18)

$38,000

TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE

F-16

F-18
PER AIRCRAFT:

$11,854,001

$124,000
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION:

The staff economist

has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and
contractor revenue an additional
$1.02 is generated in Texas.

This means that the total income accruing to

the state for the purchase of a single F-16 is:
2.02 * $11,854,001 = $23,945,082

She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the state’s
income creates 1 additional job.

This means that the sale of a single F-16

creates:
$23,945,082/$280,000 = 85.51 new jobs
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Harriet Madoff, Republican Congresswoman from St. Louis

When you look back at your past, you find it amazing how much
your thinking has changed. When you were a student at Columbia in the
late 60’s, you and your good friend Maggie Bangser (now a famous reporter
with the New York Times) would talk of bringing the ’’system” to its knees
by working on the inside. Today, you are a Republican congresswoman
from a district that derives most of its income from federal defense
spending.

Your conservative philosophy began to take shape when, directly
out of Columbia, you accepted a position with the CIA. Your intent was to
change the system from within. What you learned while working there
changed you. Your desk received information from the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow. This gave you first hand information on the massive Soviet arms
buildup that began in 1965 and continues to this day.
Your contact in Moscow was Matthew Czepliewicz, who was the
CIA’s top person in Moscow. The two of you became ’’pen pals”, a
friendship that continues to this day on the floor of the House. Czepliewicz
was elected to Congress from Arizona the same year you were.
In 1978 you left the CIA to accept a position with the Heritage
Foundation. You took this job because you felt the need to convince the
nation of the Soviet threat it faced. While on the foundation staff, you
became good friends with David Kositsky, who you worked with on the
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Defense Studies Committee.

Kositsky has since become the Reagan

Administration’s Under Secretary for Security Assistance.

In 1979, after a year at Heritage, you decided that the best way to
pursue your goal of a stronger national defense was to run for Congress.
You returned to your home in St. Louis, where, after winning the
Republican nomination in a hotly contested primary contest, you beat the
Democratic incumbent in the general selection.

Your strong views on

defense during the campaign won you the support of Robert McDonald, the
Chairman and CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. McDonnell Douglas’
PAC, VOICES* FOR A STRONGER AMERICA, contributed $10,000 to your
1980 campaign.

You became close friends with McDonald in 1981 when

you fought hard to save the F-18 program in Congress.

GOALS:

GET REELECTED.

1982 is an election year. YOU MUST ATTRACT

PRESS ATTENTION TO YOUR CAMPAIGN.

SUPPORT THE INTERESTS OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.

This is the biggest employer in the area. Total district revenues
from the production of a single F-18 (value added because of final
assembly) is $12,106,000.

Your staff economist has determined that every

$1.00 of this 12 million, an additional $1.02 in income is created in
Missouri.

This means that production of one F-18 creates income of

$24,454,120. Your economist has further determined that each $280,000
increase in the state’s income creates 1 additional job.

This means that the
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sale of a single F-18 creates $24,454,120/5280,000 = 87.34 new jobs in the
state. The majority of these new jobs would be created in your district.
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INITIAL TACTICS:
Presently before the House is legislation that would require U.S.
aircraft manufacturers to submit any foreign sales offset packages for
review by the congress. You recognize that such legislation would make it
extremely difficult for U.S. companies to compete with Dassault and
Panavia.

Once the packages of U.S. companies were made public, they

could be easily matched by the foreign competition.

THE LEGISLATION WOULD ENCOURAGE FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO
PURCHASE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S.
Be ready with arguments to support defeat of this legislation.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1.

LaFalce Letter

2.

White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy

3.

Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981

4.

Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:
Ralph Gill, Democratic Congressman from Rhode Island.
You are relatively new to Washington, having just been elected to
Congress in 1980. Your victory surprised most political pundits, because
1980 was supposed to be the year for conservative candidates. However,
your popularity as a state representative helped the voters to overlook your
party affiliation. You campaigned as the Candidate of Common Sense.
In the past you have been an extremely successful manipulator of
the press. In an effort to continue this practice, you became good friends
with Maggie Bangser, New York Times and Karen Baler, Washington Post.
You have become an important ’’undisclosed source” for both of them.
The other day you happened to run across an old Brown
classmate of yours, Hoshiar Gosal. Gosal, who is now a sales
representative for Panavia, was an exchange student from the U.K. when
you were a senior at Brown.
GOAL:
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER 1982 ELECTION.
INITIAL TACTICS:
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press
coverage. Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get
you media attention. REMEMBER, IT’S 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE
MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION.
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES
THAT SEND JOBS OVERSEAS?
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON YOUR
DISTRICT: This information will be provided to you through the mail over
the break.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
1. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy
3. LaFalce Latter
4. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy
5. Executive - Legislative Consultation

U. S. GOVERNMENT CORRESPONDENCE

Note: The printing format represents the format used by the respective United
States Government Agencies
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GTOP SECRET/CLASS 1 NOFORN

FROM:
TO:

CIA, LANGLEY VA.

AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO

INFO:

SECDEF MARINO TO SEC STATE CARNEY

SUBJ:

GREEK GOVERNMENT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PENETRATION

THEREOF

1.

ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION GATHERED FROM OUR AGENTS IN

ATHENS INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FOREIGN, POSSIBLY
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS PENETRATED HIGHER
LEVELS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.
2.

AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER

THIS IS KGB CONNECTED ACTIVITY.
3.

NEED NOT TELL YOU THAT THIS IS INFORMATION OF THE

HIGHEST SENSITIVITY, AND SHOULD BE GUARDED CLOSELY.
RECOMMEND THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT NOT BE INFORMED OF
THIS INFORMATION AS THIS MAY ENDANGER OUR SOURCES.
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CIA
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFOR BT
10 OCT 83 1143Z
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN
FROM:

CLA, LANGLEY VA.

TO: AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO
INFO: SEC. STATE CARNEY SECDEF MARINO
SUBJ: ANARCHIST UNIT WITHIN GREEK ARMED FORCES
1. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION GATHERED BY OUR
AGENTS IN ATHENS INDICATES THAT THE ANARCHIST GROUP
WITHIN THE GREEK MILITARY IS RECEIVING FUNDING FROM
MOSCOW VIA BULGARIA.
2. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT THE LEADERSHIP FOR THIS
GROUP IS MADE UP OF HIGHER RANKING OFFICERS WITHIN THE
GREEK ARMED FORCES.
3. AS OF YET THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION WHETHER THIS
PROBLEM HAD PENETRATED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GREEK
MILITARY.
4. IF DECISION IS MADE TO REVEAL THIS INFORMATION TO GREEK
GOVERNMENT PLEASE GIVE THIS AGENCY AMPLE NOTICE SO OUR
SOURCES CAN BE FORWARDED, AND IF NECESSARY, PULLED
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BACK. INDISCREET BEHAVIOR COULD COST US DEARLY IN THIS
MATTER.
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CIA
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN
29 SEP 84

0318Z

FLASH/TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN
FROM: CIA, LANGLEY VA.
TO: AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO
INFO:

SECSTATE CARNEY
SECDEF MARINO
ASDISP BOYLE
USSA KOSITSKY

SUBJ: PENETRATION OF AIR FORCE SELECTION BOARD BY SOVIET
INTELLIGENCE.
1. SERGEI BOKHAN, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SOVIET
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WHO DEFECTED THIS PAST MAY, HAS
REVEALED THAT GENERAL JOHN SCHECTEROPOUS, HAF, IS AN
AGENT FOR THE KGB.
2. BOKHAN HAS FURTHER REVEALED THAT THE CONSULTING
FIRM OPERATED BY MR. JEFFREY SCHWARTZ IS A KGB OPERATION.
THE BUSINESS WAS STARTED FROM SEED MONEY FUNNELED
THROUGH BULGARIA IN 1975.
3. ACCORDING TO BOKHAN, SCHECTEROPOUS HAS BEEN WORKING
WITH KGB SINCE THE GREEK REVOLUTION OF 1947.
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SCHECTEROPOUS LOST A FIRST WIFE IN THE FIGHTING, AND
BLAMES HER DEATH ON MONARCHIST ELEMENTS WITHIN THE
GREEK ARMY.
4.

SCHECTEROPOUS IS CONNECTED WITH OTHER HIGH RANKING

MEMBERS OF THE GREEK MILITARY WHO ARE DIRECTING
ANARCHIST UNITS WITHIN THE GREEK ARMY. BOKHAN HAS
REFUSED TO REVEAL WHO THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE UNTIL THE
U.S. PRESSURES THE SOVIET UNION TO RELEASE HIS WIFE AND
7-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER. BOTH WERE TURNED OVER TO THE
SOVIETS BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.
5. BECAUSE SCHECTEROPOUS MIGHT LEAD US TO OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE ANARCHIST LEADERSHIP, RECOMMEND NO
MENTION BE MADE OF THIS DISCOVERY TO THE GREEK GOVERN¬
MENT.
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CIA
FLASH/TOP SECRET/NOFORN
BT//

MEMORANDUM

T0P SECRET EYES ONLY

TO: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: GEN. DELL, SECAF
RE: SOVIET INFILTRATION OF GREEK MILITARY
1. In light of the proposed sale of American fighter aircraft to the Greek
gov’t., SECAF is gravely concerned by the CIA discovery of Soviet agents in
the highest echelons of the HAF. Ultimately, Soviet infiltration brings into
question the security of NATO operations throughout East Med.
2.

SECAF continues to believe sale of weapons to Greek government is of

strategic importance both for American and Nato security in East Med.
HAF currently operating obsolete and poorly maintained equipment in an
area of vital importance to the safety of southern Balkans, eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East. Strength of Greece should be maintained
as a deterrent to Soviet military action as well as Turkish ambitions in
Aegean.

Sale of arms demonstrates to Greece a continuing American

friendship, reinforces the bonds of the NATO alliance and exhibits both to
other NATO allies and to the Soviets strong American commitment to
western defense.
3.

Secondary considerations in the economic sphere should also be

weighed. Aircraft sales entail considerable economic benefit for further
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American growth and defense preparedness. As it appears HAF has selected
the F-16, such a sale would reduce unit costs for the USAF as well, a
matter of congressional concern.

4. Within the context of overall NATO planning and operations, sale of the
F-16 furthers SECAF’s policy of RSI of alliance equipment.
5.

Should we fail to sell American aircraft it seems likely the HAF will

purchase the MURAJ 2000 from the French. Three drawbacks are
apparent: U.S. loses any economic benefit to be gained; U.S. NATO
solidarity appears weakened, especially in light of traditional Gaullist
attitudes of French - U.S. government has been working to stem similar tide
in Greek gov’t.;

potential for technology loss is not removed - French jets

incorporate much American technology and design. Moreover as F-16 is
clearly superior U.S. leaves Greece in more vulnerable position vis a vis
Soviets due to inferior equipment.

6. This does not however deny SECAF’s genuine concern regarding the loss
of high level American military technology due to Soviet presence in HAF.
Both American and NATO security are at stake. SECAF however does not
believe HAF has fallen under control of leftist factions within Greece.
Security breach not only could be contained but used to our advantage
through disinformation possibilities.

POLICY OPTIONS
1. Let Congress stop sale entirely.
2.

Inform Greek P.M. and Chief General Cheneterous of Soviet
presence.
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3.

Sell less than state of the art technology

4. Make sale conditional upon U.S. participation in security
arrangements for any co-production and rework facilities.
a) As noted in sec.5 non sale has serious ramifications fo security
b)

Security interests of U.S. are paramount - if need be, we should inform

Greeks to preserve national and NATO security. Defectors wife and family
should not represent an American concern.
c) General Dynamics has already been told to release only data on F-16
A/C versions and are willing to co-operate on further technology
precautions.
d) Potential already exists for theft or capture of F-16

from Israel,

Egypt or Turkey. Sale to Greeks does not increase this problem. SECAF is
more concerned with problems of secret strategic planning in Aegean,
Balkan and East Europe regions.
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April 8, 1986
ARMS TRANSFER GROUP
Annette Boyle, Under Sec’y Defense
David Kositsky, Under Sec’y State
Shari Rosenfeld, ACDA
Policy Statement

We fully support the arms transfer policy of July 9, 1981.
In today’s world, the U.S. must not only strengthen its own
military capabilities, but must be prepared to help its friends and allies to
strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other terms
of security.
These principles applied judiciously to arms transfers can:
-help deter aggression by enhancing the status of preparedness.
-increase our forces’ effectiveness in concert with our friends to project
power in response to threats by mutual adversaries.
-demonstrate that the U.S. has an enduring interest in the security of
its friends and partners.
-foster regional and internal stability.
To attain these objectives, the U.S. will continue to require
effective control over all arms transfers. In making such decisions, the U.S.
will give consideration to a broad range of factors, including:
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the degree to which the transfer responds appropriately to military threats
confronting the recipient.
-whether the transfer will promote mutual interests in countering
externally supported aggression.
-whether the transfer is consistent with U.S. interests in maintaining
stability within regions where friends of the U.S. may have differing
objectives.
In the situation with Greece, internal and regional stability will be
paramount in evaluating arms transactions.
The Arms Transfer Group reserves the right to evaluate and
approve all arms transfer agreements.

NEWS RELEASES

280

WASHINGTON POST
March 27,1986
Karen Baler
Staff Reporter

NAVY AND AIR FORCE DEFEND THEIR RECENT ” COMMERCIAL
PROMOTION” OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO TURKEY

Secretary of the Navy Naomi Segal stated that Turkey should be
supplied with the strongest possible aircraft, believed to be the F-18, due to
Turkey’s Soviet border. She supports the F-16 for sale to Greece, citing
uneasiness about arming Greece with something as strong as the F-18
because of leftist tendencies there. Annette Boyle, Ass’t. Sec. Def. Int’l.
Security Policy, responded that it is unfair to downgrade the F-16 which is
certainly a worthy aircraft. She expressed uncertainty over the validity of
the Secretary of the Navy’s arguments for the Turkish sale of F-18s.

Secretary of the Air Force Dell also disagreed with Segal that
Turkey’s Soviet border gives it higher priority, stating that ’’all NATO
partners should receive fair treatment”.

It was confirmed that the Turkish sale involves as much as 3
times as many aircraft as the Greek deal pending. It is widely known that
the Navy and Air Force favor the F-18 and F-16 respectively. Other
government officials admit that there is some consideration to keeping both
defense contractors (McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics) in business
by supporting them for different contracts thereby keeping the defense
business as a whole strong.
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Matthew Czepliewicz, Republican Congressman from Arizona,
issued a statement of support for the Administration’s assurance to the
Turkish government of undisrupted arms supplies though he considers the
Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to ’’have exercised questionable
judgment in their promotion of the F-18 and F-16”.
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WASHINGTON POST
March 27, 1986
Karen Baler
Staff Reporter
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS HEAVILY SUPPORT CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGNS
Yoshi Shigenari, Conservative Democratic Congressman from Fort
Worth, Texas, denied allegations of a $5000 unreported contribution to his
1980 campaign from General Dynamics, supposedly uncovered by his
accountant recently.

Shigenari confirmed his friendship with General

Dynamic’s CEO Daniels and his good relationship with the firm, including
receipt of $135,000 in campaign contributions from their political action
committee (PAC) to his three campaigns. He denied any impropriety,
stating that a thorough search of his records for money inadvertantly
overlooked has turned up nothing and he is confident that all contributions
have been properly disclosed.
In a related story, McDonnell Douglas CEO Robert McDonald
confirmed that his PAC contributed to the campaign of Congresswoman
Madoff (R, St. Louis), stating that all money has been properly disclosed
and that MD has a ceiling of $10,000 contribution per candidate. Madoff
publicly supports increased export of military aid to Western Allies, citing
the additional benefit of domestic employment. Much of that employment
would be in her district should MD win the contract.
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WASHINGTON POST
March 27, 1986
Karen Baler
Staff Reporter
GREEKS HIRE CONSULTANTS TO HELP AWARD DEFENSE
CONTRACT
Chief General of the Hellenic Air Force Thomas Cheneterous
confirmed yesterday that the Greek military has hired two independent
consultants to tabulate data and aid in the decision making process of
Greek’s purchase of military aircraft from one of a number of defense
contractors bidding, including General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas.
Cheneterous cited time concerns and other military duties of his own staff
as a principal reason for the move, and has no concern about the
impartiality of the consultants hired, named as Mr. William Zack and Mr.
Jeffrey Schwartz.
McDonnell Douglas CEO Robert McDonald was not surprised by
this development, stating that it is Standard Operating Procedure for
governments to solicit technical and statistical support in weighing the
proposals. He has heard of Mr. Zack but is not familiar with his
credentials, and did not know anything about Mr. Schwartz. Neither of the
consultants could be reached for comment as of yet.
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NEWS FLASH!!!!
GENERAL IN HELLENIC AIR FORCE SEEN RECEIVING BRIBE

Maggie Bangser, New York Times Robert Deweydopolis, General
in the Hellenic Air Force was seen receiving a bribe recently in the form of
a bottle of champagne.

When witnessed, Deweydopolis clutched the bottle

close to his chest and stated (with a smile): ”1 can’t believe I’m being
bribed!”

One source high in the Greek government, who prefers to remain

anonymous, has speculated that the bribe reaches far beyond on bottle.
Deweydopolis refused to disclose the source of the bubbly, but the unnamed
Greek official indicated that the best champagne is undoubtedly found in the
hills of France.
Office of the Secretary
United States Air Force
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WASHINGTON POST PRESS RELEASE
Karen Baler, Staff Reporter

General Dell issues the following statement:

In order to avoid any misrepresentation and confusion concerning
my remarks before the Congressional committee chaired by Rep. Swanson I
would like to clarify my response to questions posed on the security of arms
sales.

Rep. Gill and Rep. Madoff asked for my assessments on the security

of aircraft sales with regard to the potential for technology theft or
acquisition by eastern block nations or supporters. Their question indicated
to me a particular concern for the stability and security of the Greek
government and its desire to purchase a new combat fighter.

My answer was phrased in what were purely geostrategic terms:
arms sales of this type place American made weapons in close geographic
proximity to potentially hostile and agressive eastern block adversaries. My
comments concerning Egypt merely reflect a general strategic concern with
overall stability of the Middle East region and the threat of Soviet incursion;
it was not an assessment of the domestic stability of the Egyptian
government.
Arms sales to any nation are based on the need ”to strengthen
and revitalize mutual security relationships” and ”to help deter agression”
of geographically proximate adversaries. Under no circumstances could the
Secretary of the Air Force support the transfer of American weapons and
technology when potentially detrimental effects of such a transfer counter
balanced any positive contributions to United States interests and objectives.
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Furthermore, all proposed arms sales are subject to review by the State and
Defense Departments.

Assessments as to the political stability of any nation are properly
the place of the State Department and beyond my authority. It will continue
to be Air Force policy to offer technical assistance and support to friends
and allies who purchase American equipment in order to safeguard
American technology and our national security.

BUREAUCRATIC KNOT THREATENS U.S. SALE OF ARMS TO GREECE
Maggie Bangser, New York Times

U.S. Secretary of Defense Carmen Marino and Chief General of
the Hellenic Air Force Thomas Cheneterous finally have something about
which they can agree.

Neither government official can understand why U.S.

aircraft manufacturers McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics have not
submitted technical data or proposals for their respective aircrafts, the F-18
and F-16.
Marino, citing U.S. law which requires manufacturers to submit
data and proposals to the State and Defense Departments, indicated today
that neither he nor Secretary Carney have received any information.
Cheneterous, in a separate interview expressed ’’shock” and said he is
’’deeply surprised” that no American proposals have reached his desk.
Proposals from Panavia and Dassault have been submitted, however.
The source of the problem seems to be a letter written by U.S.
Secretary of the Air Force David Dell to Cheneterous which states clearly
that no arms sale proposal could be submitted to Greece until the U.S. is
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notified ’’whether your government wishes to pursue a Foreign Military Sale
(in which the government acts as middleperson between manufacturer and
foreign government) or a Commercial Sales Agreement (sale handled by
manufacturer and foreign government, without involvement of American
government)”.

A baffled Cheneterous responded by saying that, in fact, no such decision
could be made until all the technical data is received from manufacturers.
The confusion begs the proverbial question: ’’does the right hand know what
the left hand is doing?”

While the U.S. government remains oblivious to its

own bureaucratic faux pas, we continue to lose ground quickly to European
aircraft manufacturers.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES
GENERAL DYNAMICS UNDER SEIG
Maggie Bangser, New York Times

The likes of this could only happen in a crazy place like New
York City, in some crazy time in the future...

A major European aircraft manufacturer has disclosed that the
General Dynamics Corporation is being investigated for overcharging the
United States government in sales contracts for its F-16 fighterplane, and
that a major shakeup in the top ranks of G.D. is underway.

The European

corporation has stated that the information was uncovered by its in-house
intelligence staff.

Neither Stephen Daniel, CEO of General Dynamics, nor Frank
O’Keefe, Sales Representative could be reached for comment.

DID YOU KNOW THAT...

THE FORT WORTH DIVISION , MAKER OF THE F-16 FIGHTING
FALCON, PAID $596 MILLION IN WAGES LAST YEAR?

THAT EACH PAYROLL DOLLAR GENERATES $3 IN OTHER JOBS,
BUSINESSES AND BENEFITS TO THE FORT WORTH REGIONAL
ECONOMY FOR A TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF @2.4 BILLION
ANNUALLY?

THAT THE DIVISION ADDITIONALLY PAID MORE THAN $803
MILLION FOR MATERIALS AND SERVICES IN 48 STATES AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA?
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THAT PAYMENTS OF $213 MILLION WENT TO MORE THAN 2 250
BUSINESSES IN THE STATE OF TEXAS WHICH, WHEN COMBINED
WITH THE $596 MILLION PAYROLL, DIRECTLY INTRODUCES $809
MILLION INTO THE TEXAS ECONOMY?

THAT THE FORT WORTH DIVISION GENERATES AN ESTIMATED
42,000 JOBS FOR TEXAS ALONE?

THAT EACH 1,000 JOBS AT THE DIVISION—AND THERE ARE
19,000 EMPLOYEES— IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EQUIVALENT OF 15
RETAIL STORES, 2,800 AUTO REGISTRATIONS, $15.5 MILLION IN
BANKING DEPOSITS, $22.3 MILLION IN RETAIL SALES AND $7.8
MILLION IN PERSONAL INCOME IN TEXAS ALONE?

THAT OF THE $213 MILLION IN PAYMENTS BY THE DIVISION TO
TEXAS SUPPLIERS,

1,654 SMALL BUSINESSES RECEIVED $75.5

MILLION, 52 MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES RECEIVED $2.8
MILLION AND 99 WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES RECEIVED $8
MILLION?

THAT THE FORT WORTH DIVISION AND VARIOUS EMPLOYEE
ACTIVITY GROUPS CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN $2.2 MILLION AND
THOUSANDS OF VOLUNTEER HOURS TO CHARITIES, COMMUNITY
EFFORTS AND NEEDY INDIVIDUALS THROUGHOUT TARRANT
COUNTY AND SURROUNDING AREAS LAST YEAR?

MORE THAN 800 f-16 FIGHTING FALCONS ARE IN SERVICE
WORLDWIDE?
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11 COUNTRIES USE THE F-16 FIGHTING FALCON AS THEIR
FRONT LINE FIGHTER?

THAT THESE AIR FORCES HAVE PLANS TO PURCHASE NEARLY
3000 MORE F-16 FIGHTING FALCONS IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?
THAT 271 F-16 FIGHTING FALCONS WERE DELIVERED ON TIME
AND ON BUDGET TO SEVEN DIFFERENT AIR FORCES THIS YEAR
ALONE?
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WASHINGTON POST
GREEKS DENY BRIBERY CHARGES
April 2, 1986
Karen Baler, Staff Reporter

Allegations of bribery in connection with champagne received by
Greek General Robert Deweydopolis were vehemently denied by him today.
”1 don’t take bribes” said Deweydopolis.

He would not comment on the

true nature of the transaction or the source of the gift.
GREEK GENERALS PREFER MURAJ 2000

Hellenic Air Force Generals Cheneterous, Deweydopolis and
Schecteroupos were treated to demonstrations of the Muraj 2000, the F-16
and the F-18 yesterday by the representative from Dassault, the french
maker of the Muraj, with the aid of Howard Dyck’s Death & Destruction
Associates, a computer consulting firm.

”We are pleased with the Muraj

2000”, Deweydopolis stated, qualifying his preference by noting that the
demonstration was given by the French.

He is not involved in the

negotiation of sales terms, offsets, etc. and clarified that his statement
refers to the aircraft itself and not to any financial arrangements.

APPENDIX D
WRITTEN CONSENT FORM
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WRITTEN CONSENT FORM
DEVELOPING A CASE STUDY SIMULATION FOR GRADUATE
LEVEL BUSINESS EDUCATION
1. I, Guido Slangen, am a faculty member at the School of Management at
Hartford Graduate Center. I have been working for the last three years
doing research on teaching methodologies for adult graduate business
students.

2. You are asked to participate in this study. I will distribute student
evaluation forms at the end of the International Business Negotiations course
to evaluate the materials used in the course.
3. In all written materials which I may use, I will not use your name, the
name of your company, or any names you might mention. This information
will be used in my dissertation at the University of Massachusetts. It may
also be used in subsequent journal articles and.or book.
4. While consenting at this time to participate in the evaluation of your
learning experience, you may at any time withdraw from this process.
5. Furthermore, while having consented to participate, you may withdraw
your consent to have specific excerpts from your survey used in any printed
materials if you notify me within thirty days after the last class session.
6. In signing this form, you are also ensuring me that you will make no
financial claims on me for the use of your written comments.
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7. Finally, in signing this you are stating that no medical treatment will be
required by you from the University of Massachusetts, should any physical
injury result from participating in this research.

**---.have read the above statement and agree to
participate as a student in the evaluation of the course under the conditions
delineated above.

signature of Participant

Date

Signature of Faculty Member

Date
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